Posts from the California Category
CA: ABC Issues Industry Advisory on Outsourcing Marketing, Compliance and Logistics
June 8th, 2009
On Friday, CA ABC issued an advisory to respond generally to the explosion of service providers that enable wineries to outsource one or more components of their D2C and D2T channels.
Activities Requiring Licenses: The Department describes when third party providers require a license. In CA a license is required when a business sells (transfers title), solicits a sale or delivers alcohol pursuant to an order. (B&P Code 23025) If interpreted according to its plain language, the definition of sale would require the following types of businesses to obtain licenses to sell wine: delivery companies, credit card companies that offer wine to certain cardholders, banks with loyalty programs, florists that offer wine through retail partners, airlines, and many more. To avoid opening Pandora’s box, ABC offers some exceptions. ABC allows a delivery company under the express direction of a licensee to operate without a license. The Advisory does not offer the same exception for a website that makes an offer to sell at the direction of a licensee. However, if a website merely publishes an offer made by a winery this would not be a solicitation by the web provider. If ABC were to hold otherwise, every media publication in California accepting winery advertisements would require a license. The Advisory does make clear that when selecting a marketing service provider, the winery or licensee must retain control of business decisions and core operations such as pricing, making offers, transferring title and directing delivery.
Tied House Risks: Beyond the cautions on unlicensed sales, ABC reminds wineries that they cannot pay retailers for advertising. Wineries cannot pay online storefronts licensed to sell as retailers for loading content, posting any material, or any advertising whatsoever. The retailer only can receive money from its markup and sale of the wine products. In some instances, the winery can pay for additional services such as age verification and compliance services.
Nothing is Free: ABC reminds industry that no free goods or premiums may be provided in connection with the marketing and sale of alcoholic beverages. This includes free shipping. Shipping may be included the price but it cannot be offered as free shipping.
Consignment Sales: Federal and state beverage alcohol laws prohibit consignment sales. Attempts to improve inventory management through just in time logistics can be problematic for innovative service companies. A licensee must sell alcoholic beverages to which they have title. Inventory cannot be returned if unsold. Any just in time delivery solutions should be carefully examined to ensure that the transaction is not a disguised consignment sale.
The web of federal and CA law is full of traps for the unwary. ABC’s advisory identifies many of the traps without offering solutions. Businesses must examine the totality of the circumstances and ensure that the essential elements of each transaction and control of these elements rest with licensees.
This analysis was authored by Susan Cagann, Special Counsel at Farella Braun + Martel LLP. Susan will be speaking on the subject of marketing and retail agents at ShipCompliant’s Compliance Seminar and Users Conference June 11th in Napa, CA.
California Sales Tax Hike Starts Tomorrow
March 31st, 2009
A Special Notice was sent out by California’s Board of Equalization early this month, alerting taxpayers that the sales and use tax rate in the state of California will increase by 1% on April 1, 2009.
The tax increase is part of voter-approved Proposition 1A, a budget package designed to increase state revenue by $16 billion throughout the next 2 – 3 years. Intended to be a temporary tax, “The 1% tax rate increase will expire on either July 1, 2011, or July 1, 2012, depending upon whether the voters approve the proposed Budget Stabilization constitutional amendment in a statewide election to be held on May 19, 2009”.
All suppliers licensed as Wine Direct Shippers in California are affected by this increase, as payment of sales and use tax is a requirement of the license. The new state tax rate will be raised from 6% to 7%, making the total of all state-wide tax rates, 8.25%. The rate of 8.25% is comprised of three separate taxes, which apply to the entire state: 7.0% “state” tax + 0.25% “county” tax + “combined state and local” tax of 1.0% = 8.25%.
