Posts from the Litigation Category
Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness (CARE) Act of 2010 Introduced
April 16th, 2010
As expected, the Congressional subcommittee hearing on Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation has been followed by a House bill. H.R. 5034 was introduced yesterday by Representative Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) with support from the National Beer Wholesalers Association (NBWA). The bill is also called the "CARE" (Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness) Act of 2010, and Wine & Spirits Daily posted a copy of it on their site.
It is the purpose of this Act to—
(1) recognize that alcohol is different from other consumer products and that it should be regulated effectively by the States according to the laws
thereof; and
(2) reaffirm and protect the primary authority of States to regulate alcoholic beverages.
The bill would amend both the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Wilson Act to “support State based alcohol regulation, to clarify evidentiary
rules for alcohol matters, to ensure the collection of all alcohol taxes, and for other purposes.”
The Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America (WSWA) applauded the legislation, saying
It is important that states retain their constitutional power to regulate the distribution of beverage alcohol and are able to fend off litigation, which serves to destabilize or destroy that authority. Although we may oppose direct shipping and self-distribution as a matter of policy, our goal is not to overturn existing state laws. We simply believe the proper forum for resolving legitimate differences over these issues is in the state legislatures – not the courts.
We will have more coverage of this bill as the story develops.
Read more:
Wine & Spirits Daily (subscription required)
Massachusetts will not appeal Family Winemakers decision
April 13th, 2010
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley will not appeal a January Federal Appeals Court decision upholding an earlier District Court decision which overturned the 2005 direct shipping law. In January, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 2008 district court ruling that found that the state law governing direct-to-consumer shipments by wineries was unconstitutional.
The court said the law has a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce because it favors instate interests by preventing direct shipments of nearly all out-of-state wine to Massachusetts consumers while allowing direct deliveries by all Massachusetts wineries.
The flawed shipment law provided that only wineries that produce less than 30,000 gallons a year and had not used a wholesaler for distribution in the last six months could ship directly to local consumers. The wholesaler backed law was enacted in 2005 and vetoed by then Governor Mitt Romney. It was enacted over his objection in 2006.
The Massachusetts Legislature is now considering legislation that will mimic the model direct shipping law which will establish a new regulatory framework for shipments by all wineries, large and small, including licensing, reporting and tracking requirements.
The Joint Committee on Consumer Protection and Professional Licensure in February reported favorably on legislation submitted by Senator Robert O’Leary (S 176) and Representative David Torrisi (H 317), two long time supporters of the model legislation. These two bills were combined into a single committee bill, H 4497. H 4497,”An Act regulating the direct shipment of wine”, has been referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means. It provides for a $100 per winery licensing fee, requires monthly reporting and tax collections, limits shipments to four cases per consumer per year per winery and establishes stiff penalties for noncompliance. The bill also attempts to address a cost-prohibitive issue that has kept common carriers such as FedEx and UPS out of the delivery market.
Wine Institute is currently working with the House Ways and Means Committee to improve the bill by addressing the common carrier issue and the four case limit. Once the bill clears this House committee, it will likely be approved by the full House.
-Carol Martel, Counsel for the Northeastern States, Wine Institute
Possible Effects of Recent Congressional Hearing on Direct Shipping
April 6th, 2010
You may have seen reports about a recent U.S. Congressional subcommittee hearing on “Legal Issues Concerning State Alcohol Regulation.” The hearing was important for anyone concerned about direct-to-consumer wine shipping since a primary question was whether federal courts should be stripped of their authority to strike down state alcohol laws that discriminate against out-of-state businesses—the very issue at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald.
Click image to view video (RealPlayer required)
The hearing followed a reportedly aggressive lobbying campaign by the National Beer Wholesalers Association (NBWA). The common speculation is that NBWA is concerned that large retailers and global brewers are trying to put beer wholesalers out of business, and that litigation over self-distribution—Costco v. Hoen and a recent lawsuit in Illinois over whether Anheuser-Busch can obtain a wholesaler permit—is a particular threat to their state monopoly pricing power. The undertone of the NBWA effort is that the industry needs to return to a simpler time when the 21st Amendment meant what the wholesale tier thought it did, before the Supreme Court had a chance to weigh in and reset the balance.
While the wine industry has not always benefitted from court decisions, the federal circuits and the Supreme Court have for more than 40 years consistently sought to weigh the interests of states and the market carefully when examining state alcohol laws. Under this court precedent, states have broad authority under their police powers—their ability to protect the public—and the 21st Amendment to regulate the movement and sale of alcohol beverages. But they cannot use state power to discriminate against interstate commerce or to protect in-state monopoly behavior. Despite NBWA’s apparent beliefs to the contrary, there is no evidence that courts have abused their power of judicial review in any way that would justify the blunt reconfiguration of the relationship between federal and state law.
Not that all the state regulators who testified at the hearing would agree. The chairman of Michigan’s Liquor Control Commission offered completely unsubstantiated testimony that because of litigation, direct shipping is a free for all, allowing out-of-state wineries to deliver wine into Michigan on the “honor system,” and resulting in the loss of millions in uncollected tax revenue. This position is questionable since in the wake of Granholm states have more aggressively regulated shipping and have established comprehensive systems of licensing and compliance.
Apart from the fact that state licensing systems make it easier for states to determine whether alcohol is contraband—wine can only be shipped by licensees—Michigan has at least two substantial hammers to ensure their state direct shipping laws are followed. The 21st Amendment Enforcement Act allows states to file for federal injunctions against out-of-state businesses that ignore their laws, and Alcohol Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau (TTB) policy provides TTB authority to punish federal basic permittees, such as wineries, that violate state law.
Whether the subcommittee hearing will lead to legislation is anyone’s guess. But should a new federal law along the lines sought by NBWA come to fruition, the impact could be substantial for winery direct-to-consumer shipping. States would be free to rewrite their laws to discriminate against out-of-state wineries and subsidize local monopoly behavior. Such a federal law would be an open invitation to roll back the gains wineries have spent nearly two decades fighting to achieve.
Notes on Wine Distribution v.32
February 4th, 2010
The latest version of “Notes on Wine Distribution”, by R. Corbin Houchins, is now available. Release 32 includes updates on legislation, litigation and general discussions on available distribution channels for wine. This release includes substantial changes, including new sections on age and identity, facial neutrality, and logistical support services, as well as updates to state summaries in Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Read about these and other updates that affect the way wine is sold and shipped within the United States.
If you are at all interested in the shipping and distribution of wine, this is an excellent resource that is well worth reading. You can view the most recent version of the document anytime by visiting the ShipCompliant Blog and clicking the link located under “Compliance Resources”, or by visiting CorbinCounsel.com and clicking on the home page link, “Notes on Wine Distribution.”
Siesta’s Over
January 27th, 2010
On January 26th, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ended the puzzling status of interstate retailing in Texas created by the lower court’s decision in Siesta Village Market. The district court had ruled that out-of-state retailers had a Commerce Clause right to sell wine to Texas consumers, but only wine that had been purchased from a Texas-licensed wholesaler.
The decision is another example of uncertainties resulting from the principal unresolved Granholm question: How does one reconcile the location-neutrality principle with the infamous North Dakota dictum to the effect that states may discriminate against out-of-state wholesalers? The Fifth Circuit’s answer, like that of the Second Circuit, is that Granholm extended Commerce Clause protection to wineries, but not to wholesalers or retailers, because national markets in the lower tiers would make it impossible for a state to protect the “traditional three-tier system.” As the Court of Appeals judge said about setting aside fundamental economic policy embodied in the dormant Commerce Clause to follow a judicial aside that was not part of the Granholm holding, “That language may be dicta. If so, it is compelling dicta.”
Post-Granholm litigation shows clearly enough that judges, though not bound to follow dicta, will elevate it to persuasive precedent when it coincides with their value systems. The values question is whether states’ asserted 21st Amendment right to maintain a privileged middle tier trumps the Commerce Clause policy against differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests. All one can say at this point is, “to be continued.”
by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com
High Fives in the First Circuit
January 26th, 2010
Justified jubilation greeted the 14 January 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the federal district court decision of 19 November 2008 in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, invalidating the Massachusetts “volume cap.” (see previous post “Huge win for wineries, but can I ship to Massachusetts now?” )
Oddly enough, the appellate ruling may be more important outside Massachusetts than within. There are two reasons, one quite straightforward, the other less so.
