Before jumping into a direct shipping program in a new state, wineries should consider their current prospect list, market potential, shipping difficulty and costs. When it comes to calculating start-up costs to enter a new state, there is often more than meets the eye. In addition to license fees, wineries may need to budget for a number of “hidden” fees including bonds, label registration fees and other application fees.

Bonds

Some states require wineries to obtain a bond in order to secure a direct shipping license. A bond is a written guaranty, purchased from a bonding company (usually an insurance firm or a surety company), to guarantee that all taxes due will be paid to the state. If there is a failure to pay, the bonding company will make good up to the amount of the bond.

Bonds for direct shippers range from $500-$1500 depending on the state, but premiums, or out-of-pocket costs, to wineries typically average around 10% of the total bond price, or $50-$180 out-of-pocket on an annual or biannual basis. Different bonding agents may quote different rates, so it pays to shop around.

Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Texas and Wisconsin all require that wineries secure a bond before submitting your license application. For wineries that ship 40,000 gallons or more annually, Oregon issues a bond document after the license application has been received but before the license is issued. Wineries that ship less than 40,000 gallons to Oregon annually can apply for a bond wavier.

Label Registration

Several states require brand or label registrations for direct shipping. Ohio, a state that 26% of direct shippers have in their program, requires wineries to register all the labels that will be shipped into the state for a one-time registration fee of $50 per label.

If that sounds pricey to you, consider Connecticut who charges $200 per label and requires labels to be re-registered every 3 years if they are still actively shipped into the state.

Georgia, Michigan, New York, North Carolina and Virginia do not charge a fee though label or brand registration is required in these states.

Application Fees

Some states may require business, Secretary of State or tax registration, or other one-time application fees. This varies from state to state and depends on how your business is structured. Wineries that start shipping to Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia or Wisconsin may encounter one or more of these fees.

License, bond, label registration and application fees all factor into the true break-even costs of shipping to a new state. The key to ensuring a profitable direct shipping program is to research thoroughly in order to avoid getting caught off-guard with unexpected costs.

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The latest version of “Notes on Wine Distribution”, by R. Corbin Houchins, is now available. Release 32 includes updates on legislation, litigation and general discussions on available distribution channels for wine. This release includes substantial changes, including new sections on age and identity, facial neutrality, and logistical support services, as well as updates to state summaries in Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Read about these and other updates that affect the way wine is sold and shipped within the United States.

If you are at all interested in the shipping and distribution of wine, this is an excellent resource that is well worth reading.  You can view the most recent version of the document anytime by visiting the ShipCompliant Blog and clicking the link located under “Compliance Resources”, or by visiting CorbinCounsel.com and clicking on the home page link, “Notes on Wine Distribution.”

Click Here to View NWD Release 32

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On January 26th, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ended the puzzling status of interstate retailing in Texas created by the lower court’s decision in Siesta Village Market. The district court had ruled that out-of-state retailers had a Commerce Clause right to sell wine to Texas consumers, but only wine that had been purchased from a Texas-licensed wholesaler.

The decision is another example of uncertainties resulting from the principal unresolved Granholm question: How does one reconcile the location-neutrality principle with the infamous North Dakota dictum to the effect that states may discriminate against out-of-state wholesalers? The Fifth Circuit’s answer, like that of the Second Circuit, is that Granholm extended Commerce Clause protection to wineries, but not to wholesalers or retailers, because national markets in the lower tiers would make it impossible for a state to protect the “traditional three-tier system.” As the Court of Appeals judge said about setting aside fundamental economic policy embodied in the dormant Commerce Clause to follow a judicial aside that was not part of the Granholm holding, “That language may be dicta. If so, it is compelling dicta.”

Post-Granholm litigation shows clearly enough that judges, though not bound to follow dicta, will elevate it to persuasive precedent when it coincides with their value systems. The values question is whether states’ asserted 21st Amendment right to maintain a privileged middle tier trumps the Commerce Clause policy against differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests. All one can say at this point is, “to be continued.”

by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com

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New rules in Texas should benefit Lone Star consumers, and also make life a little easier for wineries. On June 19th, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law HB 1084, which will take effect on September 1st, 2009. Under the new rules, three different volume limits replace the existing set of two limits for licensed shippers.

