Posts from the Indiana Category
A Little Knowledge Is Not Enough: Evidentiary Burdens In On-Site Cases
August 10th, 2008
The August 7th decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Baude v. Heath has been characterized as a loss in the fight against on-site purchase requirements. Indeed, the opinion leaves Indiana’s initial personal visit requirement in place. That is not, however, the whole story.
It’s important to keep in mind in reading the opinion that the Court of Appeals is affirming the lower court’s granting of summary judgment against the state on one point and reversing it on another. That is, the district court had decided no trial was necessary because uncontested facts established the unconstitutionality of both the wholesale licensee ban and the initial on-site visit requirement. The appellate court agreed with the former conclusion and disagreed with the latter.
Statutes that openly discriminate against out-of-state wineries are almost always unconstitutional and provide fit subjects for summary judgment. Statutes without openly discriminatory provisions, but whose effect in practice is to impose a greater burden on out-of-state wineries than on local wineries, may be unconstitutional, depending (in the locution of the leading case) on whether the burden is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”
That determination of excess is at the heart of the 7th Circuit opinion. The appellate court had little trouble in concluding that the kinky ban on shipment by wineries that had direct distribution rights anywhere provided virtually no benefits, except to wholesalers, and was substantially burdensome. Because uncontested facts in the district court demonstrated exclusion of a substantial number of out-of-state sellers, the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing discriminatory harm to interstate commerce, shifting the obligation to produce evidence to the defendants. The state and wholesalers had offered only one intelligible counterargument –the claim that requiring commerce to go through a local middle tier makes it easier to monitor sales and collect state excises. We can keep Baude v. Heath in the column of cases that do not consider that claim a substantial justification for demonstrated burdens on commerce.
In the other (and more important) half of the 7th Circuit opinion, the same burden-benefit analysis reached a different conclusion with respect to the supposed economic consequences of Indiana’s requirement that the consumer travel to the winery site before receiving the first direct shipment order. Faced with a contention that such a burden is inherently excessive, the chief judge offered some unvarnished advice to plaintiffs’ counsel: “It is impossible to tell whether a burden on interstate commerce is [excessive] without understanding the magnitude of both burdens and benefits. . . . . Exact figures are not essential (no more than estimates may be possible)[,] and the evidence need not be in the record if it is subject to judicial notice, but it takes more than lawyers’ talk to condemn a statute . . . .” In other words, you can’t litigate a burdening case as if it were a case of overt facial discrimination. See Notes on Wine Distribution, pages 8-10, for my discussion of that point and of Cherry Hill Vineyard (which was cited in Baude) and similar cases.
Regarding judicial notice (which occurs when a court accepts something, such as a tide table, as true from published sources, without live testimony), courts seldom take notice of controversial facts. That point came up when the chief judge, sounding a bit offended by plaintiffs’ argument that there was no point in having a face-to-face screening system because determined underage purchasers would defeat or circumvent it, declined to take judicial notice of propositions they advanced in support. Plaintiffs cited some studies and attempted to use an on-line ID check provider’s advertising to show on-site screening is unnecessary. The appellate court wasn’t having it and noted that “it would be awfully hard to take judicial notice that in-person verification with photo ID has no effect on wine fraud and therefore flunks the interstate commerce clause.”
Thus, although delivery requirements involve face-to-face proof of age, Baude stands for the proposition that plaintiffs would have to prove that carrier screening undercuts the enforcement benefit of the initial winery site requirement. The appellate opinion refers to Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, a case involving a specific tobacco-regulating statute, as forbidding states to require carriers to check age of persons receiving intoxicating liquor. That is, I believe, an egregiously wrong reading of the case (see blogging on both sides of the issue here), but the opinion does not rely on it. Rather, it describes the face-to-face transaction between carrier employee and recipient of the shipment as facially inferior to age screening at a winery, to a degree that allows the state to treat the former as inadequate. As with economic effects, plaintiff evidence was, in the court’s view, simply absent on the efficacy of at-delivery age screening: “Given the state of this record, and the state of the empirical literature, we know very little.” The take-away is that before you can knock down a duly enacted state statute, you need to know –and show– rather a lot about its discriminatory effects.
