Posts from the Legislation Category
Next Steps in Direct Shipping: Refining State Laws
February 15th, 2010
As readers of this blog know, direct-to-consumer shipping has been a watchword among wineries for more than a decade. The result of all of this attention is a national shipping market that allows consumers in 37 states representing 82% of the U.S. population to receive wine purchased off-site legally. Persistent lobbying efforts and the collapse of counterfactual objections have built momentum for state acceptance of winery direct-to-consumer shipping. It is now only a matter of time before the few last holdout states allow winery shipping. But the system is far from perfect.
Many winery shipping laws passed in the last ten years were the best that could be achieved at the time, the result of crucial last minute horse trading and political calculation. Since it was critical to ensure the channel existed, administrative cost and effectiveness often became secondary considerations. While this was practical and necessary, implementation has revealed a system that is often creaky and unwieldy.
While the wine business is lucky to have organizations like ShipCompliant that reduce the hassle of direct shipping, for many wineries the expense and complexity of state regulation make shipping a daunting prospect. The system needs to be simplified and refined to make direct shipping more efficient, cost effective, and reflective of market needs. Not that any of this is going to be easy.
Broadly speaking, we need to accomplish at least three things:
How many pages is this thing? Licensing needs to be less costly and more efficient for both wineries and regulators. Qualifying for a shipper’s license shouldn’t be so burdensome that it discourages small businesses from making use of a tool whose principal object is to help them.
I need to send a 25¢ check? Recordkeeping and reporting requirements need to be made more transparent and practical. Wineries shouldn’t be forced to write a check that costs more to process than its worth, and regulators shouldn’t be asked to sift and retype mountains of paper each month. States could easily follow the Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau model of filing electronic reports on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis depending on the prior year’s shipments.
But market support makes shipping work better. States should facilitate use of efficient and practical tools—such as marketing websites and pick-and-pack warehouses—that have developed around direct shipping. Recently, these tools have come under fire with investigations in both California and Virginia. But wineries aren’t trying to do anything unreasonable here. Virtually every industry is allowed to use market aggregators that make the consumer experience for finding niche products better. The wine industry’s goal isn’t to make wine deliveries less secure or accountable, it’s to unlock demand and facilitate fulfillment.
Most states now recognize that shipping can be safely regulated. With new and simpler regulatory models wineries can demonstrate that smarter laws mean better enforcement. States always look to each other for guidance, and nothing relieves administrative concern like a system that functions.
For this reason, state regulators could be real partners in this process. They are as familiar with the problems of winery shipping as wineries themselves and would likely welcome legal refinements that could shift scarce agency resources to ensuring their shipping laws are followed. By working with state ABCs to streamline and reduce the cost of administrative oversight, wineries can build momentum for modifying state shipping laws. We could also ensure that the models that are established work both for regulators and the regulated industry.
Most critically, wineries need to stay involved in the policymaking process and understand the arguments for supporting refinement. To get their voices heard, wineries must speak with the strength of their grassroots, a clear voice, and irrefutable logic. As any winery that has been through the last decade knows, this is the only way to ensure that winery policy works better.
by Cary M. Greene, Esq.
Notes on Wine Distribution v.32
February 4th, 2010
The latest version of “Notes on Wine Distribution”, by R. Corbin Houchins, is now available. Release 32 includes updates on legislation, litigation and general discussions on available distribution channels for wine. This release includes substantial changes, including new sections on age and identity, facial neutrality, and logistical support services, as well as updates to state summaries in Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Read about these and other updates that affect the way wine is sold and shipped within the United States.
If you are at all interested in the shipping and distribution of wine, this is an excellent resource that is well worth reading. You can view the most recent version of the document anytime by visiting the ShipCompliant Blog and clicking the link located under “Compliance Resources”, or by visiting CorbinCounsel.com and clicking on the home page link, “Notes on Wine Distribution.”
Representing Change: One Piece of Washington’s Overhaul
February 3rd, 2010
Last year, Washington State relaxed some of its restrictive alcoholic beverage laws as a result of a couple of comprehensive bills that passed the legislature (SB 5834 and HB 2040). The mandatory minimum markups between suppliers and wholesalers and between wholesalers and retailers are now history. Retailers can now pay suppliers using electronic funds transfers if they want to. Price posting (which required beer and wine suppliers and distributors to file their product prices with the state and hold those prices for 30 days) was officially abolished.
Another change in the law that has more significance than it might appear to on the surface is the expansion of the state law’s definition of “Authorized Representative.” First, some definitions are in order: a Certificate of Approval is the Washington license given to a U.S. winery or brewery located outside of Washington that enables it to ship its products to a Washington importer or distributor. An “Authorized Representative” is an entity located outside of Washington but in the U.S. that is appointed by a Certificate of Approval (COA) holder to market and sell the COA holder’s products into the state of Washington through the three-tier system.
Before last July, Washington made it very hard for out of state wineries and breweries to sell their products into Washington through marketing agents, unless they wanted to give over all of their brands to the marketing agent.
That’s because, through a quirk in Washington law whose origins aren’t very clear, there could be only one source (i.e. either one Certificate of Approval license holder, or one Authorized Representative) for an out of state winery or brewery’s products. For example, if you were a winery that produces Brand A and Brand B, and you have been selling your Brand A to a Washington importer, you couldn’t appoint an Authorized Representative to market and sell your Brand B in Washington.
That all changed on July 26, 2009. As part of the “omnibus bill” and other sweeping legislative changes that took place last year in Washington, the definition of Authorized Representative was amended to remove the exclusivity portion that had been so problematic. As a result of the change to RCW 66.04.010(2), a Certificate of Approval holder can now divide up its brands, selling some itself and using one or more Authorized Representatives to market and sell different ones, if it wants. The state does require the producer to have written agreements with each of its Authorized Representatives, and there can be only one Authorized Representative per brand, but even with these restrictions, this one seemingly minor change in the law gives producers a lot more control and flexibility over how they market their products in Washington.
-Sara Mann, Beverage Industry Attorney
High Fives in the First Circuit
January 26th, 2010
Justified jubilation greeted the 14 January 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the federal district court decision of 19 November 2008 in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, invalidating the Massachusetts “volume cap.” (see previous post “Huge win for wineries, but can I ship to Massachusetts now?” )
Oddly enough, the appellate ruling may be more important outside Massachusetts than within. There are two reasons, one quite straightforward, the other less so.