In addition to the 1% state tax increase mentioned previously, there are also some district tax rate updates, which apply to the following cities and counties:
- The following cities in California have updated their local tax rates: Arcata, Arvin, Campbell, El Cajon, El Monte, Eureka, Galt, La Mesa, La Habra, Oxnard, Pico Rivera, Port Hueneme, Scotts Valley and Trinidad
- The following counties in California have updated their local tax rates: Amador, Sonoma and Marin
Attention 17/20s: 17 + 20 ≠ 02
August 15th, 2008
That’s right – when California License Type 17 (Beer and Wine Wholesaler) and License Type 20 (Beer and Wine Off-Sale Retailer) are issued in conjunction, the privileges associated with the combination license are not equivalent to those of the 02 Winegrower’s License. A Type 17 License “permits incidental sales to other supplier-type licensees” and a Type 20 License “authorizes the sale of beer and wine for consumption off the premises where sold.” The joint issuance of the two licenses is authorized by Section 23378.2 of the California Code and permits the issuance of a package off-sale beer and wine license to a licensed California wholesaler if only wine is sold from the retail premises. It is significant to note that when shipping out-of-state, a 17/20 licensee is considered a retailer resulting access to fifteen states.
A month ago at the ShipCompliant Users Conference, Matthew Botting of the California ABC revealed that many 17/20 permit holders were not fulfilling all requirements of the combination license and were instead operating more like 02 licensees because many were unaware that 17/20 permit holders must act as a bona fide wholesaler in order to comply with the provisions of the license. Please note that in order to operate as bona fide wholesaler, a 17/20 permit holder must sell to retailers, in general, at least every 45 days. Section 23779 provides, in pertinent part:
No wholesale license shall be issued to any person who does not in good faith actually carry on or intend to carry on a bona fide wholesale business by sale to retail licensees of the alcoholic beverage designated in the wholesale license, and the department may revoke any wholesale license when the licensee fails for a period of 45 days actively and in good faith to engage in the wholesale business…Sale by a wholesale licensee to himself as a retail licensee is not the transaction of a bona fide wholesale business.
For more information on 17/20 licenses or other California wine-related licenses, check out Matthew Botting’s presentation and slides from the 2008 ShipCompliant Users Conference.
Is the retail to consumer shipping battle headed to the Supreme Court?
October 15th, 2007
The issue of direct shipments by retailers to consumers has become a very hot topic of late. As of today, retailers can ship to less than half of the number of states to which producing wineries can ship. The Specialty Wine Retailers Association is fighting hard with both legislative efforts and litigation to open more states for retail to consumer shipments. The heated battle in Illinois, where out-of-state retailers recently lost the ability to ship to consumers under HB 429, raised national awareness to this issue.
The fundamental question is whether the decision in Granholm v. Heald that said states must treat in-state and out-of-state wineries evenhandedly should also apply to in-state and out-of-state retailers. R. Corbin Houchins recently made two posts (September 18th and October 5th) that do an excellent job of highlighting the legal questions that come into play when attempting to extend Granholm to retailers. In his October 5th post, Mr. Houchins indicates his disagreement with the reasoning of the recent and important Arnold’s Wines v. Boyle opinion, which upheld discrimination against out-of-state retailers in New York.
There is a very interesting recent article, with substantial background materials for lawyers who do not practice in the subject area, on FindLaw.com titled “The Fight Over State Laws Favoring In-State Alcohol Purveyors: Do Such Laws Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause?” that also examines the important ruling in Arnold’s Wines. This article is definitely worth reading.
The Court has had to examine the intersection between the dormant Commerce Clause idea and the Twenty-First Amendment a number of times. Two years ago, in the seminal case of Granholm v. Heald, the Court appeared to send a message that while the Twenty-First Amendment may indeed empower states in some ways, it does not trump the anti-discrimination, anti-balkanization norm of the Commerce Clause.
The federal district judge in the recent Arnold case in New York properly acknowledged the importance of Granholm. Nevertheless, the judge held that Granholm’s ban on state discrimination against out-of-staters applied only to state laws regulating producers of alcohol, not laws (such as the one at issue in the recent New York case) that regulated wholesalers or retailers.
The New York judge’s interpretation of Granholm is, I believe, in error.
The Arnold’s Wines case will likely impact current (Texas, California) and future (Illinois?) cases in the battle over retail to consumer shipments and could possibly end up in the Supreme Court, where a favorable decision could potentially open the legislative floodgates for retailers as Granholm did for wineries in 2005.