The primary importance of Baude is to add weight to an already substantial body of judicial opinion that suits based on a facially neutral law’s burdensome effects on interstate commerce relative to local commerce have to be tried quite differently from suits like Granholm, which was based on overt and explicit discrimination against interstate commerce. The case does not say that the face-to-face law would prove constitutional in a properly presented case, only that it was wrong to conclude that its unconstitutionality was so clear as to require no presentation of quantitative evidence on its burdens.
Reversing a grant of summary judgment does not require that the lower court enter summary judgment for the other side. Rather, it provides guidance to the district court as to evidentiary requirements if the case goes on to trial, and leaves the statute in place if there are no further proceedings below. The plaintiffs’ burden of proof in Baude is substantial but not unsupportable. It ain’t necessarily over.
7th Circuit Reverses Indiana Face to Face Ban
August 8th, 2008
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals made an important decision yesterday regarding face-to-face transactions when shipping wine directly to Indiana consumers. After Indiana initially passed its direct shipping laws to comply with Granholm, the face-to-face requirement was successfully challenged in August of 2007. However, yesterday’s decision will eventually reverse the face-to-face clause.
None of the plaintiffs contends that Indiana’s law has led him to buy more wine from Indiana and less from other states. The law simply shifts sales from smaller wineries (in all states, including Indiana) to larger wineries (all of which are located outside Indiana). The Indiana Winegrowers Guild has filed a brief as amicus curiae opposing the face-to-face clause, which the Guild maintains has made it unduly difficult for its members to ship their wine direct to consumers. But if what the Guild says is
true, then the statute—although bad economically for Indiana’s wineries—must be sustained against a challenge under the commerce clause. Favoritism for large wineries over small wineries does not pose a constitutional problem, and the fact that all Indiana wineries are small does more to show that this law’s disparate impact cuts against in-state product than to show that Indiana has fenced out wine from other jurisdictions.The judgment of the district court with respect to the wholesale clause is affirmed, and with respect to the face-to-face clause is reversed. The case is remanded for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
We expect to receive clarification from the lower court or from the Indiana ABC on how current and future permit holders can comply with the existing statutes. We’ll update you here as we receive more information.
Rhode Island and Alabama: Let My Pinot Go!
March 27th, 2008
As legislative sessions continue to progress across the country, more and more legislative bills concerning direct shipments of wine are being considered. If the bills mentioned in this post pass, two states will change from being prohibited states to permit states. The last state to change from a prohibited state to a permit state was Indiana, and that turned out to be a little messy. The bills for Rhode Island and Alabama are straight forward and fair - let’s hope they make it through the process.
If HB 520 or its companion SB 412 in Alabama, and S 2125 in Rhode Island pass, they would allow for any licensed wine producer, supplier, importer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer to apply for a direct shipper license ($100 initial fee; $50 per year thereafter) that would allow them to ship up to 24 cases of wine per year to an of-age resident of the state, as long as the resident is not located in a dry area. Sales and excise taxes must be paid annually.
An Accident On The Way To Court
March 25th, 2008
The February 26, 2008 decision by an Arizona federal district court in Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver supports an in-person purchase requirement, one of the principal legislative attacks on the level-field principle enunciated in Granholm.
In-person purchase as a precondition to direct shipment solves a fundamental political problem for the middle tier. Although Granholm allows states to eliminate discrimination against interstate direct shipment by forbidding in-state shipment, pursuing that “level down” strategy requires extravagant expenditure of political capital, because it constitutes a death sentence for a significant fraction of local wineries. Thus, wholesaler trade associations are faced with reconciling survival of direct shipment for local wineries with the core objective of forcing wineries in other states to go through three tiers, a conceptual problem after Granholm.
The solution is the “accident of geography” theory, which contends that the impracticality of, e.g., an Arizona consumer’s visiting a Yakima Valley winery to place an order for a wine advertised on the Internet, compared to the convenience of visiting an Arizona winery for the same purpose, does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The Black Star court, like a New York federal district court in Buy Right, Inc. v. Boyle and a Tennessee federal district court in Jelovsek v. Bresden, appears to have bought the theory; federal district courts in the Kentucky case, Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, and the Indiana case, Baud v. Heath, rejected it. Appeals are reportedly under way in the fourth, sixth and seventh federal circuits; if the plaintiffs appeal in Black Star, the ninth circuit will also be involved.