The simple reason is that the First Circuit decision merely leaves things within the state as they have been since 18 December 2008, when Judge Zobel enjoined application of the state’s maximum volume requirement to “small winery” shipping licenses, which are necessary for sales directly to consumers. Since that order, wineries of all sizes, with and without Massachusetts wholesalers[1], have been eligible for the license. Nevertheless, the state is not practically open to direct shipment, because the major interstate carriers find the delivery vehicle licensing requirement too burdensome and wineries have no reliable way to know whether an order would be the 27th case of direct shipment wine purchased in the year by that consumer, putting the shipper in violation of a 240-liter limit. (Those obstacles, which were not involved in Family Winemakers, are described in a previous post “Why can’t I have a Boston wine party?”)
A more subtle reason is that the First Circuit has articulated an analysis, arguably even more favorable to trade than the decision it affirmed, that may prove persuasive in other circuits with challenges to volume caps and to other so-called facially neutral features that operate to the detriment of interstate trade. That aspect of the decision is well worth a closer look –though it does require striding into a bit of a legal thicket.
Which Yardstick?
Stripped to essentials, Family Winemakers is about choosing the proper test for determining the constitutionality of a state law that burdens interstate commerce in wine.
Before getting into the technicalities of constitutional tests, a little context may be helpful: As the readers of these blogs know, state laws that disadvantage interstate trade raise issues under the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, which gives Congress power to legislate regarding commerce among the states. In subject areas, like wine distribution, where Congress has not enacted legislation that serves as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, states have some room for regulation, even if it affects interstate trade to a degree. However, the fact that interstate commerce is within Congress’s power to regulate means that in subject matter where it has not acted (where, in other words, its regulatory power is “dormant”) certain unwritten principles inherent in the Commerce Clause nevertheless limit state regulatory power. State laws that exceed those limits are said to offend the “dormant Commerce Clause.” As a leading case puts it, “The modern law of what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about economic protectionism –that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”
In Granholm, the Supreme Court famously invalidated Michigan and New York laws for violating the dormant Commerce Clause by reserving direct shipment privileges for home state wineries. Family Winemakers is one of the most promising among many lawsuits attempting to discern the core message of Granholm and apply it to different facts.
Why Granholm Doesn’t Provide All the Answers
Granholm dealt with laws whose “object and design” to discriminate against out-of-state wineries was “evident” from their text and which in fact did discriminate. The Court considered how the presence of those factors —intent to discriminate and effect of discriminating— affected the answers to two distinct questions.
The first question concerned the 21st Amendment and certain federal legislation, which, taken together, affirmed the right of states to regulate wine from outside the state as fully as wine produced in the state and declared it illegal to ship wine into a state in contravention of “any” its laws. Does that broad language, the Court asked, permit the states intentionally to discriminate against interstate commerce (as a literal reading might suggest)? After an extensive and somewhat controversial historical analysis of the federal statutes and the constitutional amendment, the Court answered “no,” concluding that the dormant Commerce Clause subjects alcoholic beverage regulation to the same tests of constitutionality as apply to laws governing other goods.
The second question was what test would apply. In Granholm’s analysis, the choice between the two relevant tests was obvious. As stated in a leading case:
[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected . . . . But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach . . . .
Having caught the two states before it red-handed at economic protectionism, the Court had no trouble applying the strict test, which invalidates a law unless the state clearly demonstrates with “concrete” evidence that it is necessary for an essential state purpose and there is no workable less-discriminatory means of achieving the purpose. Neither defendant state even came close to meeting that standard, with the result we all know.
So, great: No 21st Amendment immunity and a flunked dormant Commerce Clause test; commerce wins, grapes are freed. But what if the law in question were not overtly discriminatory? What if it treated all wineries alike and only incidentally burdened interstate commerce? Would it then receive the “more flexible approach?”
Pretty Faces
On its face, the law invalidated in Family Winemakers took no account of whether a winery were in-state or out-of-state. It was, in the phrase popular with its proponents, “facially neutral” as between local and interstate sellers.
Defenders of volume caps and on-site requirements argue that facial neutrality has two profound effects: For alcoholic beverages, it invokes 21st Amendment immunity from dormant Commerce Clause challenge, which was repudiated in Granholm for facially discriminatory laws; and, even if there were no immunity, it would require application of the “more flexible” test of constitutionality, under which a statute will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the claimed local benefits, rather than the strict necessity test Granholm applied to facially discriminatory laws. Neither argument survived the First Circuit’s treatment of Family Winemakers.
Not a Vaccine
The district court judge had dismissed the immunity argument summarily, citing a passage in Granholm that actually refers to an extraterritoriality case in which the Court did not expressly reject immunity, but rather spoke of the need to “reconcile the interests protected by the two constitutional provisions” (i.e., the 21st Amendment and the Commerce Clause), and two post-Granholm decisions in other circuits that did not deal explicitly with the immunity issue at all. While her no-immunity conclusion seems sound, the opinion left room to argue that the lower court did not fully deal with the facial neutrality immunity argument.
The appellate opinion takes a different tack. First, the Court of Appeals articulates a more specific repudiation of a 21st Amendment immunity defense for all facially neutral laws, formulating a useful test: Even though the statute is “neutral on its face,” if its effect is to “change the competitive balance” between in-state and out-of-state wineries in a way that benefits local wineries and “significantly burdens” their out-of-state competitors, the result is the same as for facially discriminatory statutes in Granholm –no 21st Amendment immunity.
In reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit somewhat surprisingly begins by distinguishing[2] Granholm. That is, after admitting that Granholm dealt only with facially discriminatory statutes, the court set forth on its own to decide whether the 21st Amendment provided Massachusetts with immunity from dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a discriminatory statute everyone agreed was facially neutral. It nonetheless took guidance from Granholm in viewing the question as resolvable by historical context and in reading the 21st Amendment as preserving only the pre-Prohibition regulatory power Congress allows states under the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act –i.e., the right to regulate out-of-state wine on the same basis as in-state wine, but not to discriminate against the former in favor of the latter.
By engaging in relatively extensive history-grounded analysis, the First Circuit has provided sound support for the proposition that Granholm’s no-immunity ruling applies to all discriminatory measures, whether overtly protectionist or facially neutral. Courts adjudicating laws that burden interstate commerce relative to local have in Family Winemakers well-expounded judicial authority for ignoring putative 21st Amendment immunity. On the other hand, extension of Granholm to different scenarios, no matter how persuasively reasoned, cannot forestall further argument over the “narrow Granholm” approach advanced by states and wholesalers, which would preserve pre-2005 law for every situation that does not exactly match Granholm’s facts.
