Two important factors paved the path to the passage of direct shipping legislation in Maryland. First, a local citizens organization, “Marylanders for Better Beer and Wine Laws”, kept pressure on the Maryland legislature year after year even though earlier direct shipping bills were defeated. Second, the Maryland Comptroller’s office released a Direct Wine Shipment Report late last year debunking many of the claims made by opponents of wine shipping concerning minor access to wine and harm that might come to local business as a result of wine shipments.

Though retailers were included in original versions of the direct shipping legislation, they were left out of the final language, perhaps in part, because the Comptroller’s Report did not advocate for retail-to-consumer shipping.

The new law takes effect July 1, 2011 and allows wineries to obtain a Direct Wine Shipper’s Permit for $200 (renew annually). Each licensed winery will be allowed to ship up to 18 cases of wine to a single delivery address each year and will be responsible for quarterly reporting and payment of excise and sales taxes on all shipments made into the state. Potential shippers now await permit application and instruction forms from the Maryland Comptroller, which could be made available any time. We will keep you updated as more information becomes available.

When comparing the text (see our redline version) of the current bill to that of the revised version of the original bill (HR 5034) from September, you’ll notice that not much changed in terms of substance. Aside from the assignment of a new bill number (HR 1161), the re-introduced bill was renamed to be the “Community” Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act of 2011 from the “Comprehensive” Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act of 2010. The Purpose (Sec. 2) and Declaration of Policy (Sec. 3a) were also rewritten and are now slightly more concise. However, the meat of the Act lies within the Construction of Congressional Silence (Sec. 3b) and the Amendment to Wilson Act (Sec. 4), both of which were untouched. For additional background on the CARE Act and its potential effects, see our previous post, which was published just before the House Judiciary Committee hearing on September 29th, 2010.

Because HR 5034’s lead sponsor, Bill Delahunt, retired from congress last year, HR 1161 has a new lead sponsor in Rep. Jason Chaffetz of Utah. Rep. Chaffetz was one of the original co-sponsors of HR 5034, which was shelved with 152 total co-sponsors. HR 1161 was introduced with only eight co-sponsors last week, but that number will certainly grow as the lobbying efforts begin to ramp up. The bill has yet to be introduced in the Senate.

And so the battle continues. NBWA and WSWA both applauded the introduction of HR 1161 as necessary to enable “states to defend their alcohol laws from litigation designed to eviscerate state control over alcohol policy decisions.” A coalition of supplier groups, including the Brewers Association, Beer Institute, Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, Wine Institute, National Association of Beverage Importers, and WineAmerica, remain opposed and immediately responded by referencing their preemptive February joint producer letter to Congress urging them to refrain from spending “valuable time wading into an intra-industry squabble and unraveling a successful regulatory structure to the detriment of consumers, the industry, and the federal interest in a fair, competitive, and orderly marketplace for alcohol beverages.”

“Ultimately, this legislation is about who should make decisions regarding alcohol regulation, not what those decisions should be,” said NBWA President Craig Purser in a statement. “Alcohol is different than other consumer products and that’s why the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution created a state-based system of alcohol regulation that effectively balances local community control, tough consumer protections as well as choice and variety. The majority of Americans believe that laws regarding the regulation of alcohol should be made at the state and local level – and so do we.”

Paul Kronenburg, President of Family Winemakers of California, summarized the supplier opposition to HR 1611. “Family Winemakers of California (FWC) remains opposed to efforts at the national level to undermine the Commerce Clause and embolden states to pass discriminatory alcohol laws.  Rarely are states reluctant to regulate and they don’t need H.R. 1161 to remind them of their authority.  Florida is a prime example where wholesalers recently introduced a production cap bill despite last year’s Massachusetts decision finding caps unconstitutional.  FWC will work with others to preserve our national economic union and consumer choice by opposing H.R. 1161.”

"We see HR 1161 as a radical departure from the principles of a single economic union laid down in the Constitution," said Tom Wark, executive director of the Specialty Wine Retailers Association. "This bill would revoke all Commerce Clause protections against discriminatory state laws that wine retailers currently enjoy and would undoubtedly lead to protectionist laws that hurt retailers and consumer access to wine, beer and spirits."

In a previous post, we discussed how the CARE Act would not change anything overnight, despite hyperbole to the contrary. Effectively, it would allow states the ability to pass new laws that include non-facial forms of discrimination such as capacity caps, in-person purchase requirements, and limits on production capacity. One certainty is that the hyperbole and rhetoric on both sides will escalate as the industry associations dig in and make their case for (and against) federal legislation. Wholesaler groups are going out of their way to say that this is not an “intra-industry” squabble, but the battle lines are currently drawn with wholesalers united on one side, and suppliers united on the other.