Virtual wineries taken to court
October 10th, 2006
Last week the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control took three “virtual” wineries to court stating that they violated the provisions of their licenses by pouring wine for consumers at a wine festival. So called virtual wineries typically hold two licenses in combination, a type 17 which is a wholesale license and a type 20, which is a conditional retail license allowing the licensee to sell wine directly to consumers via a wine club or internet sales. This combination of licenses allows a business owner to have a lot of the same privileges as a winery or type 02 license holder without having a bricks and mortar winery or the on-going compliance requirements that wineries have. The main prohibition of the 17/20 combo is that those licensees are not allowed to pour wine at consumer tastings and they cannot have tasting rooms. California is the only state that allows wholesalers to sell wine to consumers. The three wineries are arguing that the prohibition on public tasting is unfair to small proprietors and the charitable organizations that host the tasting events and are challenging what they claim is a “little known” law. The penalty for pouring wine at a consumer event without the correct permits is a 15 day suspension of the license or a fine. An administrative judge will give the ABC a decision within 30 days and the ABC will act on the decision within 100 days. At this point the California Assembly is not proposing a change in the law.
More on the Family Winemakers lawsuit
October 4th, 2006
Tom Wark from Fermentation posted a lengthy comment in response to Doug Caskey’s thoughts on the Family Winemakers lawsuit. This was another great response, so I wanted to post it to make sure everyone reads it.
Doug:
First, anyone accusing you of being a traitor to the wine industry simply doesn’t know you or doesn’t care for honesty.
That said, I want to comment on your elequent plea for respecting the postion Colorado and other smaller state wine industries find themselves in vis a vis the current debate over direct shipping regulations.
First, with regard to the Granholm ruling, it strikes me that the ruling did not so much “reinforce” the validity of the 3-tier system as much as it simply concurred that it was a legitimate way for a state to structure the distribution of alcohol. By this I mean, it did not endorse the excusionary charachter of system, but rather acknowledged its legitimacy. This is important.
The idea that the state is preventing direct shipping by those that produce over a certain amount because it “values small businesses that stimulate agriculture” belies the facts and machinations in the direct shipping debate. Were direct shipping to consumers open to all wineries, large and small, there is no reason to believe that a small Colorado winery would be hurt by CA wineries of any size trying to attracte consumers to wine clubs or occassional Internet sales. In fact, being closer to the Colorado consumer than a CA or WA winery, the Colorado winery should have an advantage in reaching that consumers.
The bottom line is that production limits are approved by Wholesalers becauase it keeps the vast majority of direct sales from occuring while allowing in-state wineries that they rarely deal with to go about their business without criticizing wholesalers. As a bonus for wholesalers, it puts wineries in-state into conflict with out-of-state wineries that are prevented from entering the market via direct sales.
As for monopolistic tendencies, it is indeed easy to accuse wholesalers of being monopolies. But the idea that “the same can be said of the large wineries in California” just doesn’t wash for one simple reason: The Wholesalers benefit from STATE SPONSORED monopoly status. By dictating the use of the three tier system the States guarantee that a smaller and smaller group of wholesalers take a piece of every sale in the state. Yet, there are no provisions that they represent any winery that wants to sell in that state. If in addition there are production requirements on those that can sell direct in a state that has granted a monopoly to wine wholesalers many wineries will be prevented entirely from doing business in that state.
The State of California does not impose any regulations that result in CA wineries selling the vast amount of domestic wine in the United States. This difference in who imposes a monopoly is important.
If the concern is for fairness and a desire to see Colorado wineries expand and prosper there is a simple way to accomlish this: Allow wineries to self distribute in the state as well as sell direct to consumers. No one represents a brand better than the owner. But as long as the state imposes the 3-tier system, this can never happen because under Granholm if CO wineries can self distribute then out of state wineries must be able to also. Wholesalers would just as soon see small state wine industries disappear altogether than allow this sort of situation.
And this brings us to the idea that “Under the guise of “equal protection” as spelled out in the Granholm decision, their (those bringing suits) legal actions have the impact of squelching the advantages that state governments want to give small agribusinesses like wineries.”
If government and legislators were truly interested in giving small agribusiniess a hand up, they would ignore the demands and campaign donations of wholesalers and allow unrestricted direct sales and unrestricttd self-distribution in their states. It’s clear the legislators too would rather throw CO wineries and other small state wine industries under the bus before upsetting the antiquated but very profitable apple cart known as the state sponsored wholesaler monopoly, AKA “Three Tier System”.