The simple reason is that the First Circuit decision merely leaves things within the state as they have been since 18 December 2008, when Judge Zobel enjoined application of the state’s maximum volume requirement to “small winery” shipping licenses, which are necessary for sales directly to consumers. Since that order, wineries of all sizes, with and without Massachusetts wholesalers[1], have been eligible for the license. Nevertheless, the state is not practically open to direct shipment, because the major interstate carriers find the delivery vehicle licensing requirement too burdensome and wineries have no reliable way to know whether an order would be the 27th case of direct shipment wine purchased in the year by that consumer, putting the shipper in violation of a 240-liter limit. (Those obstacles, which were not involved in Family Winemakers, are described in a previous post “Why can’t I have a Boston wine party?”)
A more subtle reason is that the First Circuit has articulated an analysis, arguably even more favorable to trade than the decision it affirmed, that may prove persuasive in other circuits with challenges to volume caps and to other so-called facially neutral features that operate to the detriment of interstate trade. That aspect of the decision is well worth a closer look –though it does require striding into a bit of a legal thicket.
Which Yardstick?
Stripped to essentials, Family Winemakers is about choosing the proper test for determining the constitutionality of a state law that burdens interstate commerce in wine.
Before getting into the technicalities of constitutional tests, a little context may be helpful: As the readers of these blogs know, state laws that disadvantage interstate trade raise issues under the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution, which gives Congress power to legislate regarding commerce among the states. In subject areas, like wine distribution, where Congress has not enacted legislation that serves as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, states have some room for regulation, even if it affects interstate trade to a degree. However, the fact that interstate commerce is within Congress’s power to regulate means that in subject matter where it has not acted (where, in other words, its regulatory power is “dormant”) certain unwritten principles inherent in the Commerce Clause nevertheless limit state regulatory power. State laws that exceed those limits are said to offend the “dormant Commerce Clause.” As a leading case puts it, “The modern law of what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about economic protectionism –that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”
In Granholm, the Supreme Court famously invalidated Michigan and New York laws for violating the dormant Commerce Clause by reserving direct shipment privileges for home state wineries. Family Winemakers is one of the most promising among many lawsuits attempting to discern the core message of Granholm and apply it to different facts.
Why Granholm Doesn’t Provide All the Answers
Granholm dealt with laws whose “object and design” to discriminate against out-of-state wineries was “evident” from their text and which in fact did discriminate. The Court considered how the presence of those factors —intent to discriminate and effect of discriminating— affected the answers to two distinct questions.
The first question concerned the 21st Amendment and certain federal legislation, which, taken together, affirmed the right of states to regulate wine from outside the state as fully as wine produced in the state and declared it illegal to ship wine into a state in contravention of “any” its laws. Does that broad language, the Court asked, permit the states intentionally to discriminate against interstate commerce (as a literal reading might suggest)? After an extensive and somewhat controversial historical analysis of the federal statutes and the constitutional amendment, the Court answered “no,” concluding that the dormant Commerce Clause subjects alcoholic beverage regulation to the same tests of constitutionality as apply to laws governing other goods.
The second question was what test would apply. In Granholm’s analysis, the choice between the two relevant tests was obvious. As stated in a leading case:
[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected . . . . But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach . . . .
Having caught the two states before it red-handed at economic protectionism, the Court had no trouble applying the strict test, which invalidates a law unless the state clearly demonstrates with “concrete” evidence that it is necessary for an essential state purpose and there is no workable less-discriminatory means of achieving the purpose. Neither defendant state even came close to meeting that standard, with the result we all know.
So, great: No 21st Amendment immunity and a flunked dormant Commerce Clause test; commerce wins, grapes are freed. But what if the law in question were not overtly discriminatory? What if it treated all wineries alike and only incidentally burdened interstate commerce? Would it then receive the “more flexible approach?”
Pretty Faces
On its face, the law invalidated in Family Winemakers took no account of whether a winery were in-state or out-of-state. It was, in the phrase popular with its proponents, “facially neutral” as between local and interstate sellers.
Defenders of volume caps and on-site requirements argue that facial neutrality has two profound effects: For alcoholic beverages, it invokes 21st Amendment immunity from dormant Commerce Clause challenge, which was repudiated in Granholm for facially discriminatory laws; and, even if there were no immunity, it would require application of the “more flexible” test of constitutionality, under which a statute will be upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the claimed local benefits, rather than the strict necessity test Granholm applied to facially discriminatory laws. Neither argument survived the First Circuit’s treatment of Family Winemakers.
Not a Vaccine
The district court judge had dismissed the immunity argument summarily, citing a passage in Granholm that actually refers to an extraterritoriality case in which the Court did not expressly reject immunity, but rather spoke of the need to “reconcile the interests protected by the two constitutional provisions” (i.e., the 21st Amendment and the Commerce Clause), and two post-Granholm decisions in other circuits that did not deal explicitly with the immunity issue at all. While her no-immunity conclusion seems sound, the opinion left room to argue that the lower court did not fully deal with the facial neutrality immunity argument.
The appellate opinion takes a different tack. First, the Court of Appeals articulates a more specific repudiation of a 21st Amendment immunity defense for all facially neutral laws, formulating a useful test: Even though the statute is “neutral on its face,” if its effect is to “change the competitive balance” between in-state and out-of-state wineries in a way that benefits local wineries and “significantly burdens” their out-of-state competitors, the result is the same as for facially discriminatory statutes in Granholm –no 21st Amendment immunity.
In reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit somewhat surprisingly begins by distinguishing[2] Granholm. That is, after admitting that Granholm dealt only with facially discriminatory statutes, the court set forth on its own to decide whether the 21st Amendment provided Massachusetts with immunity from dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a discriminatory statute everyone agreed was facially neutral. It nonetheless took guidance from Granholm in viewing the question as resolvable by historical context and in reading the 21st Amendment as preserving only the pre-Prohibition regulatory power Congress allows states under the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act –i.e., the right to regulate out-of-state wine on the same basis as in-state wine, but not to discriminate against the former in favor of the latter.
By engaging in relatively extensive history-grounded analysis, the First Circuit has provided sound support for the proposition that Granholm’s no-immunity ruling applies to all discriminatory measures, whether overtly protectionist or facially neutral. Courts adjudicating laws that burden interstate commerce relative to local have in Family Winemakers well-expounded judicial authority for ignoring putative 21st Amendment immunity. On the other hand, extension of Granholm to different scenarios, no matter how persuasively reasoned, cannot forestall further argument over the “narrow Granholm” approach advanced by states and wholesalers, which would preserve pre-2005 law for every situation that does not exactly match Granholm’s facts.
Question and Answer
If immunity is out of the picture, the primary issue becomes how to test a statute under the dormant Commerce Clause –i.e., what questions should a court ask to determine whether a statute will be upheld or struck down? Family Winemakers follows prevailing Commerce Clause jurisprudence in recognizing the two possibilities noted above, a strict “per se” test requiring proven necessity or a more flexible balancing test.
The states and wholesalers argue that facial neutrality would, at least in the absence of proven intentional protectionism, automatically require the more flexible approach, known as the Pike test after the shortened name of the case that first formulated it[3]. However, the Pike test as developed in case law is not invoked by superficial characteristics.
As enunciated in Granholm and its progeny, the Pike test requires a two-stage inquiry. First, a court asks two questions: Does the challenged state law regulate “even-handedly” as between interstate commerce and local commerce? Is whatever burden it places on the former an “indirect” consequence of its pursuit of a legitimate local interest? Only if the answer is “yes” to both does one apply the balancing test, which asks whether the burden on interstate commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the legitimate state purpose. If the answer to that highly subjective third question is “no,” the state law stands. For none of those questions is the answer determined by facial appearance.
In the district court analysis, a law adopted for a protectionist purpose that has the intended effect of favoring in-state commerce relative to interstate cannot meet the even-handed regulation and indirect burden requirements for application of the Pike balancing test, and is thus subject to the strict necessity test employed in Granholm, irrespective of facial neutrality. Judge Zobel went on to buttress her ruling by declaring that that even if the law constituted even-handed regulation with only incidental burdens on interstate sellers, entitling it to application of the Pike test, it would still be invalid because it did not advance any local purpose (other than the illegitimate objective of protectionism). The court’s reasoning seems almost mathematical: As the Pike test preserves a statute only when its adverse impact on interstate commerce is not excessive in comparison to a legitimate local benefit, if its local benefit is zero, any burden is excessive, and Pike won’t save it.