Further Reading:
HR 5034 Bill Summary and Status
HR 1161 Bill Summary and Status
NBWA Press Release
WSWA Press Release
Beer, Wine and Spirits Producers Press Release
Viewpoint: Back to the Future with HR 5034 (June 2010)
H.R. 5034 Update: Revision Reignites Debate, Important Hearing Set for Wednesday (September 2010)

Denial of review leaves standing the 5th Circuit opinion, which reads Granholm to mean only that states giving their in-state manufacturers the right to circumvent the “three-tier system” cannot for protectionist purposes deny the same dispensation to out-of-state manufacturers. In that analysis, the state can allow its own retailers to deliver directly to Texas consumers while denying the same privilege to out-of-state retailers, because Granholm does not address application of the Commerce Clause to non-producing sellers.

Judge Leslie Southwick’s opinion in Steen does not shrink from the basic Granholm question: Does the state law facially and intentionally discriminate against out-of-state retailers relative to in-state retailers? Although he points out that Texas has not authorized circumvention of the three-tier system for local retailers and thus, he believes, cannot be discriminating when it prevents out-of-state retailers from circumventing the same system, Steen is about justifying location discrimination, not about whether it exists.

The justification Steen offers is that without excluding interstate retailing, the state could not maintain a mandatory three-tier system — thus elevating the form of regulatory structure to a constitutional principle outweighing Commerce Clause considerations. Does denial of Supreme Court review advance that position in the ongoing controversy over state barriers to interstate retailing and wholesaling?

When the Supreme Court Passes

It is a truism in the law that the Court’s denying review carries no implication that the decision in question was correct. Many considerations go into review decisions, and it is not difficult to justify excluding from a packed court calendar a case revisiting a difficult and divisive precedent that affects only a relatively small segment of the economy. As noted in previous blogs, I suspect it will require inconsistent rulings among the appellate circuits to drag the Court into confronting the internal contradictions of Granholm.

Nonetheless, even if denial of review is technically meaningless, it may add a bit of luster to the lower court opinion in the eyes of judges in other circuits and at least justifies a close look at where the Steen decision leaves us.

Before Granholm

Ironically, it was the 5th Circuit that presaged Granholm in the 2003 Dickerson case, by invalidating facially discriminatory Texas direct shipment laws. In Dickerson the 21st Amendment did not save the state statutes because they had been adopted for a protectionist purpose, rather than a recognized 21st Amendment objective such as temperance. Reasoning based on purpose followed straightforwardly from the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Bacchus.

In 2005, Granholm supplanted Dickerson as the definitive statement of Commerce Clause versus 21st Amendment jurisprudence on discrimination against out-of-state wineries relative to in-state wineries. Both cases dealt exclusively with the producing wineries’ direct sales and shipments to consumers.

While Dickerson was merely silent on application of the nondiscrimination principle to other tiers of distribution, Granholm contains the famous quotations from Justice Scalia’s one-judge opinion in a 1990 Supreme Court case that did not involve direct shipment to consumers, North Dakota v. U.S., “We have previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is ‘unquestionably legitimate’ . . . . The Twenty-first Amendment . . . empowers North Dakota to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.”

A Little Latin

Because Granholm involved no challenge to a state three-tier system itself, but dealt only with discriminatory application of a three-tier requirement, the above quotations play no role in the strict logic of the ultimate decision. They are, in legal parlance, “obiter dicta,” which means things said in passing — usually shortened to “dicta,” and sometimes seen in its singular form, “dictum.”

Portions of an opinion that are mere dicta, even coming from the Supreme Court, are not binding on lower courts. Lower courts are obliged to accept the Supreme Court’s determinations of matters of law that are pivotal to its decisions and to follow the doctrinal principles necessarily implied by how a Supreme Court case came out. That source of mandatory guidance is known as the “holding” of the case. The Commerce Clause principle of nondiscrimination that actually drove the Granholm result is part of its holding. Dicta are not part of the holding, and lower courts are entitled to give them as much or as little weight as they see fit in applying the Supreme Court precedent in which they appear.