In the end, the restrictions that states put on who can ship to consumers don’t merely inhibit the “Big Boys”. They inhibit the very small boys too, the very boys that most distributors don’t want anything do do with. But the big problem is that as long as the three tier system is imposed by the state, small industries like that of Colorado will be hampered.
Terroir in Court
October 2nd, 2006
For the first time in post-Granholm legal maneuvering, a court has recognized the geographic distinctiveness of wine as a factor in applying the “level playing field” requirement.
Kentucky is one of about eight states that responded to Granholm by authorizing only on-site sales. The argument by the wholesalers and their allies in favor of that approach was that applying the on-site requirement to all wineries, local and out-of-state, constituted equal treatment for Commerce Clause purposes.
The Granholm opinion had, of course, rejected New York’s argument that all wineries were treated equally because out-of-state sellers were, like local producers, entitled to rent warehouses and maintain offices in the state. Thus, we already knew a state could not adopt facially equal provisions that introduce substantial impracticalities for interstate sellers not shared by local wineries. The question was whether an on-site-only law was such a provision.
In Huber Winery v. Wilcher, a federal court in Kentucky ruled that Granholm forbids laws that allow residents to purchase wine at wineries in all locations, noting that the effect is to foreclose a larger number of wineries in the major producing states, while imposing only a minor inconvenience on consumers who travel to wineries in Kentucky and adjacent states. The opinion is important because (1) it applies the “strict scrutiny” test, which is standard for overt discrimination, to the de facto discrimination before it, and (2) it recognizes that practical availability of wine from one growing region does not compensate for denying practical access to the greater variety of wines from others –i.e., that “interstate commerce” is not all the same. In reaching the latter conclusion, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that “each winery’s products are distinctive,” expressly declaring that the consumer rights to interstate commerce recognized in Granholm are not satisfied by Kentuckians’ ability to purchase Tennessee and Indiana wine on-site, to the exclusion by travel distance of the products of California, Oregon and Washington.
Family Winemakers sues Massachusetts over capacity cap
September 19th, 2006
In the previous post, we mention that a group sued Arizona over the discriminatory nature of their 20,000 gallon capacity cap. Now, the Family Winemakers of California, a group representing over 740 small and medium sized wineries, is suing the State of Massachusetts for the same reason. Paul Kronenberg, President of Family Winemakers, said the following about the 30,000 gallon production capacity cap in Massachusetts
Last year, the Supreme Court told Michigan and New York to stop the discrimination. But the Massachusetts legislators have chosen to ignore the Court’s message that we are one national economic market. State laws that protect and perpetuate a wholesaler monopoly at the expense of wineries seeking market opportunities and consumers seeking a wider choice in wine, run counter to the concept of free trade within the nation.
Read the full press release here.
Other hurdles in Massachusetts have effectively kept it closed for direct shipping to date. On top of the 30,000 gallon capacity cap, there is a burdensome 14 page permit application as well as a 240 Liter (26+ cases) per individual volume limit across all wineries. Similar to the rule in Indiana, this would mean the winery that ships the 27th case would be in violation. FedEx and UPS are not shipping to Massachusetts for direct sales.
New laws take effect in four states on July 1st
June 25th, 2006
Hello again, back in the swing of things after a nice two week break. We’ve seen some big developments in the world of wine direct shipping over the last two weeks that we’ll look at in more detail over the next few weeks.
July 1st is a huge day for direct shippers as new laws take effect in Washington, Idaho, and Colorado. We also just learned that HB 1968 was signed by the Governor of Hawaii on Thursday and will also take effect on July 1st. We’ll give you the full breakdown on the new rules and permit requirements in each of the these states this week. It is important to note that all four were previously “reciprocal” states and are now moving to a limited direct model to comply with the Granholm ruling. By my count, that will leave only seven reciprocal states (Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) after July 1st.
We will also look at other direct shipping developments around the country in the near future, including legislation in Kansas and Pennsylvania, the appeal of the Costco ruling in Washington, and the lawsuits filed in California to allow the direct shipment of wine by retailers.
Dropping the Second Shoe
June 19th, 2006
Recent lawsuits in California, following the preliminary consent decree in Texas, bring home the second major implication of Granholm.
