Archive for August, 2008
Attention 17/20s: 17 + 20 ≠ 02
August 15th, 2008
That’s right – when California License Type 17 (Beer and Wine Wholesaler) and License Type 20 (Beer and Wine Off-Sale Retailer) are issued in conjunction, the privileges associated with the combination license are not equivalent to those of the 02 Winegrower’s License. A Type 17 License “permits incidental sales to other supplier-type licensees” and a Type 20 License “authorizes the sale of beer and wine for consumption off the premises where sold.” The joint issuance of the two licenses is authorized by Section 23378.2 of the California Code and permits the issuance of a package off-sale beer and wine license to a licensed California wholesaler if only wine is sold from the retail premises. It is significant to note that when shipping out-of-state, a 17/20 licensee is considered a retailer resulting access to fifteen states.
A month ago at the ShipCompliant Users Conference, Matthew Botting of the California ABC revealed that many 17/20 permit holders were not fulfilling all requirements of the combination license and were instead operating more like 02 licensees because many were unaware that 17/20 permit holders must act as a bona fide wholesaler in order to comply with the provisions of the license. Please note that in order to operate as bona fide wholesaler, a 17/20 permit holder must sell to retailers, in general, at least every 45 days. Section 23779 provides, in pertinent part:
No wholesale license shall be issued to any person who does not in good faith actually carry on or intend to carry on a bona fide wholesale business by sale to retail licensees of the alcoholic beverage designated in the wholesale license, and the department may revoke any wholesale license when the licensee fails for a period of 45 days actively and in good faith to engage in the wholesale business…Sale by a wholesale licensee to himself as a retail licensee is not the transaction of a bona fide wholesale business.
For more information on 17/20 licenses or other California wine-related licenses, check out Matthew Botting’s presentation and slides from the 2008 ShipCompliant Users Conference.
A Little Knowledge Is Not Enough: Evidentiary Burdens In On-Site Cases
August 10th, 2008
The August 7th decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Baude v. Heath has been characterized as a loss in the fight against on-site purchase requirements. Indeed, the opinion leaves Indiana’s initial personal visit requirement in place. That is not, however, the whole story.
It’s important to keep in mind in reading the opinion that the Court of Appeals is affirming the lower court’s granting of summary judgment against the state on one point and reversing it on another. That is, the district court had decided no trial was necessary because uncontested facts established the unconstitutionality of both the wholesale licensee ban and the initial on-site visit requirement. The appellate court agreed with the former conclusion and disagreed with the latter.
Statutes that openly discriminate against out-of-state wineries are almost always unconstitutional and provide fit subjects for summary judgment. Statutes without openly discriminatory provisions, but whose effect in practice is to impose a greater burden on out-of-state wineries than on local wineries, may be unconstitutional, depending (in the locution of the leading case) on whether the burden is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
That determination of excess is at the heart of the 7th Circuit opinion. The appellate court had little trouble in concluding that the kinky ban on shipment by wineries that had direct distribution rights anywhere provided virtually no benefits, except to wholesalers, and was substantially burdensome. Because uncontested facts in the district court demonstrated exclusion of a substantial number of out-of-state sellers, the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing discriminatory harm to interstate commerce, shifting the obligation to produce evidence to the defendants. The state and wholesalers had offered only one intelligible counterargument –the claim that requiring commerce to go through a local middle tier makes it easier to monitor sales and collect state excises. We can keep Baude v. Heath in the column of cases that do not consider that claim a substantial justification for demonstrated burdens on commerce.
In the other (and more important) half of the 7th Circuit opinion, the same burden-benefit analysis reached a different conclusion with respect to the supposed economic consequences of Indiana’s requirement that the consumer travel to the winery site before receiving the first direct shipment order. Faced with a contention that such a burden is inherently excessive, the chief judge offered some unvarnished advice to plaintiffs’ counsel: “It is impossible to tell whether a burden on interstate commerce is [excessive] without understanding the magnitude of both burdens and benefits. . . . . Exact figures are not essential (no more than estimates may be possible)[,] and the evidence need not be in the record if it is subject to judicial notice, but it takes more than lawyers’ talk to condemn a statute . . . .” In other words, you can’t litigate a burdening case as if it were a case of overt facial discrimination. See Notes on Wine Distribution, pages 8-10, for my discussion of that point and of Cherry Hill Vineyard (which was cited in Baude) and similar cases.
Regarding judicial notice (which occurs when a court accepts something, such as a tide table, as true from published sources, without live testimony), courts seldom take notice of controversial facts. That point came up when the chief judge, sounding a bit offended by plaintiffs’ argument that there was no point in having a face-to-face screening system because determined underage purchasers would defeat or circumvent it, declined to take judicial notice of propositions they advanced in support. Plaintiffs cited some studies and attempted to use an on-line ID check provider’s advertising to show on-site screening is unnecessary. The appellate court wasn’t having it and noted that “it would be awfully hard to take judicial notice that in-person verification with photo ID has no effect on wine fraud and therefore flunks the interstate commerce clause.”