The Court itself has been lax in distinguishing dicta from holdings. For example, the 1980 landmark Midcal opinion admits states have “virtually complete control” over fashioning their liquor distribution systems, but that observation could not be a holding, because Midcal overturned the California price posting system. Nevertheless, Granholm quotes the passage without labeling it as dicta. Similarly, Granholm says the Court “held” in North Dakota that “States can mandate a three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of their authority under the Twenty-first Amendment,” although eight of the nine justices deciding North Dakota disagreed with that unqualified statement.

Because North Dakota is the primary source of current judicial defense of the three-tier system, it merits careful examination. There the conflict was between North Dakota’s distribution system and federal regulations that called for supplying spirits to armed services post exchanges at a price achievable only by direct distribution from distillers. The Court’s opinion, endorsed by four of the nine justices, declared that the state’s three-tier law survived a Supremacy Clause challenge for conflict with federal regulations (not a dormant Commerce Clause challenge) only because the state provided a workable alternative to three-tier distribution — i.e., requiring an identifying sticker on bottles distributed directly. Four other justices found the alternative too burdensome and would have overturned the state law.

The swing justice was Scalia, who wrote a separate opinion expressing the view that the practicality of the sticker alternative didn’t matter, because the state’s right to enforce three-tier distribution was absolute under the 21st Amendment. With five justices voting to uphold the law, the case resulted in a victory for the state, but with no majority view of the rationale and only one justice advancing the absolutist position. That one-judge concurring opinion is the sole source of the above quoted statements that famously appear as dicta in Granholm.

Making it Big

Some dicta fade into obscurity. The three-tier system dicta of Granholm have gone on to achieve prominence. Circuit Judge Richard Wesley in a New York retailer case, Arnold’s Wines, quoted the trial judge Richard Howell with reference to Scalia’s North Dakota assertions, “But if dicta this be, it is of the most persuasive kind.” The same text appears crucially in Steen.

Judge Howell’s subjunctive “if” clause is mere rhetorical flourish, for the text he quoted from Granholm is obviously and unquestionably a dictum. To find it compellingly persuasive, one must draw, from the fact that one justice in North Dakota found the state’s 21st Amendment right to a three-tier system weightier than a cost-saving Department of Defense liquor procurement regulation, the conclusion that the state right is also weightier than national consumer and merchant interests protected by the Commerce Clause. In reaching that conclusion, the Steen court reasoned that a state could not exercise its Granholm-sanctioned right maintain a mandatory three-tier system if retailers from outside the state, who presumably had not purchased from a “licensed in-state wholesaler,” were free to compete from local retailers for resident consumer trade.

Even if the quoted statements were authoritative, it is questionable whether they would sustain the Steen position. Although the Granholm majority states that in North Dakota the Court “recognized the three-tier system as ‘unquestionably legitimate,’” in context the North Dakota opinion recognized a three-tier system as legitimate, not “the” system in the sense of all instances of it:

“In the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is unquestionably legitimate. [Here the Court cites two of its opinions, Young’s Markets, whose reasoning was essentially abandoned in Bacchus and given burial in Granholm, and a case allowing states to regulate bootleggers traveling through en route to another state.] The requirements that an out-of-state supplier which transports liquor into the State affix a label to each bottle of liquor destined for delivery to a federal enclave and that it report the volume of liquor it has transported are necessary components of the regulatory regime.”

Nothing in North Dakota deals with discrimination between a North Dakota retailer or wholesaler and an out-of-state retailer or wholesaler. It is at bottom not even a Commerce Clause decision, as it turns on the right of a state to compromise an express federal objective under the Supremacy Clause. Even if its rhetoric can be transferred to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it unambiguously legitimizes the North Dakota system on grounds of its pursuit of traditional aims (temperance, orderly markets and tax revenues), not for the sake of the system structure itself.

In Summary

Fifth Circuit law on interstate retailing now rests on the theory that because the legitimacy of the tiered distribution system in North Dakota (with its provision for circumvention by stickered goods) was unquestionable, any state law that is part of a tiered system, even one directly contravening the Commerce Clause, must be valid.

It is one thing to say tiered systems are legitimate distribution structures (“Texas may have a three-tier system”), quite another to say that they can be used to discriminate against interstate commerce in ways that fail standard Commerce Clause tests. On careful reading, the holding of Granholm (as Justice Thomas correctly observed in his dissent) amounts to taking the 21st Amendment out of cases of intentional protectionism favoring local sellers over interstate sellers; in such cases there is no special “saving” of liquor laws that would be invalid under general Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principles applicable to all goods. In contrast, what the Steen court refers to as “our read” of Granholm takes the North Dakota dicta as insulating anything that is an “inherent part” of the “traditional three-tier system” from Commerce Clause scrutiny.