Adding the “but even if” reference to Pike as insurance against reversal for applying the wrong test is de rigueur in the courts and good for the prevailing litigant in the case at hand. The district court approach does not, however, prevent argument that Family Winemakers is “really” a Pike balance decision because the statute’s “facial neutrality” should have averted application of the strict necessity test –i.e., the outcome is a simple failure of the state to make an adequate record of local benefit, correctible in future litigation.
Again, the Court of Appeals opinion has a slightly different slant. The appellate court regards application of the strict necessity test as unquestionable under Granholm when, as in that case, a statute is protectionist in both intent and effect. Probably the most significant aspect of the First Circuit opinion is the means by which it so classifies the Massachusetts law.
Put Away that Smoking Gun
If anything moderated pro-trade celebration of the district court decision in Family Winemakers, it was the concern that the record was so strong on protectionist purpose that the case might not serve as a highly useful precedent for other cases, whose records will mostly be at best ambiguous on legislative intent.
Judge Zobel placed great stress on what is by any standard a sensationally revealing legislative history. Senator Morrissey, who sponsored the legislation, is quoted at length in the district court opinion, but a short bite will serve here to illustrate the tenor: “[W]ith the limitations that we are suggesting in the legislation, we are really still giving an inherent advantage indirectly to the local wineries.” The court was also impressed by the fruit wine exemption, a product of lobbying whose sole purpose appeared to be shielding a large local winery from going over the cap by producing cider.
In the Court of Appeals, proof of protectionist purpose rests on a more broadly applicable base. The finding of discriminatory intent explicitly rests not on the “smoking gun” statements of legislators or lobbyists, which featured so prominently in the district court opinion, but on the appellate court’s reading of the statute itself. Close attention to the text revealed a volume cap at odds with prevailing industry classification of wineries as objectively large or small, or as able or unable to secure wholesaler distribution, as well as with the state’s own size demarcation for license fees. The court was particularly impressed by the facts that ultimately there was no winery size standard at all, given that non-grape wine volume would not be counted and that the fruit wine exemption allowed an over-30,000-gallon Massachusetts winery to enjoy “small” winery benefits. Revealing intent by a combination of textual analysis and reference to objective data should be applicable to other “facially neutral” restraints before other courts, without need for thrilling exposés.
Interestingly, the First Circuit’s discussion of what constitutes evidence of discriminatory intent includes the suggestion that putting forward palpably false claims of permissible purposes is itself evidence that the real purpose is impermissible. It would be charmingly ironic if the states’ and wholesalers’ practice of asserting that discriminatory statutes do not discriminate, were adopted to help small producers, and are indispensible for preventing a parade of horrible consequences resulted in judicial findings of protectionist purpose.
Objective data also underlie the First Circuit’s finding of burdensome effect. The court follows the approach of its petroleum product distribution decision, Exxon, when it says a statute is “plainly” discriminatory if its effect is to cause local goods to constitute a larger share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a smaller share, of the total sales in the market –a demonstrable effect of the statute under consideration.
Once the statute was classified as discriminatory in purpose and effect, it became subject to the strict necessity test, with its “concrete record evidence” requirement, which the state did not attempt to meet. As the appellate court pointed out, the record revealed the opposite of necessity, i.e., the existence of a non-discriminatory means of helping wineries unable to secure wholesaler distribution –passing a direct shipment law based on the NCSL model bill, as he governor had urged– and no reason why that would have been unworkable.
Scaling Cherry Hill
The beneficial ruling from the First Circuit is all the more welcome in light of its earlier opinion in a failed suit challenging Maine’s on-site-only direct consumer sale law, Cherry Hill Vineyard v. Baldacci.
The Baldacci decision can be read in various ways and had been advanced by direct shipment opponents as recognizing a “no direct shipping market” defense to Commerce Clause challenge. In brief, the theory is that if no purchases in the state can be fulfilled by direct shipment, there is no market from which out-of-state wineries could be excluded or in which they could be disadvantaged, and therefore no discrimination. The Family Winemaker defendants claimed it supported the proposition that without “explicit” discrimination, a law would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, or at worst would be judged under the Pike test.
In Judge Zobel’s view, Baldacci turned on the absence of evidence of indirect discriminatory effects and thus presented no obstacle to her decision in Family Winemakers, in which the plaintiffs had presented effects evidence. However, her argument for distinguishing Baldacci seems to consist of two conflicting lines of reasoning.
According to one branch of her analysis, it is possible to mount a Commerce Clause attack on “leveled down” systems that equally deny direct shipment to in-state and out-of-state wineries, provided the facts show that distant wineries are losing sales to locals because they cannot use the natural means of doing nationwide business, direct shipment. It follows that the result in Baldacci would have been different had the plaintiffs made the factual showing, a proposition consistent with statements in that opinion. Judge Zobel was able to cite extensive evidence of discriminatory effects in the record before her, supporting her decision not to reach the same result as in Baldacci. So far, so good; but judges have a tendency to pile on alternative rationales in distinguishing a difficult precedent.
The second branch of her reasoning explicitly adopts another aspect of Baldacci –that there was no discrimination in the Maine system because no winery was allowed to use direct shipment, while Massachusetts permitted it for wineries below the volume cap.
The “no direct shipping market” theory directly contravenes the district court’s first line of reasoning and is, I believe, fallacious, because the Commerce Clause protects commerce, not means of delivery. A Granholm issue arises if a state favors any local market in a line of goods, even one limited to on-site sales, by directly burdening interstate sellers who are compelled by economics to use a different distribution method. Whether leveling down to all face-to-face sales constitutes discrimination subject to the strict necessity test is a hotly contested question in current Granholm litigation.
The no-local market defense theory arises from Baldacci’s misapplying Exxon, where there was no local market, to a local market in which in-state wineries made on-site sales, protected from out-of-state competition. The First Circuit clarifies Exxon in Family Winemakers:
Exxon held that a law that restricts a market consisting entirely of out-of-state interests is not discriminatory because there is no local market to benefit. Exxon is not apposite where, as here, there is an in-state market and the law operates to its competitive benefit. Massachusetts cannot apply Exxon only to "large" wineries as distinct from "small" wineries; the wine market is a single although differentiated market, and § 19F’s two provisions [the statute in question] operate on that market together.
The First Circuit went on to distinguish its decision in Baldacci (which was submitted for decision on an agreed written fact statement) as dealing with an unsupported challenge:
That case involved a challenge to a Maine law that allowed wineries to sell to consumers only in face-to-face transactions. That challenge failed because plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence that the law benefitted Maine vineyards or harmed out-of-state wineries.
Baldacci only addressed the kind of showing required when a statute is challenged as discriminatory in effect but is concededly non-discriminatory in purpose. We did not address whether a lesser showing might suffice when a law is allegedly discriminatory in both effect and purpose. We do not reach this question because even under the standard in Baldacci, plaintiffs have shown § 19F is discriminatory in effect.
The First Circuit decision encourages examination of what has been regarded as a central tenet of Granholm jurisprudence, the “level field” model. It is a commonplace that protectionist discrimination can be cured by leveling up or down; it other words, that a state can comply with the Commerce Clause by permitting direct shipment for both in-state and out-of-state wineries or by denying it to both. Such a mechanistic approach, however, leads to uncritical acceptance of formalistically even-handed schemes like on-site-only laws, notwithstanding their disparate impact on nearby and distant wineries. Putting facial neutrality in perspective, as occurs in Family Winemakers, should support critical examination of other playing fields that are only superficially level.
You Can’t Have Everything
Welcome as it is, the First Circuit opinion in Family Winemakers does not answer all the questions the case raises. Following sound judicial practice, the court prudently made the most easily defensible ruling on the record before it. The opinion’s principal limitation is that on both 21st Amendment immunity and choice of test under the dormant Commerce Clause it deals with a statute convincingly shown to be effectively and intentionally discriminatory against interstate commerce.
Thus, Family Winemakers throws a spotlight on unsettled post-Granholm issues: What test applies if a state statute is discriminatory in effect but not intent? What if it was intended to discriminate, but fails to do so (assuming anyone has an interest in arguing about it in that instance)? If it is evenhanded, but would flunk the Pike balancing test on proof of the local interest pursued, could it be saved by using a lower standard for liquor? What, if anything, is left after Granholm of the concept that a state can balance “core 21st Amendment interests,” such as temperance, against the Commerce Clause?