Question and Answer
If immunity is out of the picture, the primary issue becomes how to test a statute under the dormant Commerce Clause –i.e., what questions should a court ask to determine whether a statute will be upheld or struck down? Family Winemakers follows prevailing Commerce Clause jurisprudence in recognizing the two possibilities noted above, a strict “per se” test requiring proven necessity or a more flexible balancing test.
The states and wholesalers argue that facial neutrality would, at least in the absence of proven intentional protectionism, automatically require the more flexible approach, known as the Pike test after the shortened name of the case that first formulated it[3]. However, the Pike test as developed in case law is not invoked by superficial characteristics.
As enunciated in Granholm and its progeny, the Pike test requires a two-stage inquiry. First, a court asks two questions: Does the challenged state law regulate “even-handedly” as between interstate commerce and local commerce? Is whatever burden it places on the former an “indirect” consequence of its pursuit of a legitimate local interest? Only if the answer is “yes” to both does one apply the balancing test, which asks whether the burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the legitimate state purpose. If the answer to that highly subjective third question is “no,” the state law stands. For none of those questions is the answer determined by facial appearance.
In the district court analysis, a law adopted for a protectionist purpose that has the intended effect of favoring in-state commerce relative to interstate cannot meet the even-handed regulation and indirect burden requirements for application of the Pike balancing test, and is thus subject to the strict necessity test employed in Granholm, irrespective of facial neutrality. Judge Zobel went on to buttress her ruling by declaring that that even if the law constituted even-handed regulation with only incidental burdens on interstate sellers, entitling it to application of the Pike test, it would still be invalid because it did not advance any local purpose (other than the illegitimate objective of protectionism). The court’s reasoning seems almost mathematical: As the Pike test preserves a statute only when its adverse impact on interstate commerce is not excessive in comparison to a legitimate local benefit, if its local benefit is zero, any burden is excessive, and Pike won’t save it.
Adding the “but even if” reference to Pike as insurance against reversal for applying the wrong test is de rigueur in the courts and good for the prevailing litigant in the case at hand. The district court approach does not, however, prevent argument that Family Winemakers is “really” a Pike balance decision because the statute’s “facial neutrality” should have averted application of the strict necessity test –i.e., the outcome is a simple failure of the state to make an adequate record of local benefit, correctible in future litigation.
Again, the Court of Appeals opinion has a slightly different slant. The appellate court regards application of the strict necessity test as unquestionable under Granholm when, as in that case, a statute is protectionist in both intent and effect. Probably the most significant aspect of the First Circuit opinion is the means by which it so classifies the Massachusetts law.
Put Away that Smoking Gun
If anything moderated pro-trade celebration of the district court decision in Family Winemakers, it was the concern that the record was so strong on protectionist purpose that the case might not serve as a highly useful precedent for other cases, whose records will mostly be at best ambiguous on legislative intent.
Judge Zobel placed great stress on what is by any standard a sensationally revealing legislative history. Senator Morrissey, who sponsored the legislation, is quoted at length in the district court opinion, but a short bite will serve here to illustrate the tenor: “[W]ith the limitations that we are suggesting in the legislation, we are really still giving an inherent advantage indirectly to the local wineries.” The court was also impressed by the fruit wine exemption, a product of lobbying whose sole purpose appeared to be shielding a large local winery from going over the cap by producing cider.
In the Court of Appeals, proof of protectionist purpose rests on a more broadly applicable base. The finding of discriminatory intent explicitly rests not on the “smoking gun” statements of legislators or lobbyists, which featured so prominently in the district court opinion, but on the appellate court’s reading of the statute itself. Close attention to the text revealed a volume cap at odds with prevailing industry classification of wineries as objectively large or small, or as able or unable to secure wholesaler distribution, as well as with the state’s own size demarcation for license fees. The court was particularly impressed by the facts that ultimately there was no winery size standard at all, given that non-grape wine volume would not be counted and that the fruit wine exemption allowed an over-30,000-gallon Massachusetts winery to enjoy “small” winery benefits. Revealing intent by a combination of textual analysis and reference to objective data should be applicable to other “facially neutral” restraints before other courts, without need for thrilling exposés.
Interestingly, the First Circuit’s discussion of what constitutes evidence of discriminatory intent includes the suggestion that putting forward palpably false claims of permissible purposes is itself evidence that the real purpose is impermissible. It would be charmingly ironic if the states’ and wholesalers’ practice of asserting that discriminatory statutes do not discriminate, were adopted to help small producers, and are indispensible for preventing a parade of horrible consequences resulted in judicial findings of protectionist purpose.
Objective data also underlie the First Circuit’s finding of burdensome effect. The court follows the approach of its petroleum product distribution decision, Exxon, when it says a statute is “plainly” discriminatory if its effect is to cause local goods to constitute a larger share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a smaller share, of the total sales in the market –a demonstrable effect of the statute under consideration.
Once the statute was classified as discriminatory in purpose and effect, it became subject to the strict necessity test, with its “concrete record evidence” requirement, which the state did not attempt to meet. As the appellate court pointed out, the record revealed the opposite of necessity, i.e., the existence of a non-discriminatory means of helping wineries unable to secure wholesaler distribution –passing a direct shipment law based on the NCSL model bill, as he governor had urged– and no reason why that would have been unworkable.
Scaling Cherry Hill
The beneficial ruling from the First Circuit is all the more welcome in light of its earlier opinion in a failed suit challenging Maine’s on-site-only direct consumer sale law, Cherry Hill Vineyard v. Baldacci.
The Baldacci decision can be read in various ways and had been advanced by direct shipment opponents as recognizing a “no direct shipping market” defense to Commerce Clause challenge. In brief, the theory is that if no purchases in the state can be fulfilled by direct shipment, there is no market from which out-of-state wineries could be excluded or in which they could be disadvantaged, and therefore no discrimination. The Family Winemaker defendants claimed it supported the proposition that without “explicit” discrimination, a law would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, or at worst would be judged under the Pike test.
In Judge Zobel’s view, Baldacci turned on the absence of evidence of indirect discriminatory effects and thus presented no obstacle to her decision in Family Winemakers, in which the plaintiffs had presented effects evidence. However, her argument for distinguishing Baldacci seems to consist of two conflicting lines of reasoning.