Whether Granholm’s arguably radical application of the dormant Commerce Clause is limited to the top tier of wine distribution cannot be determined by parsing the text of that opinion. Rather, it is a policy choice between the Marshallian vision of a national market with only rare departures from free movement of goods across state lines and the Repeal era view of alcoholic beverages as disfavored articles of commerce over which states are given almost unlimited rights of regulation in consequence of their undoubted 21st Amendment right to control importation. Judges in cases yet to be presented will have to make that choice.

Meanwhile, Judge Howell’s bon mot about North Dakota dicta gains familiarity. The 2nd Circuit Arnold opinion in which it appears ultimately does not rely on it, but rather saves the state law on non-21st Amendment grounds, as pursuing a legitimate state purpose that cannot reasonably be achieved without discriminating against interstate commerce. The Steen decision goes farther by enshrining it as a primary basis for decision.

By R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com

A less predictable part of the 3rd Circuit ruling involved personal importation, a subject courts have not heretofore directly examined under Granholm. The Freeman opinion takes a straightforward nondiscrimination approach: If a state allows its resident wineries to sell directly to consumers without volume limits, it cannot impose significant volume limits on wine a consumer purchases at an out-of-state winery and brings into the state, without meeting the necessity test. To comply with Freeman, it appears that states must either fashion demonstrable proofs of necessity that will withstand close judicial scrutiny (as New Jersey failed to do) or choose between (a) imposing on their wineries’ tasting room sales the same, usually extreme, limits that apply to personal importation and (b) allowing consumers personally to import out-of-state on-site purchases with no more limits than apply to local tasting rooms.

Because the federal direct shipment law permits wineries to ship on-site purchases directly to consumers who could lawfully have carried it home as luggage under personal importation laws, independently of state direct shipment laws, invalidating state volume limits could in theory expand direct distribution geographically and make it available to wineries that do not hold shipping licenses. It seems highly unlikely, however, that states would by inaction permit creation of a significant market in untaxed personal importation of on-site sales.

Plaintiffs in Freeman also challenged the ban on all direct shipment, on the grounds that on-site laws, though not facially discriminatory, discriminate in effect by prohibiting out-of-state wineries from using the only method at hand to compete with local wineries, a visit to which by the local consumer is not as burdensome as a trip outside the state. (Non-facial discrimination is usually examined under a less stringent standard, whether the purported benefit to the state outweighs the harm to commerce, known as the Pike test.) Like most courts that have encountered it, the 3rd Circuit rejected the differential burden argument in conclusory terms, finding that the law “even-handedly forces all wine sales out of one channel and into other available channels” –i.e., no proven discrimination in effect. However, unlike some other courts, it held out the possibility that in another case the pro-commerce litigants might successfully prove differential burden by demonstrating economic loss because of the disproportionate travel requirement inherent in on-site laws. It also implied that future plaintiffs who could prove even modest economic loss to out-of-state producers might profitably argue that benefits from the non-facial discrimination are too slight to pass the Pike balancing test.

By R. Corbin Houchins, 12/23/2010, CorbinCounsel.com

The decision is another example of uncertainties resulting from the principal unresolved Granholm question: How does one reconcile the location-neutrality principle with the infamous North Dakota dictum to the effect that states may discriminate against out-of-state wholesalers? The Fifth Circuit’s answer, like that of the Second Circuit, is that Granholm extended Commerce Clause protection to wineries, but not to wholesalers or retailers, because national markets in the lower tiers would make it impossible for a state to protect the “traditional three-tier system.” As the Court of Appeals judge said about setting aside fundamental economic policy embodied in the dormant Commerce Clause to follow a judicial aside that was not part of the Granholm holding, “That language may be dicta. If so, it is compelling dicta.”

Post-Granholm litigation shows clearly enough that judges, though not bound to follow dicta, will elevate it to persuasive precedent when it coincides with their value systems. The values question is whether states’ asserted 21st Amendment right to maintain a privileged middle tier trumps the Commerce Clause policy against differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests. All one can say at this point is, “to be continued.”

by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com

The decision is another example of uncertainties resulting from the principal unresolved Granholm question: How does one reconcile the location-neutrality principle with the infamous North Dakota dictum to the effect that states may discriminate against out-of-state wholesalers? The Fifth Circuit’s answer, like that of the Second Circuit, is that Granholm extended Commerce Clause protection to wineries, but not to wholesalers or retailers, because national markets in the lower tiers would make it impossible for a state to protect the “traditional three-tier system.” As the Court of Appeals judge said about setting aside fundamental economic policy embodied in the dormant Commerce Clause to follow a judicial aside that was not part of the Granholm holding, “That language may be dicta. If so, it is compelling dicta.”