The Supreme Court opinion of May 2005 told us that a state may not allow its own wineries to sell directly to consumers if it excludes out-of-state wineries. Its first implication �that states allowing their own wineries to distribute directly to retailers may not deny out-of-state wineries access to those customers� is expressed in the November 2005 Costco ruling, which is part of the April 2006 judgment in that case.
Reports from the Central District of California, where one of the current suits is filed, indicate the state may respond like the Texas authorities, negotiating a preliminary injunction that would expand market access while the case is pending, but not definitively forfeit the state�s right to defend the suit by attempting to distinguish Granholm. Some concession seems necessary, because as the result of political maneuvering the current California statute incorporates reciprocity as a requirement for shipment by retailers, although the statute was passed primarily to eliminate that feature and the tax waiver for direct shipment by wineries. Most analysts agree reciprocity is inconsistent with Granholm.
The third shoe of the three-legged issue will be shipment by wholesalers across state lines. A suit championing that theory was rumored in Texas and appears to be a logical next step. Whether there or elsewhere, one can expect another thump soon.
Questions remain on the pivotal question whether states can make a case for discriminating against the more numerous and perhaps less stable out-of-state retail businesses in ways Granholm says they can�t against out-of-state wineries. In cases decided to date, no state has put together a coherent record supporting its approach. Opponents of freer trade read Granholm as a bad record case and hold out hope of state victory in a better-litigated suit.
On the other hand, Granholm states the principles of non-discrimination very broadly and defines the 21st Amendment very narrowly. Moreover, the new members of the Supreme Court replace Granholm dissenters and appear unlikely to affect the balance if another case reaches them under the Commerce Clause. My guess is that Granholm issues won�t be in the Supreme Court again any time soon, because the current spate of cases involves outright discrimination against interstate commerce and is likely to be settled in the circuit courts of appeals in favor of the plaintiffs. If the circuits do not split, the Supremes probably won�t hear appeals.
The following round of cases will challenge volume caps, high license fees, and other limitations the wholesalers have been able to pile on in state legislatures. If they are analyzed as direct discrimination, they are probably winners, but they may be decided as burdening cases, in which regulatory interests are balanced against effects on commerce, with far less certain outcomes.
The broader effects of Costco
May 1st, 2006
I. Discrimination against Direct Distribution from Outside the State
There seems little doubt that Costco�s reading of Granholm will survive appeal. Nothing appeared in the Costco record to distinguish direct shipment of beer and wine to retailers from direct shipment of wine to consumers.
Most states with wine industries allow local wineries some form of direct distribution. Only Washington extends an equal privilege to out-of-state wineries, a result of the Costco remedial legislation. A few states, such as New Jersey, have taken preemptive action by eliminating or restricting direct distribution rights of in-state producers. Limiting direct distribution according to annual production of the producer is emerging as a common theme. Florida recently arrived at a legislative “compromise” that set the cutoff just above the size of the largest Florida winery, a transparently protectionist measure that may or may not evade analysis as discrimination, but, like all size caps, is open to Commerce Clause objection for disproportionate burden on commerce originating outside the state.
Thus, the immediate concern is with legislation in the states that must level up or down. The Costco decision accommodated state concerns by leveling down (with a stay for legislative override) and thus does not constitute precedent for requiring open access to local markets. Because other lower courts may also find the unconstitutionality of discriminatory schemes in the protectionist measures favoring local wineries, rather than in the more basic regulatory objective of controlling the traffic pattern of liquor entering the state, neither Granholm nor Costco suggests that suppliers can rely on widespread opening of markets to direct distribution.
II. Posting and Ancillary Restraints
Costco illustrates a great divide in basic Sherman Act jurisprudence. For some observers, no contract, combination, or conspiracy can be inferred from private actors� facially unilateral acquiescence in state restraints, even if the effects are anticompetitive. That is, roughly, the Fisher v. Berkeley view. See, e.g., Sisters of St. Vincent Health Services, Inc. v. Morgan County, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1046 (S.D. Ind. 2005), citing Massachusetts Food Ass’n v. Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 564-66 (1st Cir.1999).