At first impression, the wholesalers’ argument does not seem logical. With respect to governmental restrictions, the Commerce Clause is supposed to provide equal access to markets for interstate commerce originating in any location. True, it does not require states to neutralize natural effects of geography, such as the greater cost of shipping from a distant point, but the trade restriction in question arises from the legislative pen, not from geography itself. For legislation, the Commerce Clause supports location parity by voiding state enactments with substantial discriminatory effects, including the effect of leveraging location advantages of local businesses against distant competitors.
Ironically, the court in Black Star appears to have recognized that aspect of the Commerce Clause, as it cited a 1994 Supreme Court case on the subject, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, which invalidated a facially neutral city ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste received and processed in the town to be deposited at the defendant township’s transfer station. The fatal flaw of the Clarkstown ordinance was that in practice it favored local waste management business to the exclusion of all non-local competition, which sounds pretty similar to a three-tier requirement for out-of-state businesses, but the Black Star court decided not to follow that precedent for reasons that are difficult to divine in its opinion.
There is, nevertheless, a solid basis for the anti-trade result in Black Star and other recent cases, which is widely (and perhaps erroneously) understood as endorsement of a geographic accident defense to Granholm-based suits. If there were only one message I’d want readers of these blogs and Notes on Wine Distribution to take away from discussion of Granholm, it would be the enormous evidentiary difference between a facial discrimination case like Granholm itself and a de facto discrimination case like Black Star. The latter category, which includes challenges to volume caps as well as to on-site limitations, requires much more extensive preparation, with economic expert testimony, to satisfy the plaintiffs’ substantial burden of proof. The Black Star judge underlines that point in refusing to reach the same result as Hudgins and Baude: “However, Plaintiffs proffer no evidence to suggest that such a limited exception, applicable to both in-state and out-of-state wineries, erects a barrier to Arizona’s wine market that in effect creates a burden that alters the proportional share of the wine market in favor of in-state wineries, such that out-of-state wineries are unable to effectively compete in the Arizona market.” Providing the kind of evidence the court would have to see before invalidating a facially neutral statute adds something like $150,000 on top of all the other costs of the litigation, which should be a sobering, but not surprising, fact for enthusiasts of law reform by litigation, and especially for those who think Granholm provides a lay-down slam in direct shipment cases.
Wine Distribution Notes - Release 26
March 6th, 2008
Release 26 of Notes on Wine Distribution by R. Corbin Houchins is now available for viewing.
These notes are a great resource for keeping up to date with developing trends in direct shipping and direct distribution. As always, you can find the most recent version of these notes at the ShipCompliant Blog by clicking on the “Wine Distribution Notes” link under “Compliance Resources” on the right hand side of the page.
Each new release shows green highlighting on sections with changes from the preceding release. Release 26 highlights changes from the last two releases: highlights from release 25 include updates to Alaska, Maryland, New Mexico and Tennessee. Highlights from release 26 include updates to Florida, Indiana, and others. Read the notes to find out what else is new.
Indiana Clarifies Shipping Rules - Wine Institute Recommends Member Wineries Begin Shipments
October 15th, 2007
The Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission, in response to a series of inquiries from Wine Institute’s Regional Counsel Nino Ciaravino and our local counsel John Keeler, today clarified their position with regard to an enforcement component of that state’s direct-to-consumer shipping statutes. Originally passed in March of 2006, Indiana’s DTC shipping statute contained provisions which had prevented WI from recommending that our winery members obtain the required permit and begin making shipments. A recent court ruling in Indiana removed one area of confusion that had related to an initial on-site visit requirement, as well as a potentially restrictive limitation for those who have a wholesaler in the state. An additional part of the law dealing with aggregate consumer case limits was more problematic and was not addressed by the courts. This requirement says that a consumer may receive no more than 216 liters (24 cases) of wine in any calendar year. This aggregate limit applies to multiple winery sources – rather than the more traditional quantity limits used in other states which limit that amount any one winery may sell to any individual consumer. Since there is no mechanism under Indiana’s statute for a winery to know if, in fact, a consumer has exceeded their 216 case limit from other sources, we have recommended wineries not make shipments until we could clarify that their winery licenses would not be in jeopardy.
Mr. Keeler, on behalf of the Wine Institute, met with the members of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission, along with their staff, and presented our concerns. Subsequently, the Commission has agreed to the following outline for a winery to ship into the state and avoid any violation of the statutes: “…[T}he Commission, until further notice, [agrees] not to take enforcement action against the holder of a direct wine seller’s permit for violation of I.C. 7.1-3-26-14 (annual limit on wine received by a consumer), provided that: (1) the holder of the direct wine seller’s permit has not directly shipped in excess of 216 liters within the calendar year to the particular Indiana consumer; (2) the direct wine seller has no actual knowledge that the particular consumer has received in excess of 216 liters within the calendar year; and (3) at the time of the sale transaction, the consumer represents to the direct wine seller that the sale will not result in the consumer receiving in excess of 216 liters in the calendar year.”