According to one branch of her analysis, it is possible to mount a Commerce Clause attack on “leveled down” systems that equally deny direct shipment to in-state and out-of-state wineries, provided the facts show that distant wineries are losing sales to locals because they cannot use the natural means of doing nationwide business, direct shipment. It follows that the result in Baldacci would have been different had the plaintiffs made the factual showing, a proposition consistent with statements in that opinion. Judge Zobel was able to cite extensive evidence of discriminatory effects in the record before her, supporting her decision not to reach the same result as in Baldacci. So far, so good; but judges have a tendency to pile on alternative rationales in distinguishing a difficult precedent.
The second branch of her reasoning explicitly adopts another aspect of Baldacci –that there was no discrimination in the Maine system because no winery was allowed to use direct shipment, while Massachusetts permitted it for wineries below the volume cap.
The “no direct shipping market” theory directly contravenes the district court’s first line of reasoning and is, I believe, fallacious, because the Commerce Clause protects commerce, not means of delivery. A Granholm issue arises if a state favors any local market in a line of goods, even one limited to on-site sales, by directly burdening interstate sellers who are compelled by economics to use a different distribution method. Whether leveling down to all face-to-face sales constitutes discrimination subject to the strict necessity test is a hotly contested question in current Granholm litigation.
The no-local market defense theory arises from Baldacci’s misapplying Exxon, where there was no local market, to a local market in which in-state wineries made on-site sales, protected from out-of-state competition. The First Circuit clarifies Exxon in Family Winemakers:
Exxon held that a law that restricts a market consisting entirely of out-of-state interests is not discriminatory because there is no local market to benefit. Exxon is not apposite where, as here, there is an in-state market and the law operates to its competitive benefit. Massachusetts cannot apply Exxon only to "large" wineries as distinct from "small" wineries; the wine market is a single although differentiated market, and § 19F’s two provisions [the statute in question] operate on that market together.
The First Circuit went on to distinguish its decision in Baldacci (which was submitted for decision on an agreed written fact statement) as dealing with an unsupported challenge:
That case involved a challenge to a Maine law that allowed wineries to sell to consumers only in face-to-face transactions. That challenge failed because plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence that the law benefitted Maine vineyards or harmed out-of-state wineries.
Baldacci only addressed the kind of showing required when a statute is challenged as discriminatory in effect but is concededly non-discriminatory in purpose. We did not address whether a lesser showing might suffice when a law is allegedly discriminatory in both effect and purpose. We do not reach this question because even under the standard in Baldacci, plaintiffs have shown § 19F is discriminatory in effect.
The First Circuit decision encourages examination of what has been regarded as a central tenet of Granholm jurisprudence, the “level field” model. It is a commonplace that protectionist discrimination can be cured by leveling up or down; it other words, that a state can comply with the Commerce Clause by permitting direct shipment for both in-state and out-of-state wineries or by denying it to both. Such a mechanistic approach, however, leads to uncritical acceptance of formalistically even-handed schemes like on-site-only laws, notwithstanding their disparate impact on nearby and distant wineries. Putting facial neutrality in perspective, as occurs in Family Winemakers, should support critical examination of other playing fields that are only superficially level.
You Can’t Have Everything
Welcome as it is, the First Circuit opinion in Family Winemakers does not answer all the questions the case raises. Following sound judicial practice, the court prudently made the most easily defensible ruling on the record before it. The opinion’s principal limitation is that on both 21st Amendment immunity and choice of test under the dormant Commerce Clause it deals with a statute convincingly shown to be effectively and intentionally discriminatory against interstate commerce.
Thus, Family Winemakers throws a spotlight on unsettled post-Granholm issues: What test applies if a state statute is discriminatory in effect but not intent? What if it was intended to discriminate, but fails to do so (assuming anyone has an interest in arguing about it in that instance)? If it is evenhanded, but would flunk the Pike balancing test on proof of the local interest pursued, could it be saved by using a lower standard for liquor? What, if anything, is left after Granholm of the concept that a state can balance “core 21st Amendment interests,” such as temperance, against the Commerce Clause?
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[1] The law had required wineries producing more than 30,000 gallons annually of grape wine to forego any sales to wholesalers in the state if they sold directly to consumers.
[2] To “distinguish” an earlier case is lawyer jargon for finding a difference in recited facts or some other aspect that could justify reaching a different result in the case at hand.
[3] I don’t have a snappy name for the first alternative, sometimes referred to in this post as the “strict necessity test.” If named after a case it could be the Philadelphia test, the Dean Milk test or the Maine v. Taylor test, etc., but no commonly accepted moniker has developed.
Huge win for wineries, but can I ship to Massachusetts now?
January 17th, 2010
First Circuit affirms District Court decision
On Thursday, January 14th, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in the case of Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins. The appellatte decision represents a major victory for wineries and may be the end of the case that was originally filed by Family Winemakers of California in September of 2006.
"We’re delighted with the decision on behalf of our members and all wineries across the U.S. We’re also glad that this court put its foot down about discriminatory laws, like production caps, not being able to withstand judicial scrutiny. Now it’s time to change Massachusetts law so that all wineries, not only in California but across the nation that produce more than 30,000 gallons will have an opportunity to fulfill the wine choices of Bay State residents," said Paul Kronenberg, President of Family Winemakers of California.
98% of domestic wine excluded
Massachusetts law allowed “small” wineries that produced less than 30,000 gallons per year to simultaneously ship wines directly to consumers with a “small winery shipping license” and to have their wines sold in traditional distribution through wholesalers. “Large” wineries (wineries that produce more than 30,000 gallons per year) did not have the same choices. They could either completely opt out of the three-tier system and ship wines to Massachusetts consumers with a “large winery shipping license”, or forego direct shipping to have their wines sold at wine retailers, restaurants and bars via traditional distribution.
According to the decision, the 637 wineries that qualified as “large” accounted for 98% of all wine produced in the United States in 2006. Of those 637, the top 30 producers accounted for 92% of the national market. The remaining 2% of U.S. wine production came from 4,713 “small” wineries, and 1,780 of those produced less than one gallon. In 2007, 100% of the 31 Massachusetts wineries produced less than 30,000 gallons per year.
Discrimination against interstate commerce
In November, 2008, the District Court ruled in that Massachusetts law had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. On Thursday, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The decision states in relevant part:
The primary question before us is whether § 19F unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce in light of both the Commerce Clause, Footnote art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.
It is clear that § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment does not protect state alcohol laws that explicitly favor in-state over out-of-state interests from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005). But § 19F is neutral on its face; it does not, by its terms, allow only Massachusetts wineries to distribute their wines through a combination of direct shipping, wholesaler distribution, and retail sales. Section 19F instead uses a very particular gallonage cap to confer this benefit upon "small" as opposed to "large" wineries.