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[1] The law had required wineries producing more than 30,000 gallons annually of grape wine to forego any sales to wholesalers in the state if they sold directly to consumers.
[2] To “distinguish” an earlier case is lawyer jargon for finding a difference in recited facts or some other aspect that could justify reaching a different result in the case at hand.
[3] I don’t have a snappy name for the first alternative, sometimes referred to in this post as the “strict necessity test.” If named after a case it could be the Philadelphia test, the Dean Milk test or the Maine v. Taylor test, etc., but no commonly accepted moniker has developed.
Huge win for wineries, but can I ship to Massachusetts now?
January 17th, 2010
First Circuit affirms District Court decision
On Thursday, January 14th, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in the case of Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins. The appellatte decision represents a major victory for wineries and may be the end of the case that was originally filed by Family Winemakers of California in September of 2006.
"We’re delighted with the decision on behalf of our members and all wineries across the U.S. We’re also glad that this court put its foot down about discriminatory laws, like production caps, not being able to withstand judicial scrutiny. Now it’s time to change Massachusetts law so that all wineries, not only in California but across the nation that produce more than 30,000 gallons will have an opportunity to fulfill the wine choices of Bay State residents," said Paul Kronenberg, President of Family Winemakers of California.
98% of domestic wine excluded
Massachusetts law allowed “small” wineries that produced less than 30,000 gallons per year to simultaneously ship wines directly to consumers with a “small winery shipping license” and to have their wines sold in traditional distribution through wholesalers. “Large” wineries (wineries that produce more than 30,000 gallons per year) did not have the same choices. They could either completely opt out of the three-tier system and ship wines to Massachusetts consumers with a “large winery shipping license”, or forego direct shipping to have their wines sold at wine retailers, restaurants and bars via traditional distribution.
According to the decision, the 637 wineries that qualified as “large” accounted for 98% of all wine produced in the United States in 2006. Of those 637, the top 30 producers accounted for 92% of the national market. The remaining 2% of U.S. wine production came from 4,713 “small” wineries, and 1,780 of those produced less than one gallon. In 2007, 100% of the 31 Massachusetts wineries produced less than 30,000 gallons per year.
Discrimination against interstate commerce
In November, 2008, the District Court ruled in that Massachusetts law had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. On Thursday, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The decision states in relevant part:
The primary question before us is whether § 19F unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce in light of both the Commerce Clause, Footnote art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.
It is clear that § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment does not protect state alcohol laws that explicitly favor in-state over out-of-state interests from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005). But § 19F is neutral on its face; it does not, by its terms, allow only Massachusetts wineries to distribute their wines through a combination of direct shipping, wholesaler distribution, and retail sales. Section 19F instead uses a very particular gallonage cap to confer this benefit upon "small" as opposed to "large" wineries.
We hold that § 19F violates the Commerce Clause because the effect of its particular gallonage cap is to change the competitive balance between in-state and out-of-state wineries in a way that benefits Massachusetts’s wineries and significantly burdens out-of-state competitors. Massachusetts has used its 30,000 gallon grape wine cap to expand the distribution options available to "small" wineries, including all Massachusetts wineries, but not to similarly situated "large" wineries, all of which are outside Massachusetts. The advantages afforded to "small" wineries by these expanded distribution options bear little relation to the market challenges caused by the relative sizes of the wineries. Section 19F’s statutory context, legislative history, and other factors also yield the unavoidable conclusion that this discrimination was purposeful. Nor does § 19F serve any legitimate local purpose that cannot be furthered by a non-discriminatory alternative.
We further hold that the Twenty-first Amendment cannot save § 19F from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment does not exempt or otherwise immunize facially neutral but discriminatory state alcohol laws like § 19F from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. We affirm the grant of injunctive relief.
New legislation needed
As we posted about almost three years ago, the capacity cap was not the only troubling issue with the Massachusetts wine law. The consumer aggregate volume limit provision and, more importantly, the requirement that carriers obtain a permit for each of their delivery trucks have been in some ways just as problematic for wine consumers. After DHL pulled out of the business of delivering wine, FedEx and UPS are by far and away the major two carriers for interstate delivery.
Both FedEx and UPS have chosen to avoid interstate wine shipments to Massachusetts because of the delivery vehicle permit system. This will likely not change following this decision. Technically, Massachusetts is now open to any domestic winery that holds the appropriate permit, regardless of its use of middle-tier distribution. But, without FedEx and UPS, Bay State consumers will still be out of luck for now. New legislation that eliminates the consumer aggregate volume limit and changes the delivery vehicle requirements will likely be necessary to truly open the state for Massachusetts consumers. This decision may just provide the momentum to pass a new wine shipping bill.
We’ll post further analysis from R. Corbin Houchins in the coming days, so please stay tuned. Also, for more background, see our previous posts:
Massachusetts Still Question Mark for 30K-Gallon Wineries
A Battle Well-Picked and Well-Fought
Family Winemakers Court Win is Big for the Industry
Family Winemakers of California Making Headway in Massachusetts
Why Can’t I Have a Boston Wine Party?
“New Vintage” of Wine Litigation
A response to the Family Winemakers lawsuit
Family Winemakers sues Massachusetts over capacity cap
MA Congress overrides Romney veto, court challenge likely
Massachusetts Governor vetoes wine bill
Up in the Air
October 20th, 2009
On September 30, a federal district judge in a New Mexico suit brought by US Airways to free it from state regulation of beverage service ruled that the 21st Amendment prevents the federal government from preempting state regulation of alcoholic beverage service aboard federally regulated carriers. The decision leaves New Mexico regulators free to treat airliners in their airspace as if they were local taverns with respect to licensing, server training and over-service.
Although the case does not deal directly with wine distribution, it is a significant addition to the “weak Granholm” viewpoint, which lends support to trade barrier proponents in the second wave of wine access litigation now in the lower federal courts.
Supremacy
Judge Armijo’s opinion in US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell introduces some legal elements that may be unfamiliar to industry observers, but it represents a reading of 21st Amendment jurisprudence that is well worth examining. Examination will involve a little more detail about the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution than has appeared to date in most public discussion of Granholm issues, but that will be unavoidable as post-2005 beverage law develops.
In the subject area of access by wine sellers to consumers and retailers in other states –that is, the development of a national market in direct distribution and direct retail sales and shipment– the recurring theme has been alleged incompatibility of state-imposed restraints with the Commerce Clause, which famously forbids permitting in-state wineries to sell and ship directly to consumers while denying that privilege to out-of-state wineries. That principle is said to arise under the “dormant” Commerce Clause, because it operates in an area, interstate commerce, where Congress holds exclusive power to legislate and has elected not to exercise it, thereby leaving the area federally unregulated and off-limits to state statutory restraints.
Supremacy Clause cases address the non-dormant side the Commerce Clause coin, where Congress has in fact exercised its power to legislate over a subject within its constitutional authority. A key question in Supremacy Clause litigation is whether existing federal legislation occupies the field being regulated, thereby invoking the Article VI declaration that laws passed by Congress “shall be the supreme Law of the Land … any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding,” to invalidate (i.e., “preempt”) the challenged state enactment. The answer is found by ascertaining the intent of Congress from the text of the statute.
Federal statutes may be found preemptive in more than one manner. The principal division is between (1) express preemption, i.e., a direct statement in the federal statute, denying states concurrent jurisdiction to legislate on the subject, and (2) implied preemption, i.e., a clear implication of that intent arising from the statutory text as a whole. Implied preemption further subdivides into “field preemption,” when the scope of the federal statutory scheme displays an intent fully to occupy the particular subject area, and “conflict preemption,” when regulated persons cannot comply with both the federal statute and the state law in question. The New Mexico case involves questions of express preemption and field preemption in the subject area of alcoholic beverage service on federally regulated air carriers.
In US Airways the federal legislation under consideration was the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, which charges the Federal Aviation Administration with the duty to prescribe “regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.” Pursuant to that directive, the FAA adopted a regulation stating that no carrier under its jurisdiction “may serve any alcoholic beverage to any person aboard any of its aircraft who … [a]ppears to be intoxicated.”