Currently, licensees may ship up to three gallons of wine within “any 30-day period”. This rule was perhaps the most difficult, and most commonly violated rule in a compliance check out of all state limitations. First, three gallons translates to just over 15 standard 750 mL bottles, whereas most states stick to a standard case or two-case limit. More importantly, the “rolling” 30-day period was very problematic to track for wineries that did not use an automated compliance solution. The majority of state volume limits are tracked on a calendar (month or year) basis, but this effectively created 365 different 30 day periods to track.

The new bill establishes three different volume limits for direct shipments to Texas:

1. No more than nine gallons (46 bottles)  to the same consumer within any calendar month
2. No more than 36 gallons (181 bottles) to the same consumer within any 12-month period
3. No more than 35,000 gallons (14,721 cases) to  all Texas consumers annually

Although some coverage of the changes has highlighted a “tripling” of the volume limit (from 3 gallons to 9 gallons), the annual consumer limit actually stays the same at 36 gallons. According to the House Research Organization’s bill analysis,

Increasing from three to nine gallons the maximum amount of shipments to the same consumer within a month would acknowledge the unique seasonal requirements of wineries as well as the realities of Texas summers. Wine is a perishable product that spoils at temperatures above 75 degrees Fahrenheit, so many out-of-state wineries are reluctant to ship to Texas, especially during July and August.

CSHB 1084 would not increase the overall amount of wine that a winery or out-of-state shipper could ship to the same consumer per year. In fact, it would codify in statute the current limit of 36 gallons per year, which is based on the existing restriction of no more than three gallons per month. It simply would allow wineries to ship somewhat larger quantities of wine to Texas consumers during the cooler seasons of the year.

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Wineries applying for a Texas Direct Wine Shipper’s Permit or renewing their existing permit must now pay a surcharge of $160 in addition to the $75 annual permit fee. Currently the Direct Shipper’s permit is renewed annually. However, beginning January 1, 2009 all Direct Shipper licenses will be valid for two years. Applicants will have to pay license fees and surcharges for 2 years totaling $470 when applying for a permit in 2009. The Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission added significant surcharges to a wide range of licenses affecting both in-state and out-of-state applicants.

Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute

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As was reported earlier this week, the Texas C-240 Direct Shipper’s Report will change from a monthly to a quarterly return for orders shipped after September 1st. However, we’ve received a number of questions about how to report shipments for the month of August.

August is the last month that will require a monthly return, which will report shipments to Texas consumers only for the month of August. This report is due September 15th, and should include tracking numbers for each shipment. The newly updated quarterly frequency will commence on September 1, 2008, including orders shipped from September through November, and is due December 15th. Also, please note that the new quarterly frequency is based on Texas’ fiscal year (beginning September 1st), not on the familiar calendar year (beginning January 1st), therefore the quarterly reports will be due on the following schedule: December 15th, 2008; March 15th, 2009; June 15th, 2009; etc.

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On September 1, 2008 Texas will begin requiring direct shipping reports to be submitted on a quarterly basis. Reports will be due within 15 days of the completion of every 3 month quarter. Currently, direct shippers must file a report and pay taxes every month. The new report will no longer require direct shippers to report the common carrier tracking number for each shipment, the name of the common carrier will be sufficient.

All permit holders have been mailed a copy of the Quarterly Direct Shipper’s Report by the Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission and the form will soon be available on the TABC and Wine Institute website. The last monthly reporting period is August 2008. Shipments sent on or after September 1, 2008 should be included in the quarterly report.

Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute

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Tracy Genesen of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP is one of the prominent forces currently driving legal change in the wine industry and was the keynote speaker at ShipCompliant’s 2008 Users Conference a few weeks ago.