With this very important clarification, Wine Institute is now in a position to recommend to our members that they proceed with obtaining the required permit in order to begin servicing their Indiana customers. Wineries should ensure that their order-taking procedures are modified to accommodate the special requirements outlined above in order to obtain the required assurances from the consumer that they are in compliance with Indiana’s rules. We thank you for your patience while we worked through these important details. We will be posting the necessary permit applications and background materials on our website in the next few days. For further information, please contact State Relations at (415) 356-7518.
Indiana and Oregon - starkly different paths to wine shipping laws
September 11th, 2007
Wine Spectator Online has a good article that compares the different paths that Indiana and Oregon took in arriving at their new rules. It’s definitely worth a read. Here are some excerpts:
Advocates of direct-to-consumer wine shipments recently scored two points in the win column: Oregon and Indiana. Both states now have more open direct-shipping laws, though they came about in starkly different ways and, unfortunately for Indiana wine lovers, probably face different levels of success in the long term. But for now, consumers in both states can legally receive wine shipments directly from in- and out-of-state wineries.
Because the judge focused on those two particular elements of Indiana’s law, the state’s existing direct-shipping rules remain intact. So long as the wineries are willing to ship and the courier services such as FedEx and UPS are willing to deliver, direct wine shipments to Indiana residents can commence. Unfortunately, however, Indiana consumers can’t count their chickens just yet. Since the law is written to limit individual households to 24 cases per year rather than the wineries themselves, the wineries have no way of knowing if they’ll be sending, say, the 25th case to a particular Indiana resident, and therefore violating the law. It’s a risk some wineries are willing to take-but not all of them.
Click here to read the full article.
Parts of Indiana law declared unconstitutional. Can I ship there now?
September 4th, 2007
Earlier this year, we discussed the “new vintage” of wine litigation that was taking place across the country. As background, since the 2005 Granholm decision, the wine wholesale lobby has recognized that they must pick their battles, and therefore concede the ability for wineries to ship directly to consumers in most states. Recognizing they would be hard pressed to pass legislation that would prohibit direct shipping outright, they instead began introducing provisions in direct shipping bills that created de facto discrimination.
Two such examples could be found in the text of Indiana HB 1016. The first was a previous visit requirement in Indiana that said a Hoosier resident must first make a physical visit to a winery before placing an off-site (Internet, wine club, phone, etc.) order. The second was a ridiculous requirement that prohibited wineries that were permitted in their state to wholesale wine (this is the case in California, Washington, and Oregon, which represent 90% of the wine produced in this country) from obtaining a Direct Wine Seller’s Permit.
On Wednesday, Judge John Daniel Tinder of the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Indiana ruled on these forms of discrimination in Baude v. Heath.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECLARED that the Indiana Code Section 7.1-3-26-7(a)(6) is unconstitutional insofar as it bars wineries that possess wholesale privileges in states other than Indiana from seeking a Direct Wine Seller’s permit. Defendant David L. Heath, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission, is ENJOINED from enforcing this statute to that extent.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECLARED that Indiana Code Sections 7.1-3-26-6(4) and 7.1-3-26-9(1)(A) are unconstitutional insofar as they require an initial transaction to be made physically in person between customers and permit holders before a Direct Wine Seller permit holder may ship its products directly to an Indiana resident. Defendant Heath, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission, is ENJOINED from enforcing these statutes to that extent.
In the decision, Tinder even went so far as to say “The wholesale prohibition is not aimed so much at protecting Indiana’s wineries as it is at guarding the bank accounts of Indiana’s wholesalers.” Wow! These forms of discrimination can no longer be part of the wholesaler arsenal because they violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
This is a very important decision, and many are rightfully celebrating the victory for wineries and consumers. However, a major roadblock to shipping wine into Indiana remains in place. HB 1016 stipulates that “A consumer may not receive more than two hundred sixteen (216) liters of wine in total from one (1) or more direct wine sellers in a calendar year.”