The state had adopted a far more extensive set of regulations, including requirements for licensure and server training and penalties for over-service. Following a collision on a New Mexico highway involving multiple fatalities and a driver who was allegedly over-served on a US Airways flight to the state, the regulatory authorities ordered the airline to cease serving alcoholic beverages to passengers on flights arriving in or departing from locations within the state, without licensing as a retail outlet and compliance with regulations applicable to retail licensees.
Simple Question, Different Answers
The Airline Deregulation Act expressly provides that states “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of [a federally regulated] air carrier.” Thus, the square one question was whether the suit were a simple case of express preemption, taking beverage service to be a “service” of US Airways.
As the meaning of “service” in the Act controls the outcome of the case, it is not surprising that the parties advanced different definitions. The state’s position was that the sentence in which the term appears deals with transportation services, so the term must be restricted to things like frequency of flights. That is a conclusion reached by one of the five federal appellate courts in separate circuits that had interpreted the Act (none of them the 10th Circuit, where New Mexico is located).
An alternative reading begins with observing that the statutory phrase is equivalent to “a price, a route or a service,” because the introductory indefinite article is placed to modify each of the following nouns. The implication of “a service” is that there are various services and that the express preemption applies to all of them. The reading urged by US Airways, in which the sentence applies to food and beverage service, is supported by the other four appellate decisions.
All five Circuit Court opinions apply recognized principles of statutory construction and dissect the text with well-sharpened scalpels. There is, however, a cleaver at hand.
Cutting Through Complexity –or Not
What makes US Airways worthy of discussion here is its use of the 21st Amendment to resolve a Supremacy Clause issue.
Rather than come to a conclusion as to which of the other circuits had reasoned correctly, Judge Armijo declared that the choice is forced, because interpreting the Act to apply to alcoholic beverage service would render it unconstitutional as a limitation on states’ rights preserved by § 2 of the 21st Amendment. Section 2 is, of course, the constitutional provision declaring unlawful the importation of intoxicating liquor into a state contrary to the state’s laws. Granholm adds the proviso that the state law claimed to trump a federal interest be “valid,” opening the floor to debate over how one tests for validity.
At the heart of the validity issue is the question whether parts of the constitution other than the 21st Amendment operate on state liquor laws in the same way as on state laws regulating ordinary goods. If they do, then the § 2 states’ right to venture into interstate commerce far enough to control wine importation at their borders applies only to laws that first pass muster under, e.g., the dormant Commerce Clause prohibition of discrimination against interstate commerce (as Granholm says) and under the Supremacy Clause (which US Airways ultimately excludes in the case at hand).
In finding state regulation valid, US Airways presents a somewhat convoluted syllogism, in which Congress did not intend to regulate liquor service because it could not constitutionally do so, but the federal statute might preempt the subject of liquor service anyway, if (a) the court found the federal interest in regulating liquor service outweighed the state’s interest in regulating the same subject and (b) the state laws had a significant impact on Congress’s objectives.
Imbalance
Judge Armijo implied that her decision was based in part on inadequate presentation of the airline’s case.
On how Supremacy Clause interests weigh in the balance, she wrote that US Airways “makes no argument and presents no evidence” that the state laws violate specific parts of the federal constitution, thus taking application of Granholm beyond the dormant Commerce Clause off the table. On the element of impact, she noted that the airline had not shown the state regulation “would have an adverse effect on competition and airfare.” She characterized the plaintiff’s contentions on effect as “speculative” and as taking too little account of unspecified “judicial and administrative relief under New Mexico law.”
Summing Up
After thus disposing of express preemption, the court might have had little to say about implied preemption; if the 21st Amendment would invalidate express preemption in a given subject area, it should also preclude inferring preemption in that area from Congressional occupancy of the field. However, in ruling against implied preemption, the opinion goes on to articulate two points that may prove controversial.
First, the court appears to view field preemption as requiring Congressional intent specifically to occupy a field consisting of the very subject addressed by the regulation in question, rather than to occupy a field broad enough to encompass that subject. Ascertaining implied intent is inevitably a process of divination with considerable discretion in the trial court, but the standard in US Airways may be unduly restrictive.
More significant is the second point, with which the opinion closes. The court declares that even if the subject requires “an extensive and uniform system of federal regulation,” a state may nevertheless assert a 21st Amendment right to exercise “virtually complete control” over how to structure distribution of liquor, entitling it to apply its panoply of retail licensee regulation to the federal carrier. It would be difficult to fashion a clearer expression of pre-Granholm law. The question is whether, in contexts that are not exact duplicates of the facts of Granholm, it is also a statement of current law.
Those who have followed this subject will recognize the “virtually complete control” phrase as part of a dictum from Midcal, quoted by Scalia in North Dakota v. U.S., where it was also dictum, and quoted again in Granholm, where it was dictum yet again and, as a dissenter correctly saw, incompatible with the holding. Ironically, the US Airways court cites Granholm for the control point. (For an explanation of the difference between holdings and dicta, see the blog post, Discrimination Against Out-of-State Retailers After Granholm.) Some dicta prove more substantial than the decisions that transmit them; whether that will be true of this one is the central question of current 21st Amendment litigation.
by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com
Washington State Approval No Longer Required for Wine Labels
September 17th, 2009
In an action supported by Washington Wine Institute, the Washington State Liquor Control Board adopted a new policy on wine label approval. Effective August 19, 2009, the WSLCB will accept the federal Certificate of Label Approval (COLA) as label approval for beer and wine to be sold in the state of Washington. Producers will no longer be required to apply for state label approval, but as WSLCB confirmed today, wineries will still need to file their COLA’s with the Board. Alcohol and keg products that do not require Federal label approval are also approved to sell immediately.
- Jean M. Leonard, Esq. – Executive Director, Washington Wine Institute
Has the Price Posting Bunny Run Down?
July 21st, 2009
For the fourth time in the same case, TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, a federal Court of Appeals has told the state of Maryland and its wholesaler-package store cohort that their price posting system conflicts with the Sherman Act, the nation’s premier antitrust law. As a federal enactment, the Sherman Act preempts inconsistent state law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution, absent a specific exception.
Maryland had indefatigably marched on, beating the drum for a 21st Amendment exception to federal antitrust law since 1999, when the suit began as TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer. The latest rebuff, on 15 July 2009, repeats the teaching of the previous three appeals: “Not proved.” That ruling does not change the status of price posting in Maryland, because an earlier district court ruling to the same effect was not stayed on appeal. Presumably, the qualified abandonment of posting announced by the state in a 2007 bulletin continues in force.
TFWS is, however, more than a simple failure of proof. Deeper issues remain unresolved, at least one of which might, in theory, support an attempt by the unsuccessful appellants to obtain Supreme Court review.
To understand what is at stake, one has to consider three aspects of antitrust challenges to state restraints of trade in general and to the particular alcoholic beverage regulatory restraint known as “post and hold.”
First, it is basic antitrust law that a group of manufacturers or wholesalers who agreed among themselves to publish their price lists, to sell at no other prices, and to keep the list unchanged for 30 days would be violating the federal Sherman Act if they had any effect on interstate commerce. (Almost all wine business meets the interstate commerce requirement, and most states have “little Sherman Acts” without that requirement, so we can ignore the commerce issue.)
Second, it has been accepted antitrust law since the 1940s that states, acting in their sovereign capacities, are immune from federal antitrust law, on the rationale that our federal system could not operate if the central government could enjoin state exercise of governmental functions.
Thus, federal antitrust law allows a state to mandate conduct that, if done by individuals without involvement of the state, would land them in the federal pen. Maryland could, if it wanted, specify the prices at which wine is to be sold and require those prices to be posted and held in force for any period. That is “sovereign immunity,” and its failure as a defense in TFWS is an important aspect of the ruling to which we will return in a moment.
Third, if sovereign immunity is unavailable, the TFWS court recognized an independent potential defense, viz., that § 2 of the 21st Amendment (forbidding importation of wine contrary to the laws of the state) would have allowed the state to admit wine on the condition that it be sold in a manner contrary to federal antitrust law, if the state had proven certain preconditions. Its recognition of a 21st Amendment defense is, technically, dicta –i.e., commentary that is not required to support the decision, and therefore not binding as precedent on other courts. In other words, the outcome would have been the same if there were no 21st Amendment defense: the state lost.
So if price posting was state law, why did Maryland not have a good sovereign immunity defense?