Genesen’s speech analogized her role in the industry to a “court of last resort” when legislative means are unsuccessful in remedying protectionist state laws that have remained in effect despite the Granholm ruling in 2005. Granholm resolved many instances of differential treatment by the states and was extended to apply to self-distribution in the Costco ruling. However, Genesen revealed that the post-Granholm time of prosperity has given way to another host of problems. For example, states like Maine and Arkansas, in which direct shipping markets do not exist, have level playing fields; however, treating everyone the same by not allowing anyone to ship is a detriment to the wine industry. In addition, courts are struggling to deal with retail-to-consumer shipping laws in many states. Challenges to these laws have produced interesting results, like the “funky remedy” by a district court judge in a Texas lawsuit which declared that Granholm applied to retailers, but that retailers must first buy wine through Texas-licensed wholesalers. Wholesalers have also maintained their grip on states like Massachusetts by crafting legislation that is beneficial to them but also facially neutral. The 30,000 gallon capacity cap in Massachusetts exemplifies such economic protectionism and is the contention in the Family Winemakers of California case. Oral arguments in the case took place on July 29^th in Boston and the decision is expected sometime this fall.

Many thanks to Tracy Genesen for sharing her insights into the current legal atmosphere of the industry. To view Genesen’s speech in its entirety or that of any of the other speakers at the conference, please see the 2008 Users Conference Simulcast. More information on the cases in Massachusetts and Texas is also available on the ShipCompliant Blog.

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On January 14, 2008, a district court in Texas rendered a mostly pro-trade decision in Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Perry that clarified much, but danced around the hottest issue, leaving the final veil in place.

The case upholds the basic Specialty Wine Retailers contention that a state that allows its retailers to deliver to consumers must permit direct shipment by out-of-state retailers. It also has some important things to say about the meaning of Granholm’s less pellucid passages. In particular, it attempts to deal with the most significant internal tension of the Granholm majority opinion, viz., the difficulty of squaring the holding of the opinion, that states cannot require out-of-state wineries to become residents as a condition to reaching local markets, with a dictum-within-a-dictum quoted from a 1990 Supreme Court case, North Dakota v. United States, to the effect that the 21st Amendment empowers states “to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler.” (For an explanation of the difference between holdings and dicta, see the blog post, Discrimination Against Out-of-State Retailers After Granholm).

The Siesta Village decision and its implications merit further discussion, in particular on the following points:

1. Texas had a “citizenship” requirement of at least a year’s residence in the state for most licenses. It had already been declared unconstitutional when applied to newly arriving wholesalers with physical premises within the state. Siesta Village goes farther by analyzing the statute as a location requirement and holding it unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds, to the extent it prevented issuance of the requisite retailing licenses to out-of-state retailers.

2. The Siesta Village judge takes Granholm as a location parity case, and his opinion is explicit that physical presence requirements “plainly discriminate against interstate commerce.” However, like every analyst of Granholm, he had to deal with a key question posed by the quotation from North Dakota, noted above: If a state has the right to require all wine to “be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler,” how does one give effect to the Commerce Clause policy against location discrimination? One way of resolving the issue is to require the state to accept methods of consummating the purchase requirement that do not substantially burden interstate commerce relative to local, such as running the sale through the local middle tier without requiring the wine to take an economically disadvantageous logistical path when sold by an out-of-state retailer. Another is to declare that the quotation is dicta and therefore not binding in applying the Granholm holding to a different chain of distribution where its effect on commerce is more problematic –rather too bold a departure to expect in a district court opinion. In the event, the judge simply let the contradiction lie, holding that the retailers have to comply with Texas laws requiring a state retail license and purchase from a Texas-licensed wholesaler, a deferral that has been described as a ticket to the next round of litigation. Meanwhile, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has informally commented that it is not their problem.

3. Experts disagree on the extent to which Granholm was a “weak record case” that could have gone the other way had the states made a better showing of regulatory problems, for example in tax collection and averting deliveries to underage recipients. Siesta Village takes the opposite view, and granted summary judgment, which means the court decided Texas failed to show substantial likelihood that, if it were afforded a full hearing, it would present evidence on which a judgment in its favor could be based. To win in a direct discrimination case a state would have to show there is no reasonable alternative to discrimination for achieving legitimate regulatory objectives. The court reads Granholm to say that the availability of licensing and modern communications makes such an argument inherently implausible, and comes close to saying a state can never prevail on the proposition that interstate delivery is more likely to cause underage drinking than intrastate delivery.