As we’ve discussed before, most wineries will continue to choose not to ship to Indiana consumers because they can’t possibly know if the consumer has already received their 24 case allotment. FedEx and UPS will continue to ship to Indiana, and some wineries will likely assume the risk and ship to Indiana consumers anyway. But the majority of wineries will opt out until the Indiana ABC clarifies their enforcement policies on this matter. Hopefully the Indiana legislature will address this issue directly in the next session.
Litigation and legislation battles continue in other states that will further shake up the wine shipping landscape. For example, in Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, the Family Winemakers seek to overturn the Massachusetts provision that prohibits wineries that produce more than 30,000 gallons from receiving a direct shipping permit. Massachusetts also has a law similar to Indiana where a MA resident may receive no more than 240 liters across all wineries.
Click here to read the full Baude v. Heath Opinion
“New Vintage” of Wine Litigation
February 5th, 2007
There’s an excellent article on law.com titled “New Vintage of Wine Litigation is Fermenting”. The article summarizes the “next wave” of wine lawsuits that will continue to shake up the landscape of direct shipping.
New suits and amended complaints filed in the past year are attacking requirements that consumers must purchase wine in person, with the first court decisions recently issued in Maine and Kentucky. Wineries also are challenging legal shipping limits that are based on production volume.
In both types of cases, out-of-state wineries accuse the states of discriminating against them.
It’s interesting that almost two years after the Granholm decision there are over 30 lawsuits in over 20 states, and almost all of them are trying to clarify what the ruling actually meant. Richard van Duzer predicts,
Ultimately, this will be back before the Supreme Court, which will have to be more explicit about what it said and what it hasn’t said.
Ken Starr also contributes a quote to describe the de facto discrimination,
It appears that the wholesalers are simply seeking legislatively to do indirectly what the Supreme Court said in Granholm they can’t do directly.
Below is a summary of the litigation discussed.
Maine: In Cherry Hill Vineyard v. John E. Baldacci, No. 1:05-cv-00153 (D. Maine), the judge upheld the in-person requirement in Maine’s law , claiming the face-to-face restriction applies equally to in-state and out-of-state wineries.
Kentucky: In Cherry Hill Vineyards v. Hudgins, No. 3:05-cv-00289 (W.D. Ky.), on December 26th, 2006, the judge struck down the in-person requirement, but did not strike down the 50,000 gallon capacity cap restriction.
Indiana: In Baude v. Heath, No. 1:05-cv-00735 (S.D. Ind.), IN residents are suing over the requirement that the initial purchase of wine be made in person.
Massachusetts: In Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-cv-11682 (D. Mass.), the Family Winemakers of California is suing over the 30,000 gallon capacity cap, which is conveniently just over the production of the largest producer in MA.
Arizona: In Black Star Farms v. Morrison, No. 2:05-cv-2620 (D. Ariz.), five AZ consumers are suing over the 20,000 gallon capacity cap.
Confusion about Indiana
July 27th, 2006
We have had a number of people ask about the direct shipping status in Indiana. Most will say something like “Indiana is now available for direct shipping”. Well, not really. Technically, Indiana passed House Bill 1016 in March, allowing for direct shipping. However, there are severe restrictions that effectively make Indiana prohibited. Wineries can theoretically obtain a $100 permit to direct ship into Indiana if they sell less than 500,000 gallons Indiana and the Indiana consumer makes an initial onsite visit to the winery and provides the following
(A) Name, telephone number, Indiana address, or consumer’s Indiana business address.
(B) Proof of age by a state issued driver’s license or state issued identification card showing the consumer to be at least twenty-one (21) years of age.
(C) A verified statement, made under penalties for perjury, that the consumer satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (1) through (3)
and the winery does not have a wholesaler in the state of Indiana and the winery pays excise, sales, and use taxes monthly and (this is the real kicker)
Sec. 14. A consumer may not receive more than two hundred sixteen (216) liters of wine in total from one (1) or more direct wine sellers in a calendar year.
So, if an Indiana consumer receives 24 cases in a calendar year from other wineries and you ship that consumer 1 bottle, you could be in violation of this rule. We are still awaiting the final rules from the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission. Needless to say, wineries are not shipping to Indiana and lawsuits are ongoing. In fact, FedEx and UPS will not ship there anyway.
Let’s hope Indiana figures out a way to make it less restrictive, especially regarding the 24 case per individual rule across all wineries. In the meantime, Indiana consumers are out of luck.