Price posting laws are not pure state action because the parties setting the posted prices are private actors, not the state. If wholesalers set the price, and the state merely enforces adherence to it, the TFWS court, like courts that have looked at other price posting laws, classifies it not as state action, but rather as a “hybrid” of state and private action. Hybrid restraints of trade are subject to special rules in Sherman Act cases, as established by the Midcal decision in 1980.
The 4th Circuit applied the familiar two-prong Midcal test to Maryland’s system. One prong asks whether the substitution of regulating pricing in place of competition is an articulated state policy. The other asks if the state adequately supervises the prices posted to assure that the system does not deteriorate into simple private price-fixing. If the answer is no to either, it’s not state action, and no immunity applies. Like most cases applying Midcal to posting systems, TFWS found inadequate supervision and didn’t have to consider the policy articulation prong.
I have great fondness for the Sherman Act and cheer when it sweeps away restraints on trade in wine. Still, I have to admit uneasiness about the lack of post-Midcal explication by the Supreme Court on the boundaries of hybrid status. In the Midcal case itself, the state law required the private actors to engage in conduct that was necessarily an independent violation of the Sherman Act (resale price-fixing, at the time considered always illegal). It is not obvious that a posting system that requires each private actor only to select a price and post it is requiring an always-illegal act. On the other hand, that factor may not be necessary, as Midcal’s reasoning does not expressly limit the decision to systems that inevitably produce an independent Sherman Act violation on the part of the private actors.
Other courts, notably in the Miller case from Oregon, have bridged the gap by noting the opportunity for collusion, citing anticompetitive effects on the market, or (perhaps metaphysically) joining unilateral private acts with the known coercive power of the state to form the equivalent of a conspiracy. The recent Costco case in Washington State followed TFWS in picking up that approach, which seems reasonably well established, but thus far hasn’t been given a Supreme Court imprimatur.
A risk in an appeal in TFWS would be frontal attack on the Miller-Costco line of cases, with the objective of narrowing the prevailing understanding of Midcal and reviving the validity of posting laws like Maryland’s under the sovereign immunity doctrine. There is language in one post-Midcal decision supportive of that line of argument. Litigating the point would invite the long shot countermeasure of questioning the breadth of sovereign immunity itself, whose logical underpinnings in the Supreme Court’s 1943 Parker decision are of imperfect clarity, but which is deeply settled law, if for no other reason than age. It would be an intellectually stimulating debate, but one I’d readily forego for the sake of leaving the antitrust approach of Miller, Costco and TFWS undisturbed.
Entirely separate is the question of a 21st Amendment antitrust defense. As conceived by parties defending price posting, the defense would allow a state that failed to achieve sovereign immunity because of lack of active supervision nevertheless to maintain a hybrid system that turns private parties loose to violate antitrust law if the purpose is a recognized objective of liquor regulation, such as promotion of temperance.
One of the Midcal Court’s famous statements is that it was not deciding when “if ever” the states’ rights policy behind the 21st Amendment could outweigh the federal policy for competition expressed in the Sherman Act, which the Court has termed the Magna Carta of our economic liberties. It could duck that question because the state’s factual support for the law on those grounds had already been found wanting in a related case.
Thus, Midcal marks the beginning of a judicial snipe hunt for a defense that may not exist. To say that no 21st Amendment interest could be sufficient to justify direct contravention of fundamental competition policy embodied in the Sherman Act would be a profoundly controversial development in Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. It’s much less daring to rule repeatedly that the defense requires proof that is missing in the case at bar.
One of the unfortunate consequences of the Fourth Circuit’s recurring tutelage of the Maryland district court on the standard of proof is that prolonged disinclination to address the more fundamental question tends to lodge the idea that there must be a defense more firmly in the judicial mind. Formulation of the evidentiary requirements in TFWS has produced a kind of standard incantation for use by judges before invalidating a pricing law on Sherman Act grounds –wholeheartedly adopted, for example, in Costco.
As expressed in TFWS dicta, a 21st Amendment defense can be established if the evidence shows:
1) The state’s purpose is one of those protected by the Amendment.
2) The challenged law is effective in carrying out that purpose.
3) The state’s interest in the law, to the extent it is effective in carrying out the purpose, outweighs the federal interest in promoting competition.
Maryland maintained that the purpose of price posting was to make liquor more expensive, thereby promoting the objective of temperance. The court agreed that temperance is a legitimate 21st Amendment objective, and checked off item 1.
Most of TFWS was about item 2, effectiveness, and concerned how to measure relative prices between Maryland and neighboring states that did not use posting. Ten years of litigation failed to produce a sustainable finding that post and hold had a significant effect on temperance. Thus, the TFWS court did not have to reach the unwieldy issue of whether a temperance issue outweighed the policy of the Sherman Act (an area into which one may assume it had no wish to venture). The implication is that if the law had been effective, the district court would have had to receive and weigh some kind of evidence of the social importance of reduced liquor sales versus the public’s Sherman Act right to competitively determined pricing, a nightmarish prospect for all but the most fearless lower court judges.
One should not ignore opportunities to compliment one’s adversaries. In that spirit, I express continuing admiration of defenders of price posting for their ability to maintain a straight face while asserting that its purpose is temperance. Post and hold requirements are simply another method of reducing competition and thereby padding private profits, primarily in the middle tier. If a state wished to reduce problematic alcohol consumption by raising prices, it would increase its excise tax on frequently abused products, not throw a prize to industry members by attempting to grant them a spurious exemption from antitrust law. None of the states whose price posting laws have been invalidated has attempted to replace the stricken law with a system providing sufficient state supervision to meet the Midcal test or to return to court with proof of effectiveness under the TFWS test, and none has reported a resulting surge of intemperance.
If the “21st Amendment defense” to Sherman Act challenge remains in the realm of dicta, with its underlying factual requirements never proven, it may devolve to the status of mythical animal, doing no harm to protection of competition. Even so, however, the chimera would muddy analysis of our most important antitrust law and invite protracted judicial charades like TFWS. It would be a service if some judge somewhere would switch the bunny off for good.
by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com
Still Looking for Granholm’s Limits
July 3rd, 2009
Anyone hoping the intermediate appellate court reversed in Granholm had become pro-commerce would have been disappointed by the July 1st decision of the Second Circuit in Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle.
At issue was whether a state permitting its local retail licensees to ship directly to consumers might constitutionally deny out-of-state retail licensees equivalent access. The Court of Appeals reached the less than crystalline conclusion that discrimination against interstate sellers is permissible under the 21st Amendment “insofar as it requires that all liquor sold within the State of New York pass through New York’s three-tier regulatory system.”
Judge Wesley, writing for an essentially undivided three-member panel, asserts that the locals-only licensing system “allows the state to oversee” (1) financial relationships among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers,” which relate to state tied-house statutes limiting vertical integration, and (2) the prices and other terms of sale, which the state purports to regulate with the objective of averting overconsumption and disorderly marketing. He also notes that New York claims the system allows the state to collect taxes more efficiently than with alternative systems and to prevent sales to minors.
One cannot accurately maintain that the challenged licensing system “allows” those regulatory objectives in the sense of being necessary to achieve them. It is even less defensible to assert that location discrimination in applying a licensing system is necessary to oversee financial relationships and sales terms, to collect taxes with acceptable efficiency, or to prevent underage purchases. Thus, the court cannot escape the question whether less discriminatory means exist –unless it takes the discrimination entirely out of Granholm’s analysis of discriminatory laws. Most of the opinion is an attempt to do just that.
To circumvent the nondiscriminatory means issue, Judge Wesley articulates the “narrow Granholm” 21st Amendment-Commerce Clause theory: “It is only where states create discriminatory exceptions to the three-tier system, allowing in-state, but not out-of-state, liquor to bypass the three regulatory tiers, that their laws are subject to invalidation based on the Commerce Clause.” His opinion recognizes (or carves) an exception to the equal access principle, based on the famous North Dakota statement that the 21st Amendment “empowers [a state] to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler (emphasis supplied),” even though that text appears in Granholm only as a “see also” citation that is not part of the Granholm holding and is also dictum in North Dakota itself. He does not overtly consider whether Granholm’s undoubted assertion of the legitimacy of three-tier systems includes the qualification (arguably inherent in the Granholm holding) that such systems may not employ location discrimination unless it is necessity-justified by some purpose other than perpetuation of the system itself. Without inclusion of that qualifier, it is easy to stop analyzing the Granholm opinion for effects on tiered distribution when one reaches its quotation from North Dakota.