We hold that § 19F violates the Commerce Clause because the effect of its particular gallonage cap is to change the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-state wineries in a way that benefits Massachusetts’s wineries and significantly burdens out-of-state competitors. Massachusetts has used its 30,000 gallon grape wine cap to expand the distribution options available to "small" wineries, including all Massachusetts wineries, but not to similarly situated "large" wineries, all of which are outside Massachusetts. The advantages afforded to "small" wineries by these expanded distribution options bear little relation to the market challenges caused by the relative sizes of the wineries. Section 19F’s statutory context, legislative history, and other factors also yield the unavoidable conclusion that this discrimination was purposeful. Nor does § 19F serve any legitimate local purpose that cannot be furthered by a non-discriminatory alternative.
We further hold that the Twenty-first Amendment cannot save § 19F from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment does not exempt or otherwise immunize facially neutral but discriminatory state alcohol laws like § 19F from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. We affirm the grant of injunctive relief.
New legislation needed
As we posted about almost three years ago, the capacity cap was not the only troubling issue with the Massachusetts wine law. The consumer aggregate volume limit provision and, more importantly, the requirement that carriers obtain a permit for each of their delivery trucks have been in some ways just as problematic for wine consumers. After DHL pulled out of the business of delivering wine, FedEx and UPS are by far and away the major two carriers for interstate delivery.
Both FedEx and UPS have chosen to avoid interstate wine shipments to Massachusetts because of the delivery vehicle permit system. This will likely not change following this decision. Technically, Massachusetts is now open to any domestic winery that holds the appropriate permit, regardless of its use of middle-tier distribution. But, without FedEx and UPS, Bay State consumers will still be out of luck for now. New legislation that eliminates the consumer aggregate volume limit and changes the delivery vehicle requirements will likely be necessary to truly open the state for Massachusetts consumers. This decision may just provide the momentum to pass a new wine shipping bill.
We’ll post further analysis from R. Corbin Houchins in the coming days, so please stay tuned. Also, for more background, see our previous posts:
Massachusetts Still Question Mark for 30K-Gallon Wineries
A Battle Well-Picked and Well-Fought
Family Winemakers Court Win is Big for the Industry
Family Winemakers of California Making Headway in Massachusetts
Why Can’t I Have a Boston Wine Party?
“New Vintage” of Wine Litigation
A response to the Family Winemakers lawsuit
Family Winemakers sues Massachusetts over capacity cap
MA Congress overrides Romney veto, court challenge likely
Massachusetts Governor vetoes wine bill
Virginia ABC Offers Interim Solutions for Wineries Shipping Through Third Party Service Providers
December 4th, 2009
On November 19, Terri Beirne, Wine Institute’s Eastern Counsel, met with the Virginia ABC Board, their Director, and representatives of Wine America and the Virginia wineries to continue discussions about the July Circular Letter 09-05 prohibiting direct shippers from using any third party service providers. Despite earlier indications, the Board has no plans to issue additional circulars on this issue. They suggested that a statutory change is essential to reinstate use of pick and pack/fulfillment warehouse and other third party service providers by Virginia licensees. They also offered to work with industry to craft legislation for the 2010 Virginia General Assembly Session which starts on 1/13/10 and concludes on 3/13/10.
However, the VA ABC offered two interim solutions for Wine Institute members until the law can be changed. Nothing in Virginia law currently prevents direct shipper licensees from obtaining two (2) direct shipper licenses with two different addresses, even though a second location is not owned or controlled by the licensee. Therefore, if a winery sends wine from BOTH their tasting room and a fulfillment warehouse, it can keep a current direct shipper license intact and secure a second one with the address of their fulfillment facility, from where wine can also be shipped. The Virginia direct shipper license application fee is $65 and the annual license fee is $65. Separate tax payments and reports associated with each licenses would have to be filed.
Additionally, if the winery sends ALL wine shipments into Virginia from a pick and pack warehouse with NO shipments originating in their tasting room, the winery’s Virginia direct shippers license could be changed to list the address of the warehouse from which ALL wine will be shipped. Wineries may make such an amendment to a current license by sending a letter on winery letterhead explaining the reason for the change and including the old and new addresses to Dallas “Burnie” Gaskill, VA ABC Licensing Technician at P.O. Box 1597, Spotsylvania, VA 22553-1597. Burnie can be reached by phone at (540) 538-7838 or e-mail at dallas.gaskill@abc.virginia.gov with questions. Such letter MUST include a copy of the state license issued to the warehouse making shipments on the winery’s behalf. The letter must also contain an e-mail address for the winery, where the amended license will be sent in an electronic format.
Members can contact Annie Bones at abones@wineinstitute.org or at (415) 356-7530 with additional questions. Terri would also be pleased to talk more about this situation and can be reached at (804) 301-5505 or tbeirne@wineinstitute.org.
-Terri Cofer Beirne, Eastern Counsel, Wine Institute
Maine Direct Shipping Permit Applications Available
October 12th, 2009
The direct shipping applications for Maine are now available on the Wine Institute website. The direct shipping permit allows wineries to ship up to 12 nine liter cases of wine to a recipient’s address each year. The Department of Public Safety, Liquor Licensing and Inspection Division has confirmed that there are no prohibited shipping areas at this time. The annual permit fee is $200 plus an additional $100 filing fee. Applicants will have to register with Maine Revenue Services to pay sales and use taxes before submitting their permit application. Maine Revenue Services will send applicants a Retailer’s Certificate to confirm that their sales tax account has been established. There is no fee to register with Revenue Services and the tax registration forms can be sent in via U.S. mail or electronically. The processing time for electronically filed applications is significantly shorter. Only sections 1 and 5 of the tax registration form must be completed.
Once wineries have received their Retailer’s Certificate they can submit their completed direct shipper application to the Liquor Licensing and Inspections Unit, along with a copy of their federal basic permit and application fee. The direct shipper application must also be notarized. Once wineries receive their direct shipping permit they will be responsible for paying excise tax to the Department of Public Safety and sales tax to Revenue Services. In addition, a direct shipping report must be filed twice a year. Reporting forms will be posted on the Wine Institute website once they become available. Should you have any questions please contact Annie Bones in Wine Institute’s State Relations Department at abones@wineinstitute.org.
Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute
Maine Direct Shipping Applications Update
August 25th, 2009
The Maine Bureau of Liquor Enforcement has indicated that direct shipping license applications will be available on September 12, 2009, the same day the direct shipping law becomes effective. Wineries should contact Lori Nolette, the contact for liquor licensing and compliance at the Bureau, for a copy of the application once it becomes available. The direct shipping licensees will be able to ship up to 12 cases of wine to each consumer each year. The initial license fee is $200 with an annual renewal of $50. Wineries must have a license in order to ship on-site and off-site transactions to Maine consumers beginning September 12, 2009. Wine Institute will post any updates about the direct shipper license application on the Wine Institute website as soon as it becomes available.
-Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute
Texas to Roll Out New Volume Limits
August 17th, 2009
New rules in Texas should benefit Lone Star consumers, and also make life a little easier for wineries. On June 19th, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law HB 1084, which will take effect on September 1st, 2009. Under the new rules, three different volume limits replace the existing set of two limits for licensed shippers.
Currently, licensees may ship up to three gallons of wine within “any 30-day period”. This rule was perhaps the most difficult, and most commonly violated rule in a compliance check out of all state limitations. First, three gallons translates to just over 15 standard 750 mL bottles, whereas most states stick to a standard case or two-case limit. More importantly, the “rolling” 30-day period was very problematic to track for wineries that did not use an automated compliance solution. The majority of state volume limits are tracked on a calendar (month or year) basis, but this effectively created 365 different 30 day periods to track.
The new bill establishes three different volume limits for direct shipments to Texas:
- No more than nine gallons (46 bottles) to the same consumer within any calendar month
- No more than 36 gallons (181 bottles) to the same consumer within any 12-month period
- No more than 35,000 gallons (14,721 cases) to all Texas consumers annually
Although some coverage of the changes has highlighted a “tripling” of the volume limit (from 3 gallons to 9 gallons), the annual consumer limit actually stays the same at 36 gallons. According to the House Research Organization’s bill analysis,
Increasing from three to nine gallons the maximum amount of shipments to the same consumer within a month would acknowledge the unique seasonal requirements of wineries as well as the realities of Texas summers. Wine is a perishable product that spoils at temperatures above 75 degrees Fahrenheit, so many out-of-state wineries are reluctant to ship to Texas, especially during July and August.
CSHB 1084 would not increase the overall amount of wine that a winery or out-of-state shipper could ship to the same consumer per year. In fact, it would codify in statute the current limit of 36 gallons per year, which is based on the existing restriction of no more than three gallons per month. It simply would allow wineries to ship somewhat larger quantities of wine to Texas consumers during the cooler seasons of the year.
Wine Institute Working To Clarify Impact Of VA ABC Circular 09-05
August 7th, 2009
Wine Institute and other industry representatives met with the Virginia ABC this week concerning their July 22, 2009 circular No. 09-05 governing use of third party service providers in direct shipments. The ABC staff was well aware of the concerns nationwide that their recent opinion has generated, but remained firm in their position that such entities cannot participate in direct shipments into the Commonwealth under current Virginia law. They rely primarily on the portions below of Va. Code sections 4.1-209.1 and at 4.1-203.
§ 4.1-209.1. Direct shipment of wine and beer; shipper’s license.
Any winery or farm winery located within or outside the Commonwealth may apply to the Board for issuance of a wine shipper’s license that shall authorize the shipment of brands of wine and farm wine identified in such application…..Any person located within or outside the Commonwealth who is authorized to sell wine or beer at retail in their state of domicile and who is not a winery, farm winery, or brewery may nevertheless apply for a wine or beer shipper’s license, or both, if such person satisfies the requirements of this section.
§ 4.1-203. Separate license for each place of business; transfer or amendment; posting; expiration; carriers.
A. Each license granted by the Board shall designate the place where the business of the licensee will be carried on. ….a separate license shall be required for each separate place of business……
In summary, the position of the Virginia ABC is that ONLY wineries and retailers licensed by their home states are eligible to receive a Virginia direct shippers’ license which permits the conduct of business (aka the shipment of wine into Virginia) ONLY at and from the business address listed on their license.
Because of widespread industry concerns, however, the Virginia ABC staff is willing to consider drafting a clarifying circular. While they are not expected to change their interpretation of current law, as part of this clarifying circular, they are willing to consider delaying the effective date of this ruling until April 1, 2010. By this time, the Virginia Legislature will have had an opportunity to change the law to resolve this problem for wine shippers nationwide. The Virginia ABC has suggested they will support the legislative change necessary to enable certain, but not all, third party providers to participate in the direct shipments of retailers and wineries to Virginia consumers.
Update: We will keep you posted as we continue to work with the Virginia ABC on this matter. Please consider their current circular in effect until another one is issued.
Terri Cofer Beirne, Eastern Counsel, Wine Institute
Add Two to the List of Open States, and Many More Updates, Effective Today
July 1st, 2009
Tennessee, Kansas Open For Direct Shipping
Today, both Kansas and Tennessee open for direct shipping – the first two states to open in almost three years. These are the first states to change from Prohibited to Limited since Vermont in late 2006.
As of today, Kansas residents have direct access to up to twelve cases of wine per address from licensed wineries per year. Kansas special order direct shipping license applications are available online. After registering with the Secretary of State for $36, wineries must submit proof of business tax registration, a $50 license fee, a $50 application fee with their license application as well as post a $750 bond.
Nearly one month ago on June 5, Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen signed Senate Bill 166 into law to open Tennessee for direct shipping on July 1. Tennessee ranks in the top 25 wine consuming states.
Both state licenses are available for order with full concierge service through easywinelicensing.com.
North Dakota Excise Tax Decreases
Beginning today, sparkling wine will be taxed at $0.50/gallon, down from $1.00/gallon.
Nevada State-Wide Sales Tax Increase
Effective July 1, Nevada has increased its Local School Support Tax from 2.25% to 2.6%; a 0.35% increase in state-wide sales tax. This new tax will be collected at a local level. Also, the 0.25% Collection Allowance, scheduled to increase back to 0.50%, remains in effect for sales and use taxes collected.