Post-Granholm litigation shows clearly enough that judges, though not bound to follow dicta, will elevate it to persuasive precedent when it coincides with their value systems. The values question is whether states’ asserted 21st Amendment right to maintain a privileged middle tier trumps the Commerce Clause policy against differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests. All one can say at this point is, “to be continued.”

by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com

However, the VA ABC offered two interim solutions for Wine Institute members until the law can be changed. Nothing in Virginia law currently prevents direct shipper licensees from obtaining two (2) direct shipper licenses with two different addresses, even though a second location is not owned or controlled by the licensee. Therefore, if a winery sends wine from BOTH their tasting room and a fulfillment warehouse, it can keep a current direct shipper license intact and secure a second one with the address of their fulfillment facility, from where wine can also be shipped. The Virginia direct shipper license application fee is $65 and the annual license fee is $65. Separate tax payments and reports associated with each licenses would have to be filed.

Additionally, if the winery sends ALL wine shipments into Virginia from a pick and pack warehouse with NO shipments originating in their tasting room, the winery’s Virginia direct shippers license could be changed to list the address of the warehouse from which ALL wine will be shipped. Wineries may make such an amendment to a current license by sending a letter on winery letterhead explaining the reason for the change and including the old and new addresses to Dallas “Burnie” Gaskill, VA ABC Licensing Technician at P.O. Box 1597, Spotsylvania, VA 22553-1597. Burnie can be reached by phone at (540) 538-7838 or e-mail at dallas.gaskill@abc.virginia.gov with questions. Such letter MUST include a copy of the state license issued to the warehouse making shipments on the winery’s behalf. The letter must also contain an e-mail address for the winery, where the amended license will be sent in an electronic format.

Members can contact Annie Bones at abones@wineinstitute.org or at (415) 356-7530 with additional questions. Terri would also be pleased to talk more about this situation and can be reached at (804) 301-5505 or tbeirne@wineinstitute.org.

-Terri Cofer Beirne, Eastern Counsel, Wine Institute

Kansas SB 212 was signed into law by Governor Kathleen Sebelius on April 10. Wineries interested in avoiding the hassle of the application process can purchase the license at www.easywinelicensing.com.

Licensed wineries will be able to ship up to 12 cases of wine per year to Kansas residents. To obtain a Kansas direct shipping license, wineries must pay a $50 license fee, a $50 registration fee, and post a $750 bond.

Tennessee will also open for direct shipping on July 1, although the paperwork has not yet been finalized.  Tennessee’s license is available for pre-order pending the state’s posting.

Although retailers will not be among those celebrating on July 1, the passage of SB 166 is a huge victory for many direct shippers. Governor Bredesen’s signature signals a radical change in the state’s stance on wine sold through the direct shipping channel: Tennessee is the first state to reverse its stance on direct shipments for wine since Vermont in 2006. The effective date of this legislation is less than a month away, however, there is no word, yet, on when all necessary forms will be available, so stay tuned.

To understand the significance of Judge Sotomayor’s participation in Swedenburg, it is helpful to examine the context. First, Swedenburg was decided in February 2004, following the law of the circuit as it then existed. The Second Circuit is the source of Battipaglia and other conservative 21st Amendment rulings; precedent strongly supported Judge Wesley’s conclusions. It should be no surprise to an industry that rightly hails Granholm as an innovative stroke profoundly readjusting the balance between the commerce clause and the 21st Amendment that a lower court decision two years earlier did not reach the same result. Second, the Swedenburg decision was pro-commerce in its consideration of the First Amendment issue raised by the New York statutory scheme, striking down a provision that prohibited importation of information about availability of wine at out-of-state wineries, even for lawful purchase. The other two judges on the three-judge Swedenburg panel might have gone along with the result without necessarily holding “strong 21st Amendment” positions or endorsing every aspect of Judge Wesley’s analysis.

As Tom Wark said in his blog, it will be interesting to see if confirmation hearings put direct shipment in the legal news again. It will be even more interesting to see how Justice Sotomayor comes down on implications of Granholm for the second wave of commerce cases.