Naturally, the district court in Seattle regarded Miller v. Hedlund as controlling 9th Circuit precedent. The reasoning in Miller is difficult to pin down. It appears influenced by anticompetitive effects (which we know are alone insufficient), but also to rely on the participation of private actors, consisting of filling in the blanks of a posting system which was then enforced by the state. The opinion mentions potential for collusion, but does not seem to require it. Last December�s antitrust rulings in Costco clearly rest on the wholesaler�s participation in the form of supplying prices that then become mandatory by the power of the state, resulting in a hybrid system requiring state supervision (which was lacking in Washington’s case) to survive preemption. However, all the U.S. Supreme Court authority overturning price posting deals with systems that require or condone private conduct that itself violate the Sherman Act. The Costco judge, like the Court of Appeals in Miller, seems to find a combination by, so to speak, putting the state in the same room with each private actor who posts a price. By contrast, Midcal and the other Supreme Court cases invalidating price posting laws deal with systems that send the private actors to a room where they constitute the unlawful combination on their own. How the Fisher-Miller dissonance resolves is, I think, the most important issue for the Costco appeal.
Another significant issue in applying Costco to the law in other states is the extent to which the cluster of other restraints that frequently accompany posting would fall with it. I see three bases on which that might occur. First, the court might conclude that the system is so integrated that the legislature would not have enacted the other restraints if it had known posting itself to be illegal. Second, on general principles of equity, a court issuing an injunction against unlawful conduct has power to enjoin lawful conduct associated with it if necessary to render complete relief from the threatened harm. Third, a court might conclude that the other restraints constituted per se antitrust violations on their own, which appears as an alternative basis for decision in the December opinion on summary judgment motions, incorporated by reference in the conclusions of law for the final judgment.
That third possible approach would extend Costco�s effects to more states, including some without price posting. It is, however, the most controversial of the three, as it requires finding a public-private hybrid restraint without an overt role for private parties, such as providing prices the state then enforces.
In sum, Costco is not carte blanche for ignoring other states’ posting laws, although within the Ninth Circuit an aggressive position could be justified. As a rough first look, here are some immediately vulnerable points: AZ quantity discount limits, CA beer posting, CT posting, DE delivered wholesale pricing, FL malt beverage price change waiting period and possibly the limits on quantity discounts, GA posting, HI possibly restrictions on quantity discounts, ID posting, IN posting, IA posting (possibly), KS posting (possibly), ME posting and discount restraints, MD posting and quantity discount ban (already analyzed in TFWS I through III), MA posting, MI posting and quantity discount ban, MN posting and possibly restriction on quantity discounts, MO posting and 1% limit on quantity discounts, NH beer posting, NY posting (including amendments effective in September), NC quantity discount ban, OH posting, OK posting and quantity discount ban, OR price record-keeping (possibly, because of deterrent effect on spot pricing) and price uniformity requirement, SD posting, TN posting and quantity discount ban, VT posting, VA posting, WV beer posting.
III. Central Warehousing
Central warehousing bans are difficult to analyze, because (unlike the case in Washington) they are often based on interpretation of retail license privileges or tied house laws, rather than on express prohibition. Caveats regarding ultimate application of Costco to posting and its ancillary restraints apply strongly to central warehousing bans, because they may appear more severable from direct restraint on price than, e.g., quantity discount bans. The Costco antitrust opinion of December and the recent findings of fact and conclusions of law do not present a clear rationale for distinguishing the central warehousing ban, which it classified as an antitrust violations, from the retailer-to-retailer sales ban, which it found was unilateral state action not preempted by federal antitrust law. Thus, it is difficult to predict how courts, even those following the Miller v. Hedlund line on antitrust combinations, will respond to the Costco ruling if asked to evaluate central warehousing in other states.
The following represents a currently incomplete survey of states potentially affected by Costco on use of central retail warehouses:
Central retail warehouses banned: AL, AR, CO, DE, ID, IL, IA, KS, MD, MI, NH, NM
Not banned: AK, AZ, CA, CT, DC, MA, OR
We are still researching the status of central warehousing in the states not listed above.
New California laws take effect today
January 1st, 2006
California officially moves to a limited direct model for interstate wine shipping today. Out-of-state wineries will be required to obtain a Type 82 permit from the California ABC for $10 annually and a Certificate of Use Tax from the California Board of Equalization.