Legislation update
April 10th, 2006
There has been a flurry of wine legislation activity around the country recently…
Indiana: House Bill 1016 was approved by the Indiana House and Senate and awaits signature from the governor. This is one of the stranger bills out there to say the least. It allows for limited direct shipments from both in-state and out-of-state wineries if they get a $100 permit. However, lawmakers inserted a previous visit requirement that says an initial onsite visit to the winery must be made before consumers can make offsite purchases. There is also a requirement that each consumer is limited to 24 cases per year across all wineries. This is crazy. How will one winery know how much wine a consumer has received from other wineries?
Oklahoma: The Oklahoma Grape Growers and Wine Makers Association is pitted against the wholesalers in a battler where the two sides seem too far apart. Although President Gary Butler proclaimed that both House and Senate versions of direct shipping legislation died on the floor, the OGGWMA continues to fight for direct to consumer shipments through lawsuits and public relations campaigns.
Louisiana: Two separate bills are under consideration in the LA House to allow for the direct shipment of wine. The wholesalers are putting up a good fight as usual and of the options would create a small farm winery exception where wineries that produce less than 2,000 cases only could ship directly to consumers. This would merely create an “incubation period” where small wineries could get off the ground before being forced to use distributors.
Kentucky: Compromise legislation passed the House and is expected to pass the Senate that would allow direct shipments from in-state or out-of-state small farm wineries for onsite sales only.
Maine: Two proposed bills and a lawsuit to lift the current ban on direct shipments have muddied the waters significantly in Maine. Resolution seems pretty distant at this point.
Florida: Florida is currently open to shipments, but on the “honor system” until permanent legislation is passed. A couple of different bills are on the table that would allow for direct shipments with restrictions. Florida consumers and wineries are pushing SB 282, which does not include a “capacity cap” that would prevent wineries that produce more than 250,000 gallons from shipping directly to consumers.
Indiana bill passes House and Senate, awaits Governor’s signature
March 15th, 2006
A legislative compromise in Indiana passed the House on Monday and the Senate on Tuesday and now heads to the Governor for final approval and signature. The Senate approved the legislation only after the group of 9 wineries that sued the Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission agreed to drop their lawsuit.
Although it is fantastic that another prohibited state is moving to a limited direct model and opening to direct shipments, restrictions in Indiana HB 1016 will significantly limit the flow of wine shipments into Indiana. Similar to the current legislation in Colorado, HB 1016 requires an initial onsite visit to the winery by a consumer before wine can be shipped to the consumer directly via offsite sales. Colorado will likely remove this previous visit requirement when new legislation is finalized.
Other restrictions in the new legislation include a $100 permit requirement, a 3,000 case per year aggregate volume limit, and a two case per month volume limit per customer.
Read more here and here.
Indiana wineries reach compromise… but Senator kills wine bill
February 25th, 2006
Shortly after a compromise was reached in Indiana that would allow direct shipments with a 24 case per year limit per individual and a 1,000 case limit per winery, Senate President Pro Tempore Robert D. Garton sent the bill to the Senate Rules Committee, which is considered a “graveyard for legislation”.
Instead of helping to shape a compromise that would benefit all parties, Garton pushed the decision back on the courts:
We are not the judicial branch of government,” said Garton, R-Columbus. “It will not be considered further by the Senate this year.
Are you kidding? This guy must be in the pocket of the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of Indiana
Read more here.
Indiana wholesalers attempt to buy the vote
January 15th, 2006
The Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Indiana Political Action Committee gave over $180,000 between 2000 and 2004 to Indiana politicians and candidates. The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette explains why there is no wonder that favorable legislation was introduced there. It is no secret that the wine wholesalers and distributors wield tremendous power in every state. Michigan wholesalers spent $238,000 in their wine shipping battle and also let Michigan lawmakers “use their party room to raise another $440,000″.
Opposing legislation to be introduced in Indiana next month
December 10th, 2005
When the Indiana General Assembly reconvenes next month, at least two bills will be introduced that address the issue of wine direct shipping. As is usually the case, one bill would allow direct shipments from both in-state and out-of-state wineries and one bill would prohibit direct shipments.
Indiana (and Kentucky) wine law challenged
November 18th, 2005
Nine Indiana wineries push the courts to allow in-state shipments of wine. Add Kentucky and Indiana to the list of states that will revisit their legislation in 2006.