Thus, although delivery requirements involve face-to-face proof of age, Baude stands for the proposition that plaintiffs would have to prove that carrier screening undercuts the enforcement benefit of the initial winery site requirement. The appellate opinion refers to Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, a case involving a specific tobacco-regulating statute, as forbidding states to require carriers to check age of persons receiving intoxicating liquor. That is, I believe, an egregiously wrong reading of the case (see blogging on both sides of the issue here), but the opinion does not rely on it. Rather, it describes the face-to-face transaction between carrier employee and recipient of the shipment as facially inferior to age screening at a winery, to a degree that allows the state to treat the former as inadequate. As with economic effects, plaintiff evidence was, in the court’s view, simply absent on the efficacy of at-delivery age screening: “Given the state of this record, and the state of the empirical literature, we know very little.” The take-away is that before you can knock down a duly enacted state statute, you need to know –and show– rather a lot about its discriminatory effects.
The primary importance of Baude is to add weight to an already substantial body of judicial opinion that suits based on a facially neutral law’s burdensome effects on interstate commerce relative to local commerce have to be tried quite differently from suits like Granholm, which was based on overt and explicit discrimination against interstate commerce. The case does not say that the face-to-face law would prove constitutional in a properly presented case, only that it was wrong to conclude that its unconstitutionality was so clear as to require no presentation of quantitative evidence on its burdens.
Reversing a grant of summary judgment does not require that the lower court enter summary judgment for the other side. Rather, it provides guidance to the district court as to evidentiary requirements if the case goes on to trial, and leaves the statute in place if there are no further proceedings below. The plaintiffs’ burden of proof in Baude is substantial but not unsupportable. It ain’t necessarily over.
7th Circuit Reverses Indiana Face to Face Ban
August 8th, 2008
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals made an important decision yesterday regarding face-to-face transactions when shipping wine directly to Indiana consumers. After Indiana initially passed its direct shipping laws to comply with Granholm, the face-to-face requirement was successfully challenged in August of 2007. However, yesterday’s decision will eventually reverse the face-to-face clause.
None of the plaintiffs contends that Indiana’s law has led him to buy more wine from Indiana and less from other states. The law simply shifts sales from smaller wineries (in all states, including Indiana) to larger wineries (all of which are located outside Indiana). The Indiana Winegrowers Guild has filed a brief as amicus curiae opposing the face-to-face clause, which the Guild maintains has made it unduly difficult for its members to ship their wine direct to consumers. But if what the Guild says is
true, then the statute—although bad economically for Indiana’s wineries—must be sustained against a challenge under the commerce clause. Favoritism for large wineries over small wineries does not pose a constitutional problem, and the fact that all Indiana wineries are small does more to show that this law’s disparate impact cuts against in-state product than to show that Indiana has fenced out wine from other jurisdictions.The judgment of the district court with respect to the wholesale clause is affirmed, and with respect to the face-to-face clause is reversed. The case is remanded for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
We expect to receive clarification from the lower court or from the Indiana ABC on how current and future permit holders can comply with the existing statutes. We’ll update you here as we receive more information.
The Poster Prohibited State Slackens Slightly
August 8th, 2008
Last Friday, Wine and Spirits Daily reported that Utah’s grip on liquor has let up, at least a little bit. The recent rule change applies only to Utah brewers and distilleries but this could potentially be good news for everyone in the alcohol industry. The new ruling allows Utah residents to purchase onsite orders from Utah breweries and distilleries. Utah wineries have enjoyed this same freedom since 1991. This decision is part of Governor Huntsman’s effort to free the state of the private clubs. Though it hasn’t been mentioned as a step in the governor’s plans to “liberalize” Utah’s liquor laws, perhaps this loosening will open up the gateway for responsible direct shipping legislation in the future.
Woman of the Hour – Tracy Genesen
August 7th, 2008
Tracy Genesen of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP is one of the prominent forces currently driving legal change in the wine industry and was the keynote speaker at ShipCompliant’s 2008 Users Conference a few weeks ago.
Genesen’s speech analogized her role in the industry to a “court of last resort” when legislative means are unsuccessful in remedying protectionist state laws that have remained in effect despite the Granholm ruling in 2005. Granholm resolved many instances of differential treatment by the states and was extended to apply to self-distribution in the Costco ruling. However, Genesen revealed that the post-Granholm time of prosperity has given way to another host of problems. For example, states like Maine and Arkansas, in which direct shipping markets do not exist, have level playing fields; however, treating everyone the same by not allowing anyone to ship is a detriment to the wine industry. In addition, courts are struggling to deal with retail-to-consumer shipping laws in many states. Challenges to these laws have produced interesting results, like the “funky remedy” by a district court judge in a Texas lawsuit which declared that Granholm applied to retailers, but that retailers must first buy wine through Texas-licensed wholesalers. Wholesalers have also maintained their grip on states like Massachusetts by crafting legislation that is beneficial to them but also facially neutral. The 30,000 gallon capacity cap in Massachusetts exemplifies such economic protectionism and is the contention in the Family Winemakers of California case. Oral arguments in the case took place on July 29th in Boston and the decision is expected sometime this fall.
Many thanks to Tracy Genesen for sharing her insights into the current legal atmosphere of the industry. To view Genesen’s speech in its entirety or that of any of the other speakers at the conference, please see the 2008 Users Conference Simulcast. More information on the cases in Massachusetts and Texas is also available on the ShipCompliant Blog.