Local Tax Increases
The following local tax rates are effective today:
- In Arizona, the city of Kearny has increased its retail and use tax rates from 2.5% to 3.0%
- In California, voters in Los Angeles County approved a new 0.50% district tax increasing their tax rate to 9.75% (including the 8.25% state tax rate). Also, the City Council of Laguna Beach located in Orange County voted to repeal the 0.50% Temporary Transactions and Use Tax prior to its scheduled end date, lowering their tax rate to 8.75%
- In Georgia, the counties of Camden, McIntosh and Wayne will increase their local tax rates by 1%, making the total local option tax 3.0%
- In Washington, sales and use tax within all of Wahkiakum County will increase one-tenth of one percent. The new rate will be 7.6%
Ohio Electronic Filing
For Ohio Sales and Use tax semi-annual filers, the January – June return is the first return that is required to be filed online. There are two filing methods available to direct shippers to report Ohio sales taxes electronically:
- Express Data Entry – Upload a .CSV to the Ohio Business Gateway (OBG), and make any final adjustments on the OBG’s website
- eForms – Enter tax calculations step-by-step into Ohio’s web application
If you can’t decide which filing option is right for you, view a comparison of the different filing options (please note that TeleFile is not available for direct shippers). If you have any questions about the requirement, please visit Ohio’s Department of Taxation website, or call the Ohio DOT at 800-282-1784.
Kansas permit applications available, Tennessee coming soon…
June 26th, 2009
Late yesterday the Kansas ABC posted their applications for direct shipping on their website. Wine producers across the country can now apply for permission to direct ship wine to Kansas consumers effective July 1, 2009.
Kansas SB 212 was signed into law by Governor Kathleen Sebelius on April 10. Wineries interested in avoiding the hassle of the application process can purchase the license at www.easywinelicensing.com.
Licensed wineries will be able to ship up to 12 cases of wine per year to Kansas residents. To obtain a Kansas direct shipping license, wineries must pay a $50 license fee, a $50 registration fee, and post a $750 bond.
Tennessee will also open for direct shipping on July 1, although the paperwork has not yet been finalized. Tennessee’s license is available for pre-order pending the state’s posting.
Release Thirty-One of “Notes on Wine Distribution”
June 23rd, 2009
R. Corbin Houchins’s latest “Notes on Wine Distribution” are now available. Release 31 includes updates on legislation, litigation and general discussions on available distribution channels for wine. In addition to country-wide topics such as “Direct Shipment by Retailers” and “A Limitation of Litigation”, distribution practices are also outlined on a state-by-state basis. Numerous states have had notable legislative activity this session, with Kansas, Maine, and Tennessee adopting major legislative changes regarding direct shipping. Read about these and other updates that affect the way wine is sold and shipped within the United States.
You can view these notes anytime by visiting the ShipCompliant Blog, located under “Compliance Resources”, or by visiting CorbinCounsel.com and clicking on the home page link, “Notes on Wine Distribution.”
Maine Event, At Last
June 13th, 2009
After years of trying, wine commerce proponents succeeded in adding Maine to the list of license states for direct shipment. Governor Baldacci signed HP 696/LD 1008 on June 12th.
After the Bureau of Liquor Enforcement adopts regulations and licensing procedures, the law will permit out-of-state and Maine farm wineries alike to ship wine (but not wine coolers!) directly to consumers by common carrier, subject to the same taxes as if sold locally. Meanwhile, the on-site provisions summarized in previous releases of Notes on Wine Distribution appear to remain available.
by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com
Tennessee keeps the ball rolling on direct shipping
June 5th, 2009
Governor Phil Bredesen signed Senate Bill 166 into law today. With the passage of the bill, Tennessee will legally open its doors to winery direct shipping on July 1, 2009. Tennessee prohibited direct shipments from out-of-state wineries long before the landmark Granholm case. Even onsite shipments of wine were disallowed when the Attorney General issued an opinion on the matter in February 2009. Attempts to pass direct shipping legislation in the past years have failed, unaided by a Tennessee wholesaler campaign against the bills during the 2008 legislative session. However, with the Governor’s signature, in-state and out-of-state wineries alike now have access to Tennessee wine consumers. Direct shippers can expect to pay an annual license fee of $150 (an initial application fee of $300 is required for new applicants) and remit monthly sales and gallonage taxes. Some less positive aspects of the new laws include a 3 case annual shipping limit from a winery to a consumer and restrictions on who can obtain the direct shipper’s license—retailers, unfortunately, are among the excluded.
Although retailers will not be among those celebrating on July 1, the passage of SB 166 is a huge victory for many direct shippers. Governor Bredesen’s signature signals a radical change in the state’s stance on wine sold through the direct shipping channel: Tennessee is the first state to reverse its stance on direct shipments for wine since Vermont in 2006. The effective date of this legislation is less than a month away, however, there is no word, yet, on when all necessary forms will be available, so stay tuned.
It’s Alive! (and Waiting for the Governor’s Signature) – Direct Shipping Bill in Maine
June 2nd, 2009
On May 29th, “An Act To Increase Consumer Choice for Wine” (H 696) won initial approval by the Maine House of Representatives. On June 1st, only one legislative day later, the proposed act was passed by the Senate. The bill is waiting for Governor Baldacci’s signature before becoming law.
If passed, H 696 would provide for a direct shipping permit, which would allow wineries to ship up to 12 cases of wine per year to the doorsteps of Maine consumers over the age of 21. As with any direct shipping bill, the freedom to deliver wine to a consumer’s home comes with a few restrictions, but none are overly burdensome. Some specific requirements include:
- Collection and payment of sales tax
- Quarterly reporting and payment of excise tax
- $200 license fee; $50 renewal fee
- Photo ID verification and signature of recipient upon delivery
- Licensees may not ship wine in a container smaller than 750 mL
- Licensees may not ship to local option areas or areas identified as a prohibited shipping area
The expeditious passage of H 696 through the Maine Senate is a welcome event for wineries across the country. A bill that would allow winery-to-consumer shipping in Tennessee is also waiting for a signature from their governor. If both of these measures are signed into law, Maine and Tennessee will join Kansas in the ranks of previously prohibited states who have adopted favorable direct shipping laws in 2009.
UPDATE: The Senate introduced an amendment that addresses some carrier issues as proposed in Committee Amendment “A”. The bill must again be read (date set for 6/3/2009) by the House before being considered for passage into Law.
UPDATE 6/5/2009: The Maine legislature passed the bill to be enacted on June 5th, 2009 with a carrier amendment. The bill is now ready to be sent to the governor. Once received by Governor Baldacci, he has 10 days (not including Sundays) to take action, otherwise the bill becomes law without his signature.
When Will The Wine Industry Rebound?
May 18th, 2009
Amidst lagging wine sales in 2008 and a sluggish economy, Silicon Valley Bank Wine Division founder Rob McMillan outlines critical issues facing the wine industry and growing economic and market trends in his “2009-2010 State of the Wine Industry” report.
“Wine businesses across the board are being pushed to new limits in the current environment,” said Rob McMillan, founder of Silicon Valley Bank’s Wine Division and author of the report.
Rob McMillan will reveal strategic and tactical recommendations to wine businesses as they adapt to current and anticipated market conditions and other insider information based on his expert research and surveys of nearly 500 wineries that may help you plan for your future at ShipCompliant’s 4th annual Direct Shipping Seminar & Users Conference. The conference will take place on June 11, 2009, at the Napa Valley Marriott.
Other conference speakers include W. Curtis Coleburn, Chief Operating Officer of the Virginia ABC, and Steve Gross, Director of State Relations at the Wine Institute.
Participating companies include: Wine Business Monthly, FedEx, Wines & Vines, Copper Peak Logistics, Bacchus Fulfillment, WTN Services, Pack n’ Ship Direct, Wineshipping, Benson Marketing, Microworks, Cultivate Systems, Active Club Management, WineWeb Enterprises, eWinery Solutions, Elypsis, WineWare Software, Missing Link/eCellar, VinNOW and EVT Solutions.
Register online today to confirm your spot.
Two Steps Forward, A Couple Back (or Maybe Sideways)
May 18th, 2009
“Tied House” laws contain two categories of restrictions on licensed beverage businesses not found in other industries.
One is general prohibition of beverage suppliers’ furnishing things of value to retailers, with certain exceptions (notably goods the retailer has paid for). The other is general prohibition of ownership or investment by a supplier company or its investors in a retailing company and vice versa, again with certain exceptions. Details vary by state, and there is an overlay of federal tied house law, most of which kicks in only if the prohibited act to some degree excludes a competitor from trade.
Originally, tied house laws were intended to prevent return upon Repeal to the vertical integration, primarily brewery-saloon, that was a prime target of the Prohibition movement. As economic relations have evolved since the early 1930s, the purpose has shifted toward protecting interests of the middle distribution tier, and especially toward countering the growing influence of large chain retailers which, but for tied house legislation, would treat alcoholic beverages in the same stringent cost-reducing manner as other grocery items.
On May 15, 2009 the Washington governor signed a bill that has been loudly touted as loosening that state’s highly restrictive tied house law. Purported reforms permit some trade practices claimed to have been previously forbidden and introduce the possibility of investment and outright ownership between tiers, which had previously been limited to extremely narrow circumstances. However, a close reading reveals that the supposed relaxation is in large part illusory and may net out to tightening Washington’s tied house restrictions.
For a skeptical view of the bill’s particulars, go to the “Legal Developments” page at www.CorbinCounsel.com and click on the link to HB 2040.
Round Four of the Florida Direct Shipping Battle Comes to a Close
May 4th, 2009
The streak continues. Once again Florida lawmakers were unable to pass any direct-to-consumer bills. Legislators presented two distinct direct-to-consumer bills for the 2009 legislative session but both have failed to advance beyond committee. Senate Bill 764 (House Bill 245 is its counterpart), the more restrictive of the two, would have required an annual $250 fee, a $1,000 to $5000 surety bond, a maximum production limit (capacity cap) of 250,000 gallons and a 12 case per year shipping limit. The bill survived three committee votes, but did not make it out of the General Government Appropriations committee. Senate Bill 272 (House Bill 251) would have placed no limits on production amounts or annual case shipments and the license and bond fees were much more wallet-friendly at $100 and $500 to $1000, respectively. Since neither of the bills passed by Friday, May 1, four consecutive legislative sessions have failed to produce direct shipping legislation. The Florida battle has probably been the most intense battle between winery and wholesaler associations over the years.
As of now, there are no statutes in place that regulate direct shipping to Florida residents. According to present law, out-of-state vendors must remit excise taxes and not ship to the five dry counties, but there are no other binding regulations. With no bill passed this year, Florida remains open under the administrative control of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.
Wine Freedom in the South? Tennessee Direct Shipping Bill Passes the Senate
April 27th, 2009
Tennessee, one of 13 states that still bans direct-to-consumer shipping, took steps towards ending that association on April 13, 2009 when the Senate-approved Senate Bill 166, which allows direct shipments of wine. Currently, anyone who transports wine into Tennessee by bypassing the three-tier system is committing a felony (see Section 57-3-401.b of the Tennessee Code) an act that bill sponsor Senator Paul Stanley says is already widely committed. Due to this continuous violation of existing law, Senator Stanley calls SB 166 a “common-sense bill.” Senate Bill 166 requires out-of-state wineries to obtain a $300 license non-refundable application fee and $150 annual permit fee and also sets a shipping limit of 3 cases per calendar year per individual consumer.
During the Senate Committee hearings, there was lengthy questioning regarding enforcement mechanisms to ensure out-of-state wineries are in compliance. Senator Tim Burchett also voiced concerns about the lack of jurisdiction that the Tennessee Alcohol Beverage Commission has over out-of-state wineries, to which committee chair Senator Bill Ketron responded with a quote from Section 1.C.2 of the bill, which states that applicants must, “execute a consent to jurisdiction and venue of all actions… in the state of Tennessee.” Senator Ketron also noted other enforcement mechanisms such as a clause that makes direct shipping without a permit a Class (E) Felony. Primary Sponsor Senator Stanley addressed the doubts about enforcement and compliance by pointing to many other states that have successfully instituted and enforced direct shipping laws. In addition to mentioning the success of other direct-shipping states, bill supporters also noted that SB166 could bring in an estimated $10 million in additional annual revenue.
The approved version of the bill was passed in the Senate by a 22-8 margin with two amendments, imposed by the Senate Finance, Ways and Means committee. The first amendment reduced the total annual wine shipments allowed to one resident to 27-Liters from the original 108 Liters per year, with a one case per month limit. The second amendment was apparently inserted with no specific purpose except to appease the three-tier distribution system by stating that nothing in the direct shipping bill is meant to “diminish the three-tiered scheme.” The Senate-approved version of SB 166 also requires wineries to report the appropriate sales and gallonage taxes, and direct shippers must keep records of all shipments in case the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission requests such information. Now that the bill has moved through the Senate, it awaits discussion and approval by the House Government Operations Committee.
In February, Tennessee’s Attorney General chose to level-down by banning all direct-to-consumer shipments and transports of wine for personal use. Only two months later, however, the passage of SB 166 in the Senate demonstrates willingness to accommodate consumer demand by opening up the state to direct shipping.