Thus, Arnold’s Wines puts us squarely into the fundamental uncertainty about Granholm: Are only what the majority calls “valid” or “generally applicable” (i.e., location-nondiscriminatory) restrictions permissible, even in areas of traditional state’s rights under the 21st Amendment, as Justice Thomas says disapprovingly in his dissent, or is there something special about passage of title through a wholesaler that provides ipso facto legitimacy to location discrimination between in-state and out-of-state resellers of the product?
Clearly in the second camp, the Arnold’s Wines majority opinion advances two propositions as rationales for its decision:
1. The “three-tier system” means goods physically moving through all three tiers, the lower two of which are located in the same state as the consumer who purchases the goods. A ruling requiring equal access to the same consumers by out-of-state retailers is therefore an attack on the three-tier system, which would not be consistent with Granholm, because the majority in that case said the three-tier system is unquestionably legitimate.
2. New York’s law “treats in-state and out-of-state liquor evenhandedly” once it is in the state’s three-tier system, and “thus complies with Granholm’s nondiscrimination principle.” Equal treatment of products by allowing them all, regardless of original site of manufacture, to pass through the three-tier system, satisfies Commerce Clause requirements, even if the law prohibits interstate sellers to reach the same consumers as local sellers. The dormant Commerce Clause protects goods, not merchants.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi agrees with his colleagues’ reasoning, but adds an eloquent originalist plea for judicial caution in “updating” constitutional provisions that (unlike, e.g., due process of law) are not drafted loosely with an implied invitation to reinterpret them as society changes. One has the impression he wishes he could have restrained the impetuosity of the Granholm majority. He was, in any event, determined not to extend that opinion’s 2005 update of the 21st Amendment beyond his panel’s delimited reading.
Relatively short in comparison to the complexity of the issues, the majority opinion does not address a number of questions raised by its stated rationales.
In the first place, it is not at all clear that Judge Wesley’s three-tier system is the same thing as the three-tier system declared legitimate in Granholm. The Granholm majority unmistakably implies there are such things as constitutional systems funneling all wine sales through local wholesalers, but is silent (to the exasperation of Justice Thomas) on how they would operate without producing impermissible favoritism toward local versus interstate commerce. One court has already attempted to resolve the conundrum by preserving a state requirement that sales go through a locally licensed wholesaler, but requiring the state to process retail license applications without location discrimination. If one adds drop shipment to that scenario, it becomes possible to run all sales through an in-state distributor (who would presumably also be responsible for tax and price reporting) and avoid location discrimination in access to local consumers.
Ultimately, the first rationale rests on the court’s pronouncement that unequal access to customers by retailers is “part of the three-tier licensing structure” (vice distribution system) established in New York. When the court concludes that exemption of unequal access from Commerce Clause scrutiny is established by that proposition, it is committing what a logician would call a mereological fallacy. That is, assuming the state’s licensing structure could be part of a three-tier system, it does not follow that special exempted status accorded three-tier systems applies to each part of it. That logical gap would exist even if the North Dakota dictum were established law, and even if one further assumed that all members of the class “three-tier systems” were exempt from the dormant Commerce Clause.
With respect to the second rationale, the Court of Appeals may have made a bold departure from the conceptual underpinnings of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in its attempt to diminish Granholm’s scope. Most judges and commentators have assumed that the Commerce Clause is intended to protect commerce, not merely choice of manufacturing site. It is, of course, entirely proper for a court to attempt to limit a disliked precedent to its specific facts, but drawing the line at products, excluding protection of downstream merchants, seems extreme.
Judge Wesley may have been forced to an extreme position to support his assertion that the facts before him were in “stark contrast” to those of Granholm. Viewed from another angle, the distance between the cases does not appear so great. Mrs. Swedenburg’s wines and those of the other Granholm plaintiffs had equal rights with New York wines to direct delivery to New York consumers from bricks-and-mortar locations within New York. That may not be so easy to distinguish from the Arnold’s Wines plaintiffs’ equal right to sell to New York consumers through bricks-and-mortar wholesalers and retailers within New York. One need not read Granholm very broadly to conclude that if the former was invalid, the validity of the latter is at least questionable.
Because the court seems to believe no nondiscriminatory means inquiry is necessary, its reference to state purposes may be only a makeweight. However, it is worth noting that the listed objectives themselves are not all necessarily legitimate. If the purpose of tied-house laws is to prevent supplier interests in New York retailers, regulation of sales by those retailers within New York is sufficient. Only if New York’s objective is to prevent such interests in retailers located in other states is it necessary to “oversee” the financial relationships of those sellers. That objective, however, raises significant issues of extraterritoriality. In a 1989 beer pricing case, the Supreme Court enunciated limits on state legislation, 21st Amendment notwithstanding, short of regulating conduct that occurs entirely outside the state (which would appear to include financial relationships among entities in another state, whether or not one of them sells into the state) or causing a patchwork of different requirements for businesses engaged in interstate commerce (as seems the case, given the widely differing requirements of state tied-house laws). Those limitations suggest that tied-house oversight of out-of-state sellers is a not legitimate purpose that can be advanced to justify discrimination. Worse, extraterritorial effect of state laws is ordinarily considered not merely discrimination against, but direct state regulation of, interstate commerce –an unconstitutional invasion of the federal sphere that cannot be rendered legal by laudable purpose.
In sum, Arnold’s Wines is a forceful formulation of the narrow Granholm position, with a forthright end run around less-discriminatory-means analysis. Its clarity emphasizes the developing differences among federal circuits in understanding that landmark case. While it is doubtful the Supreme Court has much appetite for revisiting Granholm, divergent interpretations at the intermediate level slowly increase the probability of high court review.
by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com
Release Thirty-One of “Notes on Wine Distribution”
June 23rd, 2009
R. Corbin Houchins’s latest “Notes on Wine Distribution” are now available. Release 31 includes updates on legislation, litigation and general discussions on available distribution channels for wine. In addition to country-wide topics such as “Direct Shipment by Retailers” and “A Limitation of Litigation”, distribution practices are also outlined on a state-by-state basis. Numerous states have had notable legislative activity this session, with Kansas, Maine, and Tennessee adopting major legislative changes regarding direct shipping. Read about these and other updates that affect the way wine is sold and shipped within the United States.
You can view these notes anytime by visiting the ShipCompliant Blog, located under “Compliance Resources”, or by visiting CorbinCounsel.com and clicking on the home page link, “Notes on Wine Distribution.”
On-Site Requirements: Still Standing in the Heartland
May 19th, 2009
Last August, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Baude v. Heath invalidated an Indiana statute that made most out-of-state wineries ineligible for the “direct wine seller’s permit,” which the law would have limited to in-state wineries and to wineries in the few states that do not grant them local wholesaling privileges. However, the opinion upheld the requirement that a consumer’s first purchase from each winery occur on the winery premises, a ruling that led the plaintiffs to seek review in the Supreme Court by petitioning for a writ of certiorari, based on de facto discrimination against distant wineries.
On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition without opinion. The consequence is that the Circuit Court opinion remains the last word on the subject, at least among the federal courts of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. (The case does not address a subsequent statutory change disqualifying wineries with Indiana wholesaler relationships from direct shipment, but a similar Massachusetts provision that fell disproportionately on out-of-state wineries was invalidated in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins.)
Denials of certiorari carry no legal weight as to the merits of the issues, but the ruling illustrates the propositions that Granholm does not “open the states” to direct shipment (in case there is anyone who hasn’t yet gotten that message) and that clarification of Granholm is probably not a high priority for the Court. For the near term, Granholm’s many unanswered questions will continue to leave lower courts considerable freedom in deciding how much a state may burden cross-border wine commerce. If conflicts among the circuits develop over time, chances of Supreme Court review will improve.
When Will The Wine Industry Rebound?
May 18th, 2009
Amidst lagging wine sales in 2008 and a sluggish economy, Silicon Valley Bank Wine Division founder Rob McMillan outlines critical issues facing the wine industry and growing economic and market trends in his “2009-2010 State of the Wine Industry” report.
“Wine businesses across the board are being pushed to new limits in the current environment,” said Rob McMillan, founder of Silicon Valley Bank’s Wine Division and author of the report.