4. Another point of controversy among lawyers is whether the Commerce Clause is indifferent to whether a court cures discrimination by leveling up or down. Siesta Village takes the side of those who argue that it makes no sense to level down in enforcing a constitutional provision intended to encourage interstate trade, at least in the absence of a clear legislative statement requiring termination of in-state privileges in case of invalidity of interstate prohibition. In constitutional law terms, the Siesta Village judge may have discovered a penumbra to the Commerce Clause that would prevent courts from taking such simplistic approaches as counting the number of lines of statutory text that would have to be rewritten and picking the smaller revision.

5. Although Siesta Village rejected the wholesalers’ strange argument that the discrimination arose not from Texas’s intent, but from the happenstance of the plaintiffs’ locations, it indulged in dicta indicating states can adopt on-site-only laws, in which case the “accident of geography,” and not state discrimination, would be responsible for excluding remote sellers. It appeared to accept the reasoning that because there is no “direct shipment market” in those states, the remote sellers are not excluded from anything by the prohibition, which is arguably a flawed argument under the Commerce Clause, whose policy extends to disproportionate burden as well as overt discrimination.

Appeals seem likely. Meanwhile, the parties in Knightsbridge Wine Shoppe, LTD v. Jolly, who agreed to extend Granholm, at least temporarily, to non-producing retailers selling to California consumers, will presumably take up their cudgels on application of the Siesta Village analysis, versus that of the New York case, Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle on September 9, 2007. In Arnold’s Wines, the New York federal district court dismissed a retailer suit without an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that the state had a 21st Amendment right to require all sales to go through an in-state wholesaler, a proposition suggested by the vexing dictum in the Granholm opinion.

The Arnold’s Wines decision seems to miss Granholm’s point that a state may have the right to require all wine to go through three tiers, but does not have the right to apply its rule with location discrimination unless it provides evidence that its discrimination against interstate sellers is required by a legitimate state objective that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means. The Siesta Village judge expressly declined to follow Arnold’s Wines, which it plausibly characterized as putting the 21st Amendment above the Commerce Clause, precisely what Granholm forbids.

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Judge Sidney Fitzwater of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas handed down a very important decision on Monday. In the Siesta Village Market Opinion, Judge Fitzwater said the following

The court concludes that Texas’ ban on the sale and shipment of wine by out-of-state retailers to Texas residents is unconstitutional, but it also holds that the requirement that wine retailers——including out-of-state retailers——first purchase such wine from Texas-licensed wholesalers is constitutional.

We’ll have much more to say about this case in the future, but this opinion is important because, for the first time, Judge Fitzwater said effectively that the principals of Granholm v. Heald should apply not only to wine producers, but also to wine retailers. In other words, just as Texas must treat in-state and out-of-state wineries evenhandedly, it must also treat in-state and out-of-state retailers evenhandedly. The following sentence in the opinion highlights this claim.

Because the retailer-plaintiffs and in-state wine retailers are engaged in the same business——the sale of wine to retail consumers——and seek access to the same market——Texas consumers——they are potential competitors and are therefore similarly situated for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis.

Unfortunately for retailers, the good news also came with a new twist. The decision upheld the constitutionality of the Texas requirement that both in-state and out-of-state retailers that wish to ship to Texas consumers first purchase the wine from a wholesaler licensed in the state of Texas. A California wine retailer, therefore, must first purchase wine from a licensed Texas wholesaler before shipping it to Texas consumers. Tom Wark, Executive Director of the Specialty Wine Retailers Association, had the following to say about the new twist.

Not only is it illegal under California law and other state’s law, but I believe it’s illegal under Texas law, Wark said. We won on everything but there’s that little unfortunate part the judge got wrong. I feel sorry for Lou Bright (who heads the Texas ABC). How is he going to implement this?

Prior to this decision, the parties had agreed to a preliminary injunction that allowed out-of-state retailers to ship wine into Texas without a permit. We’ll now wait for administrative guidance from the Texas ABC. In parallel, the decision will likely be appealed.

Click here to read the full Siesta Market Opinion

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