Rob McMillan will reveal strategic and tactical recommendations to wine businesses as they adapt to current and anticipated market conditions and other insider information based on his expert research and surveys of nearly 500 wineries that may help you plan for your future at ShipCompliant’s 4th annual Direct Shipping Seminar & Users Conference. The conference will take place on June 11, 2009, at the Napa Valley Marriott.
Other conference speakers include W. Curtis Coleburn, Chief Operating Officer of the Virginia ABC, and Steve Gross, Director of State Relations at the Wine Institute.
Participating companies include: Wine Business Monthly, FedEx, Wines & Vines, Copper Peak Logistics, Bacchus Fulfillment, WTN Services, Pack n’ Ship Direct, Wineshipping, Benson Marketing, Microworks, Cultivate Systems, Active Club Management, WineWeb Enterprises, eWinery Solutions, Elypsis, WineWare Software, Missing Link/eCellar, VinNOW and EVT Solutions.
Register online today to confirm your spot.
Massachusetts Still Question Mark for 30K-Gallon Wineries
February 8th, 2009
On January 16, 2009, the state filed its notice of appeal in the 2006 Granholm-based federal suit, Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins. The District Court had entered judgment on December 18, 2008, enjoining enforcement of a statute that prevents direct shipment by 30,000-gallon-or-more wineries that sell through Massachusetts wholesalers (a category exclusively out-of-state), while affording smaller wineries, a category for which all in-state wineries qualify, “unfettered access.”
On February 3, 2009 the District Court transmitted the record of the case to the Court of Appeals, the first step in a process that may take a couple of years. The state can move for a stay in the District Court and, if unsuccessful, apply again in the Court of Appeals. Thus, it is unknown at this point whether the appeal will, at least temporarily, reinstate the status quo ante.
Michigan Levels Down on Wine Retailers
January 13th, 2009
In just five legislative days, Michigan House Bill 6644 was introduced, edited, voted upon, and enrolled. In a disappointing turn of events, the Michigan Senate passed HB 6644, with substitutions, by a count of 36 Yeas and just 2 Nays on December 18, 2008. The bill then returned to the House for a final vote on concurrence, the result of which was 98 Yeas and 4 Nays, subsequently, HB 6644 was ordered enrolled. Governor Granholm approved the bill on January 9, 2009, now called Public Act 474′08 2008 Addenda.
While the original bill would have banned all retail to consumer direct shipping, the Senate made substitutions that provide a very small opening for retailer direct shipments. This comes after Michigan retailers, who count catering as a significant source of income, raised concerns over the potential loss of revenue. In the bill that was approved by the Senate, House, and signed by Governor Granholm last Friday, retailers are allowed to deliver to consumers if they adhere to these restrictive criteria:
- obtain a specially designated merchant license issued by Michigan, or another state’s equivalent for out-of-state retailers;
- only deliver its products through the hands of their own employees and NOT by an agent or a third party delivery service while also verifying the age of the recipient, (the only situation in which retailers may use a third-party service is if the municipality is surrounded by water and does not have road access);
- have the employees who deliver their products receive alcohol server training through a Michigan Liquor Control Commission approved server training program.
These substitutions provide relief for those lucky Michigan retailers who do not have state-wide wine shipping aspirations. Caterers who obtain the specially designated merchant license (and their own means of transportation) should find the bill satisfactory. But for those retailers who hoped to serve consumers across the state of Michigan, this bill is a blow to their direct shipping business. Although the Senate prevented the outright ban of retail-to-consumer direct shipments, there is little for retailers to smile about because they still face an indirect ban: the restriction on the use of third-party delivery services. Tom Wark, Executive Director of the Specialty Wine Retailers had this to say on the matter.
Our view of Michigan’s HB 6644 is that it is equally unconstitutional as the law that was just overturned in the District Court. However, this doesn’t surprise us as the goal of this legislation was always to do whatever was necessary to prevent Michigan consumers from legally accessing the wines they want and to protect in-state wholesalers. HB 6644 may appear to be facially neutral, but the law is unquestionably discriminatory in its effect and in its intent.
When Judge Hood’s September 30th, 2008 ruling on Siesta Village Market LLC v. Granholm effectively ordered Michigan to allow out-of-state retailers to direct ship wine to Michigan consumers, hopes were high. It was thought that the case would establish a precedent for future retail direct shipping litigation. But in November, with the prospect of having to comply with Judge Hood’s ruling–to allow out-of-state retailers to direct ship to Michigan consumers–looming, Michigan wine wholesalers and the state Liquor Commission organized to introduce HB 6644 in the most discrete manner. The organized efforts of Michigan wholesalers enabled this legislation to pass with surprising speed and support and without public discussion, tactics that prevented retailers and consumers from organizing in protest.
In the strange world of Michigan wine legislation, it is possible to allow one licensed wine vendor to direct ship, while preventing another licensed wine vendor from doing the same, while restricting the needs of wine enthusiasts and consumers. An appeal inSiesta Village Market is still possible, but for now retailers are out of luck in Michigan.
Kentucky On-Site Requirement Invalidated, but Questions Remain
December 31st, 2008
On December 24th, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, in the Cherry Hill case, the judgment of the district court, invalidating the on-site purchase requirement.
The district court ruled, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), that the in-person purchase requirement in portions of Kentucky’s statutory scheme discriminated against interstate commerce by limiting the ability of out-of-state small farm wineries to sell and ship wine to Kentucky consumers.
Although this decision sets an important precedent, especially in light of a contradictory decision in Indiana, several questions remain unresolved. Despite the justifiably positive news in the press, direct shipping to Kentucky seems unlikely in the near term.
The biggest obstacle is the fact that the common carriers (FedEx and UPS) have not approved the state of Kentucky for direct shipping. Among other reasons for not yet opening up the Bluegrass State, the carriers are not thrilled about dealing with the 53 Dry and 16 Moist counties.
Furthermore, in spite of the recent victory in Massachusetts where the 30,000 gallon capacity cap was declared unconstitutional, the Cherry Hill challenge of the 50,000 gallon capacity cap in Kentucky was not successful. So, even if the carriers approved Kentucky for shipping, only “small farm” wineries would be eligible for a permit.
Corbin Houchins provided great analysis of the original district court ruling two years ago, and I recommend revisiting that post for more information on Cherry Hill. He highlighted an additional question about the two case “per visit” limit, and how that would apply given the unconstitutionality of the on-site visit requirement.
Up and Running (So Far)
December 19th, 2008
Happily for the plaintiffs, Judge Zobel’s final judgment in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins took the path that seemed most likely from the tone and content of her memorandum and order of 19 November 2008 and leveled up. The judgment entered 18 December 2008 orders the state “to permit wineries of all sizes to apply for licenses under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, § 19F(b),” which does not contain the § 19F(a) disqualification of wineries that have sold to a Massachusetts wholesaler within six months of applying for the license, formerly applicable to all 30,000-gallon-and-over wineries. In her November opinion, the judge had noted that the “choice” to use direct shipment only after abandoning all sales through wholesalers for six months was, in effect, prohibition.
Final judgment does not settle the issue of a possible stay of the injunction pending appeal. The state has 30 days from entry of the judgment to file notice of appeal, which would be a prerequisite to moving for a stay in the trial court and, if unsuccessful there, in the Court of Appeals.
By R. Corbin Houchins, Attorney at Law
Wine Distribution Notes – Release 30
December 5th, 2008
Release 30 of Notes on Wine Distribution by R. Corbin Houchins is now available for viewing or downloading.
The Notes provide thoughtful insight on the state of direct shipping rules and valuable information on current litigation and legislation for each of the United States (plus DC), with changes from the preceding release indicated by highlighted headings. Some highlighted segments in the new release:
Direct Shipment by Retailers
Volume Caps
Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins in Massachusetts
Siesta Village Market, LLC. v. Granholm in Michigan
As always, the most recent version of the notes is available on the ShipCompliant Blog, so check regularly for updates.
An Unfortunate Direct Shipping License Clarification in Texas
December 4th, 2008
Wineries applying for a Texas Direct Wine Shipper’s Permit or renewing their existing permit must now pay a surcharge of $160 in addition to the $75 annual permit fee. Currently the Direct Shipper’s permit is renewed annually. However, beginning January 1, 2009 all Direct Shipper licenses will be valid for two years. Applicants will have to pay license fees and surcharges for 2 years totaling $470 when applying for a permit in 2009. The Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission added significant surcharges to a wide range of licenses affecting both in-state and out-of-state applicants.
Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